Performance measurement in local government: organisational control in political institutions by Johnsen, Åge
 Performance Measurement in Local Government 
 





Dissertation submitted to the  
Department of Strategy and Management at the 
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration 




Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration 








  3 
 
 





Preface ............................................................................................................................. 8 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... 11 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 15 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 17 
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM IN ORGANISATIONAL CONTROL............................................. 20 
THIS THESIS’ POSITION ................................................................................................. 23 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND CONTRIBUTION................................................................... 25 
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS............................................................................................ 29 
2 Theoretical framework.............................................................................................. 31 
ECONOMICS OF ORGANISATION AND POSITIVE THEORY OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS .... 31 
Public choice .......................................................................................................... 32 
Agency theory......................................................................................................... 34 
Organisation ecology.............................................................................................. 35 
Contingency theory................................................................................................. 36 
Organisational learning........................................................................................... 37 
The resource dependence perspective .................................................................... 38 
ORGANISATIONAL CONTROL IN THE CONTEXT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT....................... 39 
Public authority....................................................................................................... 40 
Political uncertainty and protective structures........................................................ 41 
Political compromise .............................................................................................. 42 
Public organisation effectiveness ........................................................................... 45 
Property rights ........................................................................................................ 45 
Transparency........................................................................................................... 46 
SUMMARY ................................................................................................................... 47 
3 Literature review ....................................................................................................... 48 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.......................................................................................... 50 
DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................. 53 
Benefits of performance measurement ................................................................... 53 
Instrumentalism .................................................................................................. 53 
Institutionalism ................................................................................................... 59 
Politics ................................................................................................................ 60 
Obstacles to performance measurement ................................................................. 60 
Implementation................................................................................................... 61 
Use ...................................................................................................................... 62 
Effects................................................................................................................. 64 
CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................. 65 
  4 
4 Hypotheses.................................................................................................................. 68 
THREE PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANISATIONAL CONTROL................................................. 69 
An instrumental model ........................................................................................... 71 
Asymmetric information..................................................................................... 71 
Slack ................................................................................................................... 73 
An institutionalist model ........................................................................................ 74 
Uncertainty ......................................................................................................... 75 
Ambiguity........................................................................................................... 77 
A political model .................................................................................................... 78 
Management competence ................................................................................... 78 
Political power.................................................................................................... 79 
Interest groups .................................................................................................... 80 
Resource dependence.......................................................................................... 82 
DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................. 82 
Truth ....................................................................................................................... 82 
Beauty..................................................................................................................... 83 
Simplicity............................................................................................................ 83 
Fertility ............................................................................................................... 85 
Surprise............................................................................................................... 86 
Justice ..................................................................................................................... 86 
SUMMARY ................................................................................................................... 87 
5 Method........................................................................................................................ 88 
RESEARCH DESIGN....................................................................................................... 88 
Setting..................................................................................................................... 89 
Population............................................................................................................... 90 
CONTENT ANALYSIS AND THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE .................................................. 91 
Municipal annual reports ........................................................................................ 91 
Classifications and frequencies .............................................................................. 93 
Normality and transformations ............................................................................... 98 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES............................................................................................ 99 
Asymmetric information......................................................................................... 99 
Slack ..................................................................................................................... 100 
Uncertainty ........................................................................................................... 102 
Ambiguity............................................................................................................. 103 
Power.................................................................................................................... 104 
Data sources.......................................................................................................... 106 
DATA ANALYSIS......................................................................................................... 107 
Modified regression analysis ................................................................................ 108 
Applications of significance tests ......................................................................... 109 
LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS ............................................................................. 111 
SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. 112 
6 Results....................................................................................................................... 115 
DESCRIPTION OF THE POPULATION ............................................................................. 115 
ESTIMATION OF THE MODELS ..................................................................................... 121 
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT ............................. 124 
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND SLACK ................................................................... 126 
SLACK AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT ............................................................... 126 
UNCERTAINTY AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT................................................... 126 
AMBIGUITY AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT ....................................................... 129 
  5 
POWER AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT .............................................................. 130 
CASE STUDY OF MUNICIPALITIES WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST USE OF PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT .......................................................................................................... 132 
CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................ 134 
7 Discussion ................................................................................................................. 137 
OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS............................................................................................. 137 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT ORGANISATION THEORY ............................................... 141 
The relevance of agency theory for political institutions...................................... 143 
The relevance of organisational learning for contingency theory......................... 146 
The relevance of politics for public management theory ..................................... 148 
Instrumentalism, symbolism and isomorphism .................................................... 151 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRACTICE .................................. 153 
TWO THOUGHTS IN THE CLOSING ............................................................................... 154 
References.................................................................................................................... 156 
Index ............................................................................................................................ 167 
 
  6 
 
 





Figure 1. A conventional wisdom management control framework.................................... 20 
Figure 2. Research theme..................................................................................................... 22 
Figure 3. A multi-theory perspective on public sector performance measurement ............. 50 
Figure 4. A conceptual model of public sector organisational use of performance 
measurement.................................................................................................................. 70 
Figure 5. A tree model of the performance measurement index and the MBO measure..... 96 
 
  7 
 
 





Table 1. General government total outlays as % of nominal GDP ...................................... 26 
Table 2. Empirical studies of public sector performance measurement .............................. 54 
Table 3. Benefits of using performance measurement......................................................... 59 
Table 4. Obstacles to using performance measurement....................................................... 61 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics ............................................................................................ 117 
Table 6. Spearman’s (rho) rank correlation coefficients.................................................... 120 
Table 7. Multiple regression analysis of square root of performance measurement.......... 125 
Table 8. Performance measurement and MBO by uncertainty and services...................... 127 
Table 9. Municipal control models by size and decentralisation....................................... 128 
Table 10. Municipalities ranked highest and lowest on performance measurement ......... 131 
 








This thesis is an enquiry into organisational control in political institutions. I have 
sought to choose the simplest methods available in this thesis, both due to my own 
limited capability, and because of priorities in this project regarding emphasis and time 
constraints. I have judged the potential for a modest contribution from my project to the 
ongoing scientific debate in organisation theory to be related to relatively simple, but 
basic questions in organisational control. Specifically, I have questioned some issues 
which in my point of view to a large extent and undeservedly have been taken for 
granted. These taken-for-granted notions are what I in this thesis have called the 
conventional wisdom in management control.  
My interest in the conventional wisdom in management control stems from several 
sources. I have during brief periods of time worked in municipalities, on one occasion as 
the chief financial executive in a small municipality. I have also as a researcher during 
several years had the pleasure and opportunity to participate in performance 
measurement development projects in the Norwegian local government, resembling 
both action research and management consulting. These projects and networks have 
given me a rich prior knowledge to the present project, both with regard to internal 
politics in the local authorities, as well as between central and local government and 
various interest groups. This background has also given me first hand and sometimes 
also an ‘insiders’ experience with these performance measurement issues. However, I 
have wanted to avoid a potential pitfall due to possible claims of vested interests or 
advocacy roles in some of the experiences from the Scandinavian local government 
which I personally have participated in, which otherwise could have been put forward 
for instance by doing in-depth case studies. 
From my undergraduate studies in public administration, graduate studies in business 
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management, postgraduate studies in management, and my own lecturing, I have noticed 
that what is taught in lectures and written in textbooks, are sometimes only loosely 
coupled with management practice. Furthermore, the academic life is often governed by 
strong traditions and the invisible boundaries between the disciplines but which 
nevertheless study identical phenomena. Maybe I have an educational background and a 
work experience, albeit limited, which nevertheless could have provided the relevant 
training and practice to study such multi-disciplinary phenomena as organisational 
control which otherwise could be ill-defined by studies within one discipline only. In 
order to focus this thesis I have deliberately tried to use standard, classical organisation 
theory as frame of reference and written with other students of organisation theory as 
intended audience. However, this audience is both fragmented and ill-defined. A more 
precise notion of the intended audience could rather be fellow students of organisational 
control. This community is not only comprised of scholars and researchers working in 
universities and business schools in the traditionally sense, but is maybe as least as 
much populated by management consultants, evaluators, managers, accountants and 
auditors.  
In organisation theory there are several research traditions to draw from. Given that 
such labels provide any meaning, in this thesis I have tried to pursue an Anglo-
American ‘positivist’ research tradition within the organisation theory, rather than a 
Scandinavian relatively case oriented research tradition, or a Continental, often either a 
critical or a postmodernist, research tradition. There is now an extensive, disperse and 
growing literature on performance measurement. In order to simplify the 
communication with the heterogeneous organisation theory community, I have tried to 
the largest extent possible to employ standard, international, scientific literature. I have 
therefore laid relatively much effort in trying to build on the existing literature and profit 
from the previous reported experiences from colleagues. With the above considerations 
in mind, I have also sought to write a short thesis. However, there evidently has been a 
bias towards using only English literature in this thesis. Regarding contributions 
published in the Scandinavian languages, I have discussed certain topics and published 
these papers in some of the Scandinavian management and political science journals. 
However, regarding contributions made in other languages than in English or 
Scandinavian, my limited language skills have restrained me both from reviewing, and 
from profiting from this literature. I have judged the above sketched approach regarding 
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my project as providing the best potential for establishing new insights and providing a 
modest contribution to our understanding of organisational control.  
 




In this version I have reformatted the thesis to page size A4 with one and a half line 
spacing. I have also corrected some typos. 
 
Oslo, 13 February 2007 
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This thesis deals with how asymmetric information and uncertainty affect performance 
measurement in local government organisational control. Performance measurement 
was found to be extensively studied in the classics of organisation theory, especially in 
conjunction with organisational learning. However, conventional wisdom predicts that 
with uncertain and ambiguous contingencies, organisations will use budget control, clan 
control or political control. Other use of formal control structures will largely be 
symbolic and decoupled from internal actions. Public choice, agency theory and the 
resource dependence perspective have in this thesis been suggested as a core of a 
performance measurement research programme. Experiences with performance 
measurement actually used in the public sector in the 1980s and 1990s, as documented 
in 24 studies reported in scholarly journals, were systematically reviewed, and 10 
hypotheses were formulated. Prior performance measurement indexes reported in the 
literature were in the present study modified to also incorporate verbal conclusions in 
addition to numerical performance indicators. Data from 162 Norwegian municipal 
annual reports was then collected by content analysis and analysed with difference 
between means in crosstabulations, multiple regression, and by a simple case study. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, performance measurement was found to be 
extensively used and particularly under asymmetric information and uncertainty. 
Implications of the findings point to the need to utilise agency theory, classical 
contingency theory and the resource dependence perspective more in public 
management theory.  
 









This thesis addresses organisational control in political institutions. The research theme, 
organisational control, is virtually concerned by the entire organisation theory literature. 
Organisational control is defined as a theory which specifies the differences between 
executive choice in an organisation and the decisions actually implemented (Cyert and 
March, 1963/1992). Control has also been defined as any process in which a person or 
group of persons or organisations determines or intentionally affects the behaviour of 
another person, group, or organisation (Tannenbaum, 1968). Organisational control 
comes from the knowledge that someone who matters to somebody in an organisation 
pays close attention to what is going on and tells the latter if the behaviour is appropriate 
or inappropriate (Pfeffer, 1997). Organisational control processes encompass 
recruitment and selection, training and socialization, organisational design as 
decentralization, leadership, planning and implementation, accounting and auditing, use 
of incentives, and monitoring and evaluations. The institutions of a society are defined 
as the rules specifying the roles that particular persons will assume in relation to one 
another under certain circumstances (Simon, 1947/1997). Theories of institutions deal 
with chief executives, legislatures, parties, and bureaucracies, and their interactions 
(Hammond, 1996). In this thesis I have studied performance measurement in local 
government as organisational control in political institutions.  
In the empirical public choice and public finance literature it is common to study 
local government as utility maximizing agents where the agents seek to influence the 
municipal welfare by decisions on municipal expenditure levels, user fees and budget 
deficit. The US approach relies on the median-voter model. This model assumes that 
organisational decisions reflect the demand of the median voter as political elections in 
the USA are performed as majority election of single representatives in each election 
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area. The European approach uses models where the local government is a unitary actor 
which maximizes a demand function (makes decisions) conditioned by socio-economic 
factors, electoral institutions, and local government institutions. The decision-making 
unit is typically a dominant political party or coalition of parties (Borge, Rattsø and 
Sørensen, 1995; Langørgen and Aaberge, 1997). 
The local government institutions are assumed to aggregate individual preferences 
into policy objectives that are implemented through the spending decisions. The main 
justification for local government is responsiveness. There are however four information 
problems which may reduce cost efficiency and allocative efficiency (and equity) in the 
optimization of the representatives’ preferences on behalf of the voters (Sørensen and 
Hagen, 1995). First, democratic government may include elements of paternalism. This 
may be legitimate when the voters have incomplete information. When the 
representatives have incomplete information regarding the voters’ preferences, this may 
pose a severe problem. However, Sørensen and Hagen (1995) found high a congruence 
between representatives’ and voters’ preferences. Second, imperfectly informed citizens 
may have problems controlling their representatives and the bureaucracy. Under this 
heading one may also include implementation problems as not all decisions are executed 
as they were intended to. Extensive empirical research has confirmed some of these 
theories’ claims (Blais and Dion, 1991). Third, reactive voting may punish or reward the 
representatives. However, this form of voter control may be difficult if crucial output 
measures are lacking, as for instance performance measurement. Furthermore, this lack 
of information may also pose severe problems to the representatives. Fourth, citizens 
may migrate to municipalities which provide services and taxes according to their 
preferences (Tiebout, 1956). This may enhance overall Tiebout efficiency and also 
facilitate the responsiveness of local government. For instance, Andersson and Carlsen 
(1997) studied Tiebout mobility in Norway and found only few effects of municipal 
services on municipal migration rates, albeit there are unresolved methodological 
problems in such analyses, for instance simultaneity in the regression models. However, 
decisions both to migrate, and to counter migration, are also made complicated when 
valid performance measures are lacking. Hence, performance measurement could be of 
high relevance in local government organisational control, although its relevance may 
vary between different countries.  
There is no coherent body of theory on performance measurement (e.g. Holloway, 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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Lewis and Mallory, 1995), but the organisation theory literature has used the term 
performance measurement at least since the 1950s (Ridgway, 1956). Public sector 
performance measurement has several labels differing between disciplines and 
perspectives. In public administration both review (Simon, 1947/1997), cost benefit 
analysis, policy analysis, programme analysis (Wildavsky, 1966, 1978) and evaluation 
are employed as characterizations. In contingency theory (Thompson, 1967) labels as 
search, surveillance and monitoring are used. In the resource dependence perspective 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) performance measurement is termed as benchmarking, 
environmental scanning, and monitoring. In agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
performance measurement, accounting and auditing are part of organisational 
monitoring, which has also been labeled metering (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). In 
public choice both oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984) and monitoring 
(Zimmerman, 1977; Bendor, Taylor and Gaalen, 1985, 1987) are used to denote 
performance measurement. Performance measurement seems to be a fundamental 
concept in several theories on organisational control. Moreover, monitoring and 
performance measurement is a central method in disciplines as in public sector financial 
accounting (Zimmerman, 1977), auditing (Baber, 1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983), 
and in evaluations (Chelimsky and Shadish, 1997). Within public sector auditing, 
performance measurement is extensively used in value for money (VFM) auditing, also 
termed comprehensive auditing (Power, 1997). Both within organisation theory and in 
the public sector management literature performance measurement is widely used and 
that term is also what I have employed in this thesis.  
Although organisation theory is not an old nor a coherent research programme 
(Donaldson, 1995), some contributions may nevertheless be distinguished as classical. It 
could be noted already at the onset that many of the seminal contributions to 
organisational control, e.g. Simon (1947/1997) on administrative behaviour, Cyert and 
March (1963/1992) on the behavioural theory of the firm, Thompson (1967) on 
contingency theory, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) on the resource dependence 
perspective, and Jensen and Meckling (1976) on agency theory, explicitly addressed 
performance measurement and the relevance of their works also for public sector 
organisations. Thus, the classical literature in organisation theory is permeated with 
issues on organisational control in political institutions, and also on performance 
measurement. However, it seems as much of the subsequent literature on public sector 
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management has neglected this aspect of the classical literature. I shall therefore now 
briefly recapitulate what is currently conventional wisdom in organisational control.  
 
 
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM IN ORGANISATIONAL CONTROL 
 
Contemporary conventional wisdom in organisational control, cf. figure 1, seems to be 
informed by contingency theory and new institutionalism developments in the 1970s 
(Wildavsky, 1986; Ouchi, 1979; Hofstede, 1981), and not on the classical contingency 
from the 1960s, i.e. Thompson (1967).  
 
  Uncertainty regarding means (output) 
 







Input (budget) control 
Expert control 




Trial and error control 
Output control 
ends (behaviour)  
High 
Behaviour control 







   
Figure 1. A conventional wisdom management control framework 
 
 
Wildavsky (1986) argued that the traditional budget negotiating processes of input 
control continued as the dominant model for organisational control despite more 
‘advanced’ management control models as planning, programming and budgeting 
systems (PPBS), and performance measurement. Large organisations are complex with 
many organisational levels, numerous line items in the budget, several outputs, and 
many stakeholders. As the traditional budgeting processes do not score highest judged 
one by one on all criteria a manager could put forward for a management control model, 
for instance simplicity and information about output, the traditional budgeting process 
still matches these criteria best in total. A large budget (in a large and complex 
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organisation) may therefore call for the use of the traditional budgeting (input control) 
processes rather than control models as performance measurement (output control).  
Ouchi (1979) asserted that the principal either monitors behaviour if output is 
uncertain, or the principal monitors output if behaviour is uncertain. However, in 
political institutions one may assume that both behaviour and output are uncertain 
simultaneously. According to the present conventional wisdom in contingency theory, 
organisations with uncertain contingencies will not employ instrumental control 
structures as performance measurement but rather use complexity reducing and conflict 
settling processes as traditional line item budgeting, or employ professionals in what is 
called clan control (Ouchi, 1979).  
Hofstede (1981) elaborated both Wildavsky’s (1986) and Ouchi’s (1979) arguments. 
Some new distinctions as expert, intuitive, judgmental, trial and error, and political 
control were introduced, but the basic neglect of performance measurement as a control 
instrument under contingencies of uncertainty and ambiguity was upheld. Nevertheless, 
performance measurement seems to have proliferated and been widely used in political 
institutions, at least in the 1980s and 1990s.  
An alternative explanation on organisational control structures to both agency theory 
and contingency theory comes from the historical, sociological perspective of new 
institutionalism. Here it is asserted that formal structures as performance measurement 
are used for legitimization. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that organisations and 
environments redefine the nature of techniques and output so that ambiguity is 
introduced and rights of inspection and control are lowered. A close alignment in 
institutionalized organisations would merely produce a record of inefficiency and 
inconsistency. Such organisations therefore decouple structure from activity. Hence, 
organisational control efforts, especially in highly institutionalized contexts, are 
devouted to ritual conformity, both internally and externally.  
Another branch of the new institutionalism has studied isomorphism. Isomorphism is 
defined as a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other 
units that face the same set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
The proposition put forward here is that organisations adapt to uncertainty by coercive, 
copying or imitating actions, employing organisational forms which other organisations 
in the organisational field have adpoted. Organisational field is defined as those 
organisations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional life: key 
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suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organisations 
that produce similar services and products. Thus, local government may be conceived of 
as an organisational field. Although there is no single characteristic which in itself is 
sufficient to define local government, some common charactersitics may at least 
describe ‘pure’ local government (Cole and Boyne, 1995): Jurisdiction over a 
substantially smaller area than the national government, election by popular vote, 
powers of taxation, and genuine discretion over service provision. Thus, what we 
understand as local government in one country may not be identical with local 








Figure 2. Research theme 
 
 
Three mechanisms are used to explain the processes of homogenisation. Coercive 
isomorphism stems from political influence, especially from the state, and the problem 
of legitimacy. Mimetic isomorphism is used to adapt to uncertainties by looking at 
other, presumed successful entities. Normative isomorphism is associated with 
professionalization. However, in all three mechanisms organisations are supposed to 
adopt formal structures far beyond a level where efficiency explanations solely prevail.  
In summary, the conventional wisdom in organisational control has well developed 
propositions. However, for the student of organisational control, the interesting part of 
this picture is that the three perspectives outlined above, agency theory, contingency 
theory and new institutionalism, all have divergent propositions and explanations, cf. 
figure 2. Agency theory states that performance measurement is used under asymmetric 
information and uncertainty. The classics in contingency theory state that complex 
organisations use performance measurement under uncertainty, both to reduce 
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uncertainty, and as legitimisation. The widespread conventional wisdom in contingency 
theory, however, state that under uncertainty complex organisations mainly reduce 
complexity by adopting budgeting or else employ professionals if there simultaneously 
is ambiguity. The symbolic perspective in new institutionalism state the same view as 
the conventional wisdom in contingency theory, but adds that formal structures as 
performance measurement may be used as symbols decoupled from the factual 
organisational control structures as budgeting or clan control. The isomorphism 
proposition is less concerned with symbolism than with coping with uncertainty. Thus, 
within new institutionalism the two propositions have dissimilar causal explanations on 
organisational control.  
 
 
THIS THESIS’ POSITION 
 
Monitoring (i.e. performance measurement) is used in many forms (Hammond, 1996). 
Politicians and managers can talk directly with subordinates in the bureacracies. 
Politicians and managers can utilise reports from constituents and interest groups. 
Politicians and managers can maintain a policy staff or employ academic experts or 
consultants to enhance their information processing capabilities. Politicians and 
managers can also observe the consequences when information and advice are relied and 
acted upon. Formal structures as performance measurement are assumed or designed to 
affect how organisations carry out its activities in several ways. First, individuals in the 
organisations must collect and process information in order to learn what problems the 
organisation should handle. This is the issue of effectiveness and equity. Second, the 
organisation must choose means, policies, technologies and actions, to handle these 
problems. This is the issue of efficiency and reliability. Third, the organisation must 
resolve the inevitable conflicts which arise in implementation of the policies. All these 
three issues involve bottom-up processes of information, advices and conflicts, and 
comparisons between different issues. Different organisational control structures as 
formalization, decentralization and reporting, can be expected to affect these 
comparions and thus the organisational outcome. According to this account, 
performance measurement is a complex organisational form and may be adapted to a 
variety of usages in complex organisations as in political institutions.  
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The proposition put forward in this thesis is that instrumental control structures as 
performance measurement are extensively used in political institutions and in particular 
in contingencies of uncertainty and ambiguity. Uncertainty in organisations stems both 
from lack of cause/effect understanding in the culture at large, contingency in which the 
outcomes of organisational action are in part determined by the actions of elements of 
the environment, and interdependence of internal components (Thompson, 1967). 
Political institutions may have extensive use of performance measurement because the 
principals, the organisational or political legitimate authorities, due to uncertainty, use 
several control models simultaneously in control of their agents and in dealing with the 
environment. Performance measurement may be employed when lobbying is costly or 
uncertain to constituencies and interest groups. Furthermore, performance measurement 
may also be performed in order to reduce uncertainty, address ambiguity, and enhance 
organisational effectiveness, equity and legitimacy in the longer run by organisational 
learning. Lastly, the agents use performance measurement in their internal competition 
for scarce resources. 
The proposition put forward in this thesis is at odds with the presently dominant 
conventional wisdom explanations of organisational control in contingency theory and 
the symbolic perspective of new institutionalism, as found in accounting. The 
contingency theory states that when uncertainty raises as an effect of task 
interdependence and complexity, instrumental control structures are outperformed by 
traditional budgeting processes. Traditional budgeting processes are assumed to deal 
with uncertainty and complexity more efficiently by focusing on financial input and line 
items, by settling conflicts by negotiating, and by incremental adjustments relative to 
prior year’s budgeting outcomes. Moreover, the proposition also challenges, or at least 
complement, the dominant symbolic perspective on organisational control in sociology 
and political science. New institutionalism explains use of control structures in 
institutionalized environments as predominantly ceremonies and rituals to symbolize 
rationality in order to enhance or sustain legitimacy and resources. Political institutions 
have typically been analyzed as subject to symbolic use of organisational control 
structures due to high degree of ambiguity and uncertainty resulting in inconsistency. It 
should be noted though that the new institutionalism perspective also has explanatory 
force in lesser institutionalized contexts as in business organisations.  
The proposition put forward in this thesis is congruent with the positive political 
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theory (PPT) of the economics of organisation (Moe, 1984, 1990, 1991) when this 
theory is applied to the context of local government. Furthermore, this perspective is to 
a large degree congruent with agency theory, classical contingency theory, 
organisational learning, the resource dependence perspective, and with the mimetic 
isomorphism proposition in the new institutionalism. The rest of this thesis is an 
account of how this conclusion has been arrived at. However, as applications of 
economic organisation theory to political institutions in local government hitherto only 
seldom have been undertaken, and moreover, as many fellow students of organisational 
control in accounting, economics, management, political science and sociology may be 
unfamiliar with the application of the economics of organisation to political institutions, 
a brief review of the positive political theory of institutions is presented in the 
theoretical framework in chapter 2.  
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
Scott (1995) gave three guidelines for future research in conclusions of his extensive 
review of institutionalism and organisations. His first recommendation was to conduct 
longitudinal studies of life events in institutions. This, however, presupposes that 
relevant research questions, concepts, variables and research instruments is or could be 
made readily available. This has not yet been the case in positive theory on performance 
measurement in political institutions. I have therefore not chosen a longitudinal study.  
Scott’s second recommendation was to focus on the relation between institutional 
and organisational processes, for instance by studies of institutional changes in ‘natural’ 
experiments. 
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Table 1. General government total outlays as % of nominal GDP 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 1999a 2000 a 
Australia – 31.4 31.4 36.5 34.8 36.2 35.0 33.6 33.3 
Austria 37.6 44.3 47.1 50.4 48.6 52.5 49.8 49.4 49.2 
Belgium 41.5 50.8 57.0 60.7 53.6 53.6 51.7 50.5 49.9 
Canada 34.1 39.2 39.6 46.0 46.7 46.5 42.6 41.8 41.2 
Czech Republic – – – – – 44.8 45.3 46.1 46.1 
Denmark – 47.1 55.0 58.0 56.0 58.8 56.4 53.8 52.5 
Finland 30.0 37.6 38.1 43.8 45.4 57.9 54.1 49.0 48.6 
France 38.5 43.4 46.1 52.1 49.8 54.3 54.2 53.9 53.5 
Germany 38.3 48.4 47.9 47.0 45.1 49.8 47.9 46.9 46.3 
Greece – 27.9 30.4 42.9 48.2 48.3 42.9 41.7 41.1 
Hungary – – – – – 49.2 45.0 40.7 40.9 
Iceland – – 32.5 35.7 39.3 39.0 36.7 35.9 35.5 
Ireland – – 48.2 51.0 39.0 37.6 34.7 32.8 32.1 
Italy 32.8 41.1 41.9 50.9 53.6 52.7 50.6 49.4 48.8 
Japan 19.0 26.8 32.0 31.6 31.3 35.6 35.2 38.4 39.1 
Korea – 17.1 19.3 17.6 18.0 20.5 21.9 25.7 25.7 
Luxembourg – – – – 13.4 13.2 13.2 12.8 12.7 
Mexico – – – – 17.2 17.7 15.5 13.9 13.5 
Netherlands 41.3 50.2 55.8 57.1 54.1 51.3 48.7 47.5 47.3 
New Zealand – – – – 48.8 38.8 38.5 41.4 40.4 
Norway 34.9 39.8 43.9 41.5 49.7 47.6 44.3 47.2 47.5 
Poland – – – – 60.8 49.3 46.8 44.7 43.7 
Portugal 19.5 28.0 23.2 40.2 40.6 44.6 43.9 43.7 44.1 
Spain 21.6 24.4 32.2 40.2 42.5 45.5 42.2 40.8 40.3 
Sweden 42.8 48.4 60.1 63.3 59.1 65.6 62.3 59.6 58.1 
Switzerland – – – – 41.0 47.5 48.8 49.2 49.3 
Turkey – – – – 27.9 26.5 24.3 23.9 25.2 
United Kingdom 37.2 44.8 43.4 44.4 41.8 44.4 41.0 40.3 40.6 
United States 30.0 32.8 31.4 32.9 32.8 32.8 31.6 31.2 31.1 
N 15 19 21 21 27 29 29 29 29 
Mean 33.3 38.1 40.8 44.9 42.2 43.5 41.6 40.9 40.6 
St.deviation 7.9 9.9 11.3 10.8 12.4 12.3 11.7 11.2 11.0 
Maximum 42.8 50.8 60.1 63.3 60.8 65.6 62.3 59.6 58.1 
Minimum 19.0 17.1 19.3 17.6 13.4 13.2 13.2 12.8 12.7 
Note. Source: Analytical Databank, OECD. 
General government outlays include: Expenditures of all levels of public authorities and its administration 
both at the central or federal, regional, and local levels, and social security funds; public services provided 
by the government on a non-market basis as public schools, hospitals and welfare services; non-profit 
institutions service provision on a non-market basis which are controlled by and mainly financed by the 
public authority; and social security funds imposed, controlled or financed by public authorities; but it 
does not include public enterprises. 
a Estimates and projections. Source: Economic Outlook No. 64, December 1998, OECD. 
 
 
Table 1 documents the relative size of the public sector in the OECD countries, 
measured as general government outlays as a percentage of nominal gross domestic 
product (GDP). General government total outlays increased in most countries from the 
1970s to the mid 1990s. However, in the 1990s many countries have decreased their 
public sector or are facing a decreasing public sector. Public sector attempts to apply, 
develop, and implement certain organisational forms could be regarded as organisational 
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control of political institutions in transition from a growth phase through the 1960s and 
1970s to a maturation and consolidation phase in the 1980s and 1990s. Performance 
measurement has been a core dimension in the reinventing government movement and 
in new public management (NPM) reforms throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Hood, 
1991, 1995; Thompson and Riccucci, 1998). In this respect the effects of performance 
measurement may be relevant to study. Performance measurement in political 
institutions is an utterly complex and ill-defined issue. Much of the agency theory 
research on monitoring has been on firms and in financial management. Furthermore, 
positive studies (Jensen, 1983) on the use of performance measurement in local 
government seem at present to be under-researched, and further studies therefore seem 
warranted. 
Scott’s third recommendation was to perform more comparative studies by 
developing and testing generalizations rather than explaining histories of complexities 
and uniqueness. This calls for theory-testing and correlational studies rather than theory-
development and explorative studies. In this thesis I have chosen to study central 
concepts and problems from the organisational control literature in a test of competing 
theories on organisational use of performance measurement, using a correlational 
research design.  
A central theory in the economics of organisation is agency theory. Agency theory is 
about organisational control under uncertainty in general. Common problems addressed 
in agency theory are the existence of asymmetric information, adverse selection and 
opportunism. Asymmetric information is a situation where some actors in a transaction 
process have better access to some information than other actors have, in short: Some 
actors know more than others. A parallel concept to asymmetric information is private 
information which is defined as information which is relevant to determine efficient 
allocations that is known to only some subset of the parties involved (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). Opportunism may be defined as self-interested behaviour unconstrained 
by morality (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Agency theory directs attention to the 
possibility that some agents could behave opportunistically and utilise asymmetric 
information, but not that every agent will do so. 
A special branch of agency theory which focuses on political institutions in 
particular, is public choice, which will be briefly reviewed in chapter 2 and 3. However, 
positive theory on bureaucracies and especially the politics of political institutions, have 
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largely been neglected (Moe, 1990; Williamson, 1990). This caracterization of the 
positive political theory research programme may be due to its recency (Fiorina, 1990). 
A normal development of a research programme is both to borrow concepts and 
methods from more established research programmes, and to start with the relatively 
easy and work towards the difficult. These features also chararectize this research 
programme. The borrowing from economics may have led to an over-emphasis on the 
economic research tradition. The borrowing from political science may have furthered 
an inclination to study legislatures. Positive theorists in the social choice tradition have 
largely studied legislation and election and American politics research has focused on 
the Congress. A theoretical development is easiest when it can stand on a solid 
foundation of empirical research. As the positive political theory of institutions is still a 
young research programme, its path-dependence on other researh programmes’ agendas 
may be outgrown through maturation. To achieve this, theories have to be matched with 
data in a systematic way, according to Fiorina (1990). This thesis is one such attempt.  
Despite the general nature of the economics of organisation, relatively few attempts 
had been made to employ this framework of analysis to public bureaucracy and to 
politics until the beginning of the 1990s. However, this verdict now seems to have been 
challenged especially in the public choice tradition by several economists and political 
scientists. This thesis is also a modest attempt to employ the economics of organisation 
to political institutions. However, this thesis prods along an organisation theory track.  
In this thesis I am searching for an enhanced understanding of how organisational 
control is used in political institutions. Specifically, my research question is how 
asymmetric information and uncertainty impinge upon performance measurement in 
political institutions. As these concepts have been extensively employed both in agency 
theory, contingency theory and in new institutionalism, and the explanations provided in 
these three accounts partly differ and partly contradicts each other, the research question 
is pursued by investigating how these three theoretical perspectives may contribute to 
explain organisational control in political institutions.  
Furthermore, this project may compare two competing perspectives on positive 
political theory and political institutions. As such it may test agency theory and public 
choice in the economic, rational perspective compared to the historical, sociological 
perspective. An application of economics of organisation to political institutions makes 
us able to compare its generalizability regarding organisational control in political 
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institutions versus a sociological explanation of symbolic use of organisational control 
structures in institutionalized environments. Such comparisons highlight different 
theories potential for generalizations and are in accordance with Scott’s (1995) 
recommendations. An answer to the research question may have contributions to several 
theories as agency theory, contingency theory, and to new institutionalism. Furthermore, 
an answer to this research question may contribute to the ongoing work in several 
disciplines as in accounting, strategy, organisation theory, political science and 
sociology, and in particular to public management.  
Thus, in brief, my overall research project is to question if conventional wisdom from 
contingency theory and the decoupling proposition of new institutionalism 
underperform in explaining organisational control, despite its widespread use in 
textbooks in for instance public sector accounting (Jones and Pendlebury, 1996) and in 
organisation theory (Hatch, 1997). A clear settling of these issues of how organisational 
control is used in political institutions, may provide a substantial contribution to 
organisation theory. However, such a contribution is beyond the capabilities of a single 
study or thesis. Cf. March and Olsen (1989, 1995) and Donaldson (1995) for three major 
contributions in this research programme. This thesis therefore is only a modest 
argument into this research programme. 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis is organized in seven chapters. In chapter 2 I explain the theoretical 
framework for the empirical investigation of organisational control in political 
institutions which I have undertaken in this thesis. 
Chapter 3 is a review of the public sector performance measurement literature and 
the rationale for my empirical study. Here I seek to identify a public sector performance 
measurement research programme and systematically review experiences with 
performance measurement actually used in political institutions. Public choice, agency 
theory and the resource dependence perspective are suggested as the core of a research 
programme. Drawing on 24 empirical studies reported in scholarly journals in the 1980s 
and 1990s, it is concluded that performance measurement is a very complex 
organisational form and permeated with politics. Neither the contingency theory 
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conventional wisdom, nor the new institutionalism decoupling proposition provided 
adequate explanations. However, the resource dependence perspective seems at present 
to be under-utilised in public management theory. 
Chapter 4 is based on the findings of the literature review in chapter 3. In this chapter 
I develop a conceptual model for explaining use of performance measurement in 
ambiguous and uncertain contingencies in political institutions. The chapter initially 
provides a summary of the literature review in chapter 3. The theoretical propositions 
discussed in chapter 4 offer alternative explanations to symbolic and ceremonial use of 
information. The result is 10 testable hypotheses revealing the complexity regarding use 
of performance measurement.  
Chapter 5 reports the research design employed in the empirical study. The chapter 
documents the choice of a cross-sectional, planned variation, population study research 
design, the selection of local government as setting, the measurement of the variables 
and the choice of data collection techniques and data sources, and motivates the choice 
of multiple regression as model estimation. While the conceptual model and hypotheses 
elaborated on in chapter 4 was a general model, the variables and data in chapter 5 are 
developed specifically for the research question pursued in this study.  
Chapter 6 first provides a description of the 162 Norwegian municipalities which 
have been chosen as the population of my study. The rest of the chapter presents the 
results of the data from the Norwegian local government in relation to the hypotheses 
formulated in chapter 4.  
Chapter 7 first provides an overview of the findings. As with all empirical research, 
there are also limitations and alternative explanations, and these are addressed and 
assessed. The chapter then goes on with a discussion of the results and identifies 
implications of the findings for current management theory. The chapter continues with 
some recommendations for future research, policy and practice. The thesis is rounded 
off with two thoughts in the closing.  









This chapter sketches a theoretical framework where positive theory of political 
institutions has been applied to local government. First a brief review of economics of 
organisation in political institutions is presented. Then organisational control in the 
context of local government is discussed.  
 
 
ECONOMICS OF ORGANISATION AND POSITIVE THEORY OF POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
With economics of organisation (economic organisation theories) it is here meant 
theories that seek to explain organisational performance and effectiveness. This notion 
of the economics of organisation then encompasses transaction cost analysis, public 
choice, agency theory, organisational ecology, contingency theory, organisational 
learning, and the resource dependendence perspective. Cf. for instance Cyert and March 
(1963/1992), Donaldson (1995) and Pfeffer (1997) for recent overviews and reviews of 
economics of organisation. See Rubin (1992) for a review of public choice and 
governmental accounting and auditing research. Some scholars also include population 
ecology in the economics of organisation, however, neither population ecology nor 
transaction cost analysis will be treated explicitly in this thesis.  
The positive theory on political institutions has been divided into two camps (Scott, 
1995): The economic, rational choice approach, and the historical, sociological 
approach. According to Moe (1990) the economic approach to positive political theory 
stands in sharp contrast to the sociological perspective. The economic, rational choice 
alternative is based upon microeconomics and public choice. As such it is individualistic 
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and explains organisations by individual preferences and strategies. Organisations are 
seen as rational simultaneously as individuals opt for their interests. The methodology of 
economics is aimed at reducing complexity, identify basic causal forces, and modelling 
organisational processes as parsimoniously and rigorously as possible.  
The historical, sociological stream of new institutionalism has had a strong standing 
in positive theory on political institutions since the 1970s. This stream of thought has 
influenced both organisation theory and political science. Core explanations are that 
organisational actions are not only rational instruments but also garbage can processes 
(Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972). Structures and decisions are not only chosen for their 
effectiveness but also for their potential for creating legitimacy by symbolizing the 
qualities that are valued (March and Olsen, 1989). Structures in political institutions are 
based on a logic of appropriateness reflecting conceptions of identities rather than based 
on political action driven by preferences and anticipated uncertain consequences (March 
and Olsen, 1995). This study will however emphasize the rational and political 




The first steps towards a positive political theory (PPT) of institutions, after the 
Weberian sociological theory of bureaucracy (Weber, 1947), were made by public 
choice economists in the 1960s before agency theory was launched (Moe, 1984). Public 
choice is defined as the economic study of non-market decision making, or simply as the 
application of economics to political science, and also as the economic analysis of 
political institutions (Mueller, 1989). The methodology applied in public choice is 
economics including assumptions of rational behaviour and utility maximization. Its 
basic assumption is rational, utility maximisers, often studied in conjunction with 
opportunism. The presence of opportunism in public sector organisations is a problem in 
several countries. Spain is plagued with notorious cases of inefficiency and corruption, 
and in the USA the Congress and the news media periodically bring financial 
mismanagement and scandals into attention (Olson, Guthrie and Humphrey, 1998). 
Thus, organisational control in political institutions is not only of academic interest.  
Economists had until the 1960s for the most part ignored the economic activity of 
bureaus and had not provided a positive theory of the supply of bureaus (Niskanen, 
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1971). As a remedy to this situation, Niskanen proposed the hypothesis that bureaucrats 
were budget-maximizers. Due to the bureaucrats’ asymmetric information on 
production, the bureaucrats could profit from their information advantage relative to the 
representatives and demand a larger budget and a bigger output than is socially 
desirable. Thus, the budget maximization hypothesis predicts a bigger supply and a 
larger public sector than is desirable judged by social welfare. Migué and Bélanger 
(1974), in an amendment to Niskanen’s (1971) budget-maximizing hypothesis, 
explained bureau (agency) behaviour as maximizing discretionary budget rather than the 
budget in itself. Niskanen modelled bureaus as expense centers where the budget was 
negotiated between the bureau and the sponsor. (In public choice the terms bureau and 
sponsor are often used instead of agent and principal, respectively.) The bureau provides 
most of its output to clients who do not have to pay for the services directly. The clients 
then may have no incentives to compare the cost of the services with the value provided. 
Furthermore, the bureau may obtain support from clients if the sponsor where to cut 
down on the budget. The bureau may also threat to cut in the most valued services rather 
in the marginal services in the budget negotiations.  
Not only the bureaus may shirk in the budget negotiations due to asymmetric 
information, also the sponsors may shirk and cooperate with the budget-maximizing 
bureaus. The representatives in the sponsoring committee may get increased support 
from their voters or constituencies by an increased or constant bureau output. Therefore 
the sponsor may also have preferences for a bigger bureau budget or output than is 
socially desirable. For instance, Zimmerman (1977) in his positive analysis of why 
municipal accounting in the 1970s was as it was and why attempts at reforms had so 
little impact, put forward that it was in the politicians’ best interest to present annual 
reports in a higly disorganised fashion in order to force special interest groups incur 
information processing costs. These shirking or opportunistic behaviour mechanisms 
may be present and result in a bigger bureau supply and hence larger public sector than 
is socially optimal. Niskanen’s budget-maximizing hypothesis did however not address 
the management processes internal to the bureaus or the political processes internal to 
representative government. Furthermore, there seems to have been an over-emphasis on 
explaining budgeting relative to other organisational systems and processes (Egeberg, 
1995), as for instance implementation and performance measurement (Jackson, 1990). 
As the subject in this study is not the demand and supply of public services itself, but 
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rather on how bureaucracies and political institutions governs the supply of services, I 





The (new) economics of organisation is a distinctive economic approach and can be 
characterized by three elements: A contractual perspective, a focus on hierarchical 
control, and analysis with principal–agent models (Moe, 1984). Core research issues in 
the economics of organisation have been rewarding, shirking and monitoring. Agency 
theory is commonly divided into two branches (Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989a; 
Baiman, 1990). The principal–agent theory branch of agency theory commonly employs 
formal models while the positive agency theory branch usually conducts more empirical 
studies. While much of the research and writings in agency theory has been about firms, 
the theoretical foundations are general in nature. The logic in agency theory is about 
those who have a legitimate right to control an organisation and those decision-makers 
who in fact make most of the important decisions (Moe, 1984). The economics of 
organisation has therefore centered on concepts as asymmetric information and 
uncertainty, why this may exist and what outcomes it may foster, and how unwanted 
consequences could be avoided or losses reduced. These relationships between 
principals and agents may be applicable both to for-profit organisations as for 
government and not-for-profit organisations. Organisations in which important decision 
agents do not necessarily bear a close share of the outcome of their decisions include 
both corporations, large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and non-profits 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). All of these types of organisations have therefore been 
deemed as relevant for agency theory analysis. 
In agency theory monitoring is used to denote measuring of output performance, 
apportioning rewards, observing input behaviour of inputs as means of detecting or 
estimating marginal productivity and giving assignments or instructions thereupon, 
including authority to terminate or rewise contracts (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). In 
agency relationships under uncertainty and asymmetric information, it could be rational 
both for the principal to monitor the agent, and for the agent to bond his or her 
expenditures, in order to minimize the residual (welfare) loss (Jensen and Meckling, 
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1976). The problem is that the sponsors or principals do not know the activities, efforts, 
output or slack in the organisation. On the other side, also the bureaucrats or agents do 
not necessarily always know who the ruling coalition is, its preferences or its resources, 
or the ‘true’ prices of the bureau. Monitoring has been defined as measurement of the 
performance of decision agents and implementation of rewards. Implementation is 
defined as execution of ratified decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus, performance 
measurement is part of formal control structures which are used in monitoring in order 
to facilitate implementation.  
Worsham, Eisner and Ringquist (1997) critically assessed the assumptions of agency 
theory as it was imported into the bureaucratic politics literature. They found that the 
implementation theory (the subsystem literature) seemed to have been almost entirely 
ignored by agency theorists. Agency theory was subject to an overly hierarchic notion, 
reminiscent of the early top-down studies of implementation. This view overlooked that 
different agents may be assigned to different coalitions based on interests. To include 
implementation issues could have solved the agency theory literature’s ahistoric and 
noncontextual nature. Ahistorical means that studies fail to incorporate long enough 
time frame to recognize cumulative effects of past events on the time period under 
study. At least a decade was suggested as proper time period for understanding the 
complexities involved in studies of public policy implementation. Noncontextual means 
that many studies do not locate the study within a larger social, political, and economic 
context. Worsham, Eisner and Ringquist (1997) supported Moe’s (1991) claim that the 
economics of organisation, and notably agency theory, should emphasize politics and 
context relatively more, a view also shared by Perrow (1986). Information should be 
treated as a variable that varies over time and across policy areas. Unfortunately, this 
appreciation of enhancing the relevance of the economics of organisation in the context 





The organisation ecology perspective (Alchian, 1950; Nelson and Winter, 1982) 
proposes a system-level theory based on variation and selection in order to explain 
organisations and economic systems under uncertainty. The assumption of profit 
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maximizing from the classical theory of the firm is rejected and it is argued that 
organisations well suited to particular environments would survive while the other 
organisations would fail and disappear. This means that certain organisational 
structures, leadership styles or other organisational characteristics may explain why 
some organisations survive or are perceived as effective. This selection is not 
necessarily planned. Furthermore, the outcome is not necessarily optimal as the initial 




Contingency theory is based on the premise that there is no organisational structure or 
system which applies equally well to all organisations in all circumstances. Thompson 
(1967) stated that in a stable environment, acceptable performance in the past could be 
taken as evidence of preparedness for the future. However, lacking absolute criteria of 
fitness, and being unable to assume that improvement over its past capability is a 
reflection of its future, the complex organisation then turns to social references to 
demonstrate that it is doing as well as, or better than, others in its league. Complex 
organisations are defined as open systems, hence indeterminate and faced with 
uncertainty, but at the same time as subject to criteria of rationality and hence needing 
determinateness and certainty (Thompson, 1967). Examples of complex organisations 
were manufacturing firms, hospitals, schools, armies and community agencies, and in 
this respect local government should be a valid context for studying complex 
organisations. The definition of complex organisations and the use of social reference 
under uncertainty, highlights the relevance of performance measurement and 
benchmarking under such contingencies.  
Social references may take many forms, for instance by search and surveillance. 
Problemistic search was defined as search that is stimulated by a problem and directed 
toward finding a solution to that problem (Cyert and March, 1963/1992). However, 
Thompson (1967) also conceived of the possibility that monitoring behaviour could 
scan the environment for opportunities, which does not wait to be activated by a 
problem and which does not therefore stop when a problem solution has been found. 
Such monitoring was refered to as opportunistic surveillance (not to be confused with 
opportunism), and it was suggested that it was the organisational counterpart to curiosity 
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in the individual. Opportunistic surveillance, if it is found, should be associated with the 
institutional level of the organisation, according to Thompson’s (1967) reasoning. Thus, 
performance measurement is likely to be employed more by management than by street 




The issue of performance measurement and organisational uncertainty and ambiguity 
has also been addressed in the organisational learning literature. Organisational 
learning has been defined as processing of information which changes an entity’s range 
of potential behaviour (Huber, 1991). In fact, the organisational learning literature is the 
only contribution to organisational control which has come up with a definition of 
performance measurement. Monitoring (i.e. performance measurement) was defined as 
both focused and wide-ranging sensing of the organisation’s effectiveness in fulfilling 
its own pre-established goals or the requirements of stakeholders (Huber, 1991). A 
central concept in organisational learning, and an important tool in organisation control, 
is standard operating procedures. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are learned 
behaviour and are the memory of organisations (Cyert and March, 1963/1992). In 
intentional organisational learning, actions are taken both for learning from history and 
for learning from the experience of others to encode inferences into routines. As there 
are many fallacies in organisational learning (superstitious learning, competency traps, 
information overload), the learning needs to be compared with other serious alternatives 
(Levitt and March, 1988). Performance measurement may play a significant role in these 
processes of learning. Huber (1991) judged performance measurement to be one of the 
clearest and most pervasive forms of organisational search, but asserted that relatively 
little was known about the details by which organisational experience was accumulated 
into structures of routines. Levitt and March (1988) argued that performance 
measurement was a process that yielded different kinds of routines in different 
situations, but that it was only partly successful in imposing internal consistency on 
organisational memories. Politics has already been proposed as one explanation to this 
phenomenon, and this perspective has also been put forward by Olsen and Peters (1996) 
for understanding organisational learning and public sector reforms. They argued that 
there is a long way to go before an adequate understanding of the role of experiential 
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learning in reforms in political life is available. The enhancement of quality and 
efficiency in institutional design of the common good should be studied in conjunction 
with political pressure and interference. Politics will therefore be considered in some 
greater detail next.  
 
The resource dependence perspective 
 
Information may be important both for performing tasks in the technical core and for 
formation and sustaining coalitions in order to reduce environmental uncertainty and 
sustain legitimacy and resources. Information systems has been conceptualised as the 
reports, statistics, facts, or information that are regularly collected and their pattern of 
transmission through the organisation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Pfeffer and Salancik 
argued that the fact that certain information is regularly collected, focuses the 
organisation’s attention to it. The fact that information exists and is prominent through 
the resources it consumes and attention it demands, conveys the impression that the 
information is important. New entrants into the organisation may then start to construct 
their perceptions of the organisation and its problems around the available information. 
The information may in this way provide organisational memory and enhance the 
development of SOPs. Factors affecting information collection in organisations were 
assumed to be ease of collecting the information, ease of processing the information, 
necessity of the information, and how critical the monitored activity was for the 
operations. The information may affect behaviour through its utility for decision making 
by reducing uncertainty, enhance stakeholder interests, and screen out information to 
protect the organisation’s operations from external influences. However, as it takes time 
to build new information structures, also the information structures that exist are 
guarded by the departments representing them. Thus, according to the resource 
dependence perspective one should assume that performance measurement could 
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ORGANISATIONAL CONTROL IN THE CONTEXT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
This thesis studies organisational control in political institutions, hence organisational 
control in firms is only briefly discussed. According to Cyert and March (1963/1992), 
there is nothing intrinsically more repetitious or quantifiable about economic decisions 
in firms than in other organisations. The differences between decision making in firms 
relative to say political institutions lie almost entirely in our habitual ways of thinking 
about them. On the other hand, Moe (1984) argued that the transition from economics to 
politics is by no means straightforward. These two contrasting views illustrate that some 
elaboration on the application of the economics of organisation on political institutions 
may be warranted. Hence, in this introductory section of my study, organisational 
control in firms and political institutions is somewhat more elaborated on. This is done 
to give the reader who is unfamiliar with organisational control in either firms, in 
political institutions, or in both, a better grip with the research context, and to identify 
some of the small peculiarities of decision making in local government.  
Political institutions serve two different purposes. On the one hand, political 
institutions solve collective action problems which allow actors to cooperate in the 
realization of gains from trade. On the other hand, political institutions are instruments 
for coercion and redistribution, and this has been the neglected side of the story of 
political institutions (Moe, 1990). The economics of organisation has primarily dealt 
with voluntarily exchange among autonomous actors. However, political institutions 
arise from the politics of structural choice. This means that structures, as organisational 
control in political institutions, also must be understood in terms of politics and not only 
symbolism. If the economics of organisation is to contribute to an understanding of 
political institutions, then the positive political theory must incorporate what politics is 
about. Thus, the economics of organisation must be transformed into a political theory 
along several dimensions. These dimensions are public authority, political uncertainty 
and protective structures, compromise, and public sector effectiveness (Moe, 1991). In 
addition, a fifth and a sixth dimension, property rights and transparency, have been 
included.  
 




In agency theory effective organisation is dealt with in hierarchical control through two 
issues simultaneously. The first issue is to let the agency work on the tasks it is 
supposed to do, which is the issue of effectiveness. The second issue is to ensure that 
the agency is doing the tasks as efficiently as possible. The organisational control 
problem in political institutions, where market competition is unavailable as additional 
organisational control, is then that agents can do more or other tasks than desired such 
that effectiveness and equity is reduced, and agents can shirk such that inefficiency 
emerges and hence effectiveness and equity are also reduced.  
Agency theory usually employs the term ‘residual’ when organisational control in 
firms is analyzed. The residual is the difference between the firm’s stochastic inflow of 
resources (income) and the promised payments to the agents (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Organisational control can be enhanced by letting the agents share some of the residual 
in payment which means that the agents also have a stake in the same outcome as the 
principal pursue. Political institutions, on the other hand, usually have no financial 
residual. The budget is to be balanced against the expenses, and the residual, the net 
benefit, is often directed to constituencies who do not pay marginal prices.  
The non-presence of financial residual claims may increase slack in political 
institutions relative to firms, all other things equal. Slack may be explained as the 
difference between the minimum costs for providing some amount of service, and the 
amount the agents and bureaus actually use in providing the service. Slack consists of 
payments to coalition members in excess of what is required to maintain the 
organisation (Cyert and March, 1963/1992). This slack may be used to compensate 
stakeholders for their policy support, subordinates for their compliance, extended 
quality and new equipment, or as personal consumption or ‘on the job consumption’ 
(Niskanen, 1971). Slack is then only possible if inefficiency exist. However, slack may 
aslo function to enhance long run effectiveness as means of energy for innovation, and 
buffer against uncertainty and conflict. This slack also gives the agency or bureau head 
an incentive to monitor member or team member behaviour because it is this slack 
which may enhance his capacity for control. While agency heads in firms and bureau 
heads in political institutions may both want to control the slack, the additional 
organisational control through the financial residual mechanism is not available in 
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political institutions. Though political institutions may rely on a high spirit and 
competence acquired through rigid recruitment of the most compliant candidates in clan 
control, and by formal and informal training and rules as the classical Weberian theory 
of bureaucracy in behaviour control, these are also options for firms. Therefore, the 
presence of slack is similar both in firms and in political institutions, but firms have 
financial residual claims as additional organisational control while political institutions 
have not. Performance measurement may on this reason be relatively more important in 
political institutions than in firms because interest groups may compete for the residual 
claims on the net benefits. This puts forward a partial explanation to why public sector 
seems to have provided the leading edge on performance measurement issues, as 
Lapsley and Mitchell (1996) argued.  
In firms the principal, who may be the entrepreneur or the owner, has preferences for 
the residual. The principal may hire an agent who may also wish to hire more agents for 
himself. In political institutions there also exist multiple principal–agent relationships. 
An agency relationship is defined as a contract under which one or more persons, the 
principal(s), engage another person, the agent, to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decisionmaking authority to the agent (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The voter, on behalf of all living and unborn citizens, is principal to 
the representative. The representative may have preferences for re-election and political 
support, but is to represent the differences in the voter population. The representatives 
are principal to the bureau, and the bureau itself may contain several principal–agent 
relationships. For instance, in local government the mayor on behalf of the 
representatives, has the daily dealings with the municipal chief administrative officer. 
This turns the representatives into principals relative to the bureaucracy. The chief 
administrative officer on his side turns into principal relative to his subordinate 
bureaucrats as agents, and the bureaucrats may function as principals relative to their 
subordinates, and so on. Thus, organisational control in political institutions viewed as 
principal-agency relationships, is at least as and maybe more complex than 
organisational control in firms. 
 
Political uncertainty and protective structures 
 
The exercise of public authority is threatened by political uncertainty. The ruling 
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coalition or parties do want the bureaucracies and agencies to be effective. At the same 
time they also know that they can loose control to other coalitions or parties. A trait with 
organisational control in political institutions compared to firms, is that the politicians 
play the entrepreneurial role, but they have no guaranteed property rights. Design of 
political organisational control in political institutions must then make a trade-off 
between effectiveness and control. Again, one may find a similar mechanism of 
uncertainty regarding authority in firms, as different stakeholders may compete for the 
residual and authority to control. Recall for instance the finance strategy of using 
‘poison pills’ as defense against hostile takeovers. Where the chief financial executive 
in a firm has to deal with the board of directors, the shareholders, employees and 
environmental groups, a municipal chief administrative officer has to deal with the 
municipal council, the inhabitants, employees, and different interest groups. However, 
the political uncertainty may be at least as evident in political institutions as it is in 
firms, and maybe also even more so. 
Because of political uncertainty, the politicians have designed a complex web of 
different constraints on how political institutions are controlled to insulate the 
instruments of political institutions from political enemies. Such protective structures 
may be laws and rules governed by different bodies. In agency theory common agency is 
used to denote the situation where an agent relates to several principals, or what Meyer 
(1979) denoted as a situation where public officials serve dual masters. This also means 
that political institutions often are subject to multiple principals at the same time, and 
maybe in a wider extent than firms are.  
Political uncertainty, besides leading to the common agency phenomenon, also leads 
to another aspect of organisational control in political institutions. As political control is 
imperfect due to guards against political enemies, it also means that the bureaucrats in 
political institutions could be more autonomous relative to the politicians than the 
agents in the firms relative to their owners. This makes budget-maximizing behaviour 
more likely and also performance measurement relatively more important in political 




Politics is related to negotiating, log-rolling, and compromising. In the boards of firms, 
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one may assume that compromising is as common as in municipal councils. However, 
representative democracies do not build upon a single ideology or one preference 
function and moreover often work through complex structures as through councils 
supported by special committees seeking consensus or compromises. In such complex 
governance structures there may be coalitions between the sponsors and the bureau 
which amplify the initial problem of budget- or slack maximizing. For instance, a 
political committee or a municipal council may be constituted by a relatively large share 
of public sector employees (Sørensen, 1995). These representatives may act in league 
with the bureaucrats in order to increase the budget and output which then may become 
larger than socially desirable. Thus, not only the agents can shirk, also the principals can 
shirk.  
Politics is not only constituted by compromise and win-win situations, it also 
encompasses conflicts, coercion and redistribution. This has been the theoretical domain 
of welfare theory. Therefore, some basic insights from welfare theory shall be briefly 
recapitulated. Ideally, one could wish that any actions would increase welfare and harm 
no-one. The concept of Pareto-optimality is widely used both in economics and politics 
to denote such issues. A Pareto-optimum is defined as a position from which it is 
impossible to improve anyone’s welfare, in the sense of moving him to a position that 
he prefers, by transforming goods and services through production or exchange without 
impairing someone else’s welfare (Blaug, 1985). Pareto-improvements are the actions 
and outcomes which leave someone better off and no-one worse off. However, public 
sector is often designed to settle conflicts and implement redistributions. Therefore an 
explicit appreciation of the conflict dimension of politics is warranted. The Kaldor-
Hicks optimality concept does this. A Kaldor-Hicks improvement is defined as where 
the total gain in welfare from certain actions or outcomes is such that the winners could 
compensate the losers (Wildavsky, 1966; Blaug, 1980, 1985). However, the 
compensation does not actually have to be paid, and this is what makes the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion so intriguing for students of political institutions.  
The now termed Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks criteria were both published in the early 
20th century. Vilfredo Pareto published the Manual of Political Economy in 1906 were 
he decisively broke away from traditional practice of using cardinal utility and additive 
utility functions and only restricted himself to welfare conclusions that did not depend 
on interpersonal comparisons. Enrico Barone introduced the notion of compensating 
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payment in an article in 1908, but this was not translated into English until 1935. The 
notion is now commonly attributed to John Hicks and Nicholas Kaldor who revived the 
concept on compensating payment in the 1930s. However, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion 
and the notion of compensating payments seem to be less known today than the Pareto 
criterion outside the welfare theory and policy analysis fields. Nevertheless, the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion may be useful to students of organisational control in political 
institutions. (For a more thorough treatment of the Kaldor-Hicks optimality criterion, 
see Blaug (1980, 1985) with bibliography.) 
Moe (1991) called for a theory of politics and economic organisation. The Pareto 
criterion deals with given distribution of initial resources, gains and compromises. The 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion in addition deals with conflicts, coercion and redistribution, if 
the potential of compensation is not released. Pareto optimality is a subcategory of 
Kaldor-Hicks optimality. Both the economics of organisations and the positive theory of 
political institutions should not be limited to a narrow approach to optimality unless the 
gain in parsimony outweighs the loss in explanation and prediction. Thus, the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion seems to be the dimension, or the neglected story of political institutions 
as instruments for coercion and redistribution, which Moe (1991) called for to introduce 
into positive political theories, in addition to the Pareto criterion already commonly 
employed in the economics of organisation. Nevertheless, welfare theory has not been 
able to specify an objective welfare function, and efficiency is inseparable from the 
question of equity. The Pareto criterion takes an initial distribution of resources for 
granted, while many political institutions exists in order to alter the distribution of 
resources. This means that it may be misleading to describe economics as essentially 
about voluntary or value free exchange which then presumably is grounded on a value 
free Pareto optimality, and politics as essentially being about inherently coercive 
exercise of public authority, because the Pareto criterion is encompassed by the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion. Blaug (1985) summarised his retrospect on welfare economics with 
stating that efficiency questions still appear to be inseparable from equity questions. 
However, there is still much merit in using economics to draw attention to the trade-off 
between efficiency and equity because apparently few other than economists will do so.  
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion seems to provide a bridge between the commonly used 
Pareto criterion for judging economic optimality in free exchanges, and a more relevant 
criterion for judging economic optimality when redistribution and coercion is to take 
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place or be considered. Thus, it seems to be potentially fruitful, both for students of 
political institutions and for students of organisational control, to appreciate the lesson 
of Kaldor-Hicks optimality from welfare economics when the economics of 
organisation is to be transformed into a positive theory of political institutions. 
 
Public organisation effectiveness 
 
A firm which is not run effectively may become a candidate for takeover. This threat is 
part of the firm’s organisational control structure through the market, in addition to 
internal contracts and performance measurement. Political institutions are not subject to 
organisational control due to claims on financial residual slack but on claims on net 
benefit. Furthermore, service suppliers in the public sector are not subject to forces of 
selection based on economic efficiency alone because also social equity is considered. 
Though cost efficiency is not the only criterion for judging the performance of political 
institutions, also political institutions face external threats which may enhance 
organisational control in line with the mechanism present in the take-over threats for 
firms, albeit not from financial residual claims. This mechanism goes like this: If 
political institutions are not efficient and legitimate, they may be reorganized, merged 
with neighbour authorities, or privatized. A new management may be appointed, and the 
organisation could be trimmed. An entire governmental level of authorities may be 
made superfluous and their tasks split between the authorities on the levels above and 
below, and certain sectors or services may be contracted or privatized all together. This 
means that external threats are present also for political institutions, but probably less 
so, and maybe also less frequent, than for firms. Thus, performance measurement may 




With private property rights, as ownership of shares in public traded firms, the 
stockowners may have a strong monitoring device through concentration and 
capitalization because the monitoring costs then could be small relative to the gains. 
Concentration means that someone can buy a large share of the stocks. Capitalization 
means that all decisons affecting future consequences, assuming perfect information, 
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instantly are discounted into present values which are marketable. With public property 
rights there are often restrictions on the assets, and claims are often not for sale. The 
substantially higher transactions costs of the real estate market, as opposed to the capital 
markets, and the greater difficulty of concentrating ownership in local governments, 
generally reduce the incentives of individuals to monitor elected officials (Zimmerman, 
1977). Ownership claims could on the other hand be concentrated also with public 
property rights through forming coalitions. This strategy may nevertheless have 
substantial coalition costs which may dilute the incentives to monitor the local 
government and its public officials. Thus, concentration is no self-evident incentive for 
monitoring. Moreover, capitalization is often not affecting the personal wealth of the 
voters as principals directly, or such consequences are affecting only some groups and in 
different directions. This means also that the incentive for the principal to monitor the 
agent is reduced in municipalities where concentration and capitalization of public 
property rights are small compared to private property rights, as in firms.  
Although public property rights through lack of concentration and capitalization may 
reduce the principals’ incentives to monitor the politicians or the local government, 
there may also be demand for monitoring from other groups than the principals 
(Zimmerman, 1977). Potential political candidates may demand monitoring in 
competition for scarce or misheld representative positions. Bureaucrats may demand 
information for doing their job. Furthermore, also the press may demand information in 
their mediation role between local governemt, legislators and voters. This brings us to 




In firms, management may want to hide their strategies, decisions and organisational 
structures in order to sustain a competitive advantage. Cyert and March (1963/1992) 
argued that differences between decision making in firms and in political institutions 
may stem from the extended isolated social life of firms from other organisations which 
leads to differences in behaviour simply through learning where acceptable solutions are 
not unique. In political institutions transparency and interaction with environments more 
often is the rule than secrecy and isolation. Transparency is a fundamental dimension of 
democracy and is also important for political competition to take place. Without 
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transparancy a public sector organisation may lose legitimacy and hence both public 
moral support and resources could wither. In the 1990s the information technology has 
made public disclosure of information as performance indicators (PIs) and statistics 
feasible with short delays in time and with simultaneous access also for users outside the 
organisation. This means that the traditional distinction between internal and external 
reporting, for instance as found in financial accounting, is less applicable and of 





To sum up, there are several identical organisational control problems in firms and 
political institutions only varying in degrees, and also some distinct control problems in 
political institutions. The common problems are asymmetric information, uncertainty 
and slack. The possibly distinct control problems in political institutions are public 
property rights and the presence of relatively more multiple principal–agency 
relationships (common agency), relatively more protective structures, more coercion and 
redistribution, and more transparency. However, by applying welfare theory together 
with economics of organisation, one may procede with a positive, political theory of 
institutions which also deals with politics explicitly.  
In this chapter I have elaborated on organisational control in political institutions in 
general. I have found that many themes are similar between firms and government. At 
the same time, when it comes to details, some aspects are different also. However, much 
of the classical literature on organisational control has also addressed public sector 
management. Thus, there is a rich literature on public sector management, and the next 
chapter documents that this is also the case on the issue of empirical studies of public 
sector performance measurement. Chapter 3 therefore goes on with a systematic review 
of this literature on public sector performance measurement, with an emphasis on 
explaining how and why performance measurement is used under contingencies of 
asymmetric information, uncertainty, ambiguity, and politics.  
 









The purpose of this chapter is to identify a public sector performance measurement 
research programme and enhance our understanding of how and why performance 
measurement is used as organisational control in political institutions. The research 
questions pursued are: What are the potential costs and benefits of public sector 
performance measurement? What are the obstacles to achieve these benefits? The focus 
is on performance measurement as organisational control in the political context in 
which it operates (Hopwood, 1983).  
The management literature is now abundant with both scholars’ and practitioners’ 
opinions and experiences with public sector performance measurement after the last 
decades’ proliferation of PIs. However, there seems to be lacking a coherent public 
sector performance measurement research programme, agreement on concepts 
explaining the use of PIs, and systematic reviews of empirical studies where the public 
sector experiences have been put into a coherent framework. This literature review aims 
at contributing to the organisation theory literature by addressing these issues, extending 
the ‘performance paradox’ framework proposed by Meyer and Gupta (1994) where 
organisational control is maintained by not knowing exactly what performance is. A 
more elaborated knowledge base of public sector performance measurement may 
provide insights not only into the matter of organisational control in political 
institutions, but also on complex organisational forms in general.  
Many scholars have participated both in research and development on the use of PIs 
as organisational control in the public sector. Scholars have warned against uncritical 
use of private sector inspired management in a public sector context (van Gunsteren, 
1976). Still, predecessors of performance measurement, cost-benefit analysis and policy 
analysis, were recommended by public administration experts for use in political 
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institutions despite frequent problems as scarcity of planning competence, lack of a 
common terminology, presence of uncertainty, and considerations of political rationality 
together with economic rationality (Wildavsky, 1966). Among practitioners the situation 
is as disperse as among the scholars. From UK local authorities Ball and Monaghan 
(1996) reported that there was a strong view expressed that the implementation and use 
of performance measurement review systems had been successful, the politicians more 
strongly than managers. From US city governments Ammons (1995) reported that PIs 
existed but could be utilised more. Independent reviews of performance measurement in 
the US suggested slow and partial implementation despite sustained efforts by the 
executive branch under the Government Performance and Results act of 1993 (Picciotto, 
1999). The above sketched controversies suggest that both scholars and practitioners 
may profit from a deeper understanding of the functions of performance measurement in 
the public sector. Cf. also Mellemvik, Monsen and Olson (1988) on the diverse 
functions of accounting.  
Already in the 1930s Clarence E. Ridley and Herbert A. Simon studied efficiency in 
measuring municipal activities (Simon, 1947/1997). Performance measurement, value 
for money (VFM) auditing and evaluations have been utilised in the public sector at 
least since the 1950s (Power, 1997). Since the 1980s there has been a growing interest 
in performance measurement also in the private sector (e.g. Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; 
Camp, 1989; Kaplan and Norton, 1996). However, the public sector performance 
measurement literature is already extensive. Furthermore, public sector performance 
measurement has provided the leading edge on performance measurement issues 
(Lapsley and Mitchell, 1996). The private sector performance measurement literature is 
therefore not reviewed in this study.  
The rest of this chapter is outlined as follows. In the next section a conceptual 
framework on public sector performance measurement is outlined and public choice, 
agency theory and the resource dependence perspective are suggested as the core of a 
public sector performance measurement research programme. In the third section, 
drawing on 24 empirical studies on public sector performance measurement, benefits of 
and obstacles to organisational use of performance measurement are discussed. Section 
four rounds of the review with conclusions and some recommendations for future 
research.  
 










































Performance measurement is in the interlocus of several disciplines and perspectives, cf. 
figure 3. This calls for a multi-theory approach. A multi-theory approach may give a 
richer and more valid explanation of performance measurement than a partial approach 
can do say by using agency theory only. A multi-theory review may also highlight the 
potential bias inherent in some theoretical perspectives, reveal ‘white spots’ in the 
academic landscape, and address the need for future research.  
There are many candidate contributions to the core of a public sector performance 
measurement research programme. Ridgway (1956) utilised both organisational theory 
and the Soviet (central planning) literature and identified many dysfunctional 
consequences of performance measurement, a topic Smith (1993, 1995) more recently 
has elaborated further in the public sector context. Tiebout (1956) revealed that citizens 
‘vote with their feet’ according to preferences, and therefore that governments pursuing 
social welfare could facilitate competition resulting in different performance between 
local authorities. Thus, best practice in for instance one municipality is not 
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unequivocally the best practice for other municipalities. Due to asymmetric information, 
politicians may want to monitor a bureau in order to avoid strategic behaviour. On the 
other hand, monitoring could be costly. However, even imperfect monitoring may 
reduce the bureau’s ability to decept the legislature (Bendor, Taylor and Gaalen, 1985). 
Another means in organisational control design by the legislators is to let constituency 
groups, as interest groups, monitor the agencies. The interest groups can then 
communicate the results directly to the politicians rather than through a formal 
organisational control system (Banks and Weingast, 1992). The interest groups then 
bear some of the monitoring costs but they may also have more information than the 
politicians and furthermore receive benefits of the output directly. This means that 
performance measurement may have substitutes and complements in interest group 
behaviour and in media.  
Pollitt (1988) highlighted the relevance of quality in public sector performance 
measurement, distinguishing between a customer, consumer and citizen perspective (the 
three Cs), on such issues. Pollitt (1986) reminded the public sector management 
community on the differences between efficiency, effectiveness and equity (the three 
Es), and warned against a biased emphasis on economy. Many prescriptive or normative 
approaches tend to overlook equity and power when effectiveness is discussed. 
Effectiveness and power are not necessarily two mutually exclusive concepts 
(Rowlinson and Procter, 1997). Wildavsky (1966) addressed the relevance of the 
Kaldor-Hicks optimality criterion in addition to the Pareto criterion on issues of 
effectiveness and politics in policy analysis. Politics in the public sector may therefore 
be studied also with the notion of compensating payments, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion 
(Blaug, 1980, 1985), and not only with the Pareto criterion. With the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion an improvement may be achieved as long as the benefits exceed the costs and 
the winners can compensate the losers, but without compensating payments actually 
having to be paid. With the Pareto criterion everybody is left at least as well off after a 
change as before the change. Performance measurement addresses cost efficiency, 
allocative efficiency and equity at the same time. On this background one easily 
understands that performance measurement may be contested with both politics and 
resistance. 
Performance measurement used for reducing or adapting to uncertainty is a crucial 
notion in the performance measurement research programme. Performance 
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measurement is concerned about learning from own and others experience and related to 
developing and maintaining organisational memory, routines and SOPs. Thus, the core 
of the public sector performance measurement research programme is constituted to a 
large extent by public choice, agency theory and organisational learning from the 
economics of organisation. 
Use of performance measurement was found to be inadequately researched from a 
control strategy and system perspective (Dent, 1990). However, Dent did not undertake 
any review of studies of control systems in public sector organisations, which may have 
provided relatively more empirical results than the business strategy and management 
literature did on this issue. The public management conventional wisdom, contingency 
theory and symbolism from new institutionalism (Wildavsky, 1986; Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Ouchi, 1979; Hofstede, 1981), has not yet incorporated empirical studies of 
performance measurement under contingencies of ambiguity and uncertainty, neither as 
supplement to budget or clan control, nor as component of standardisation, expert, 
political or clan control. See however Alford and Baird (1997) who found some support 
for the contingency theory conventional wisdom. Accounting, auditing, surveillance and 
control issues have been neglected in contingency theory research and are fertile areas 
for further research (Donaldson, 1995). 
Empirical studies on decoupling of organisational control structures other than case 
studies are few. See however Gupta, Dirsmith and Fogarty (1994). New institutionalism 
has also been criticised for having considered power issues insufficiently (Moe, 1990; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). New institutionalist theory may therefore have overlooked 
the possibility that formal control may enhance compliance and professionalism and 
thus serve both effectiveness and legitimacy. Furthermore, it is likely that stakeholders 
in political institutions will resist implementation and use of performance measurement 
which may cause embarrassment, unless such systems are used for external 
legitimisation only (Markus and Pfeffer, 1983; Argyris, 1990), or unless there is so 
much ambiguity that embarrassing information from the performance measurement does 
not affect the ruling coalition (Baier, March and Sætren, 1986).  
 
 




In this section, general finds both regarding benefits of, and obstacles to performance 
measurement are discussed. The discussion is based on 24 empirical studies from the 
1980s and 1990s on implementation, use and effects of public sector performance 
measurement selected from international, English language, scientific journals, cf. table 
2. Most of the studies came from UK, but also Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden and USA were represented.  
 
Benefits of performance measurement 
 
The benefits identified have been categorised according to three organisational 
perspectives which usually address these issues: Instrumentalism, institutionalism, and 
politics, cf. table 3. (It is acknowledged that political behaviour is rational behaviour. 
However, for simplicity and conceptual clarity, I have discriminated between the 




The reinventing government movement and the new public management (NPM), as it is 
called in Europe, often in a prescriptive or a normative sense, tie performance 
measurement to improved welfare through enhanced efficiency, effectiveness and 
equity. Typically benefits associated with the instrumental, cybernetics perspective as 
found in accounting and agency theory, are enhancing control and accountability, and 
reducing uncertainty and information asymmetry (e.g. Boyne and Law, 1991; Wholey 
and Hatry, 1992; Ammons, 1995; Thompson, 1995; Alford and Baird, 1997).  
The most important criterion for design and implementation of PIs was found to be 
decision relevance (Mayston, 1985). A PI should contribute with substantial relevant 
information for decision making, or it should be discarded to minimise the number if 
PIs. Furthermore, decision relevance contributes to minimise the costs of gathering, 
processing and evaluating information. To be useful PIs ought to be employed in a well-
defined welfare theory and control framework unless there probably would be 
substantial problems with validity and reliability.  
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Table 2. Empirical studies of public sector performance measurement 
Author Research problem Methods Conclusions 









Content analysis of 15 UK 
nationalised industries’ 
annual reports, and 
theoretical analysis 
PIs can be placed in a decision framework 
based on welfare theory, and many 




How public sector 
managers 
implement and use 
PIs 
Discussion and written 
feedback from over 500 
UK middle and senior 
public sector managers 
20 lessons from experience may enhance 
use of PIs, especially conceptual validity 
applied to the political context, bottom-up 




PIs and value for 
money (VFM) 
auditing in local 
government 
Content analysis of VFM 
reports from Scottish local 
authorities 
The state of the art was primitive and 
fraught with methodological problems. 
PIs were inadequate for inter-authority 
comparisons. However, the statistics 
could be of use for internal policy analysis 





PIs in monitoring 
of contractual 
performance 
Content analysis of a 
study on 38 UK local 
authorities 
PIs were only modestly introduced prior 
to contracting following compulsory 
competitive tendering in 1988. This 
makes it difficult to measure impact of 










Case study of a division of 
4000+ employee US 
government agency 
Performance measurement can be 
combined with TQM given training of 
work groups and managers, top-
management commitment, and linkages 




Major study of 
local authorities 
implementation 
and use of 
performance 
review systems 
Survey of all chief 
executive and council 
leaders in local authorities 
in the UK (514 boroughs, 
regions, districts, 
counties, metropolitan and 
non-metropolitan 
districts). Follow-up 
interviews in 28 
authorities which showed 
significant progress 
Half of all local authorities were assumed 
to operate a review mechanism and a 
majority implemented their review system 
after 1988. Type of political control 
(ruling party) did not seem to influence 
the choice. Most people would subscribe 
to the view that the system could only be 
effective if linked to the authority’s 
planning and budgetary system. There was 
a strong view expressed that the system 
had been successful, the politicians more 
strongly than managers 
Helden  
(FAM 1998) 





Case study of a Dutch 
project encompassing 12 
pioneer municipalities 
1988–95 
Dutch municipalities have been exposed 
to reduced budgets for over 15 years, and 
this may explain some of the adoption of 
instrumental organisational control 
models. Need for more behavioural 
research on implementation and about 








Case study of 4 municipal 
projects in Norwegian 
local government 1983–
98 
An implementation mode where PIs are 
loosely coupled to organisational 
objectives, may overcome resistance and 
further implementation success. Need for 
research on implementation structure 
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(Table 2 continued.) 
Author Research problem Methods Conclusions 
Use    
Carter  
(PA 1991) 
How design and 
implementation 
affect use of 
performance 
measurement 
Comparative study of 13 
UK government 
departments, public 
agencies and private 
businesses in the 1980s 
Performance measurement is used as 
organisational learning. Mature 
performance measurement models are 
designed, parsimonious and timely. 
Design and use would have been easier if 
both quality and consumer satisfaction 
was regarded as aspects of process. 
Quality is part of efficiency and not its 
conceptual antithesis. Problems transcend 
the private and public sector division, but 
PIs can be used as democratic instruments 
in the public sector 
Carter and Greer  
(PA 1993) 
What roles PIs 
have in the Next 
Steps initiative 
Content analysis of 
business plans of 4 UK 
agencies formed by the 
Department of Social 
Security 
The agencies have responded to the 
requirement of the Next Steps programme 
by developing reliable and usable PIs. PIs 
are political instruments mediating the 
Department and the agencies by means of 
exercising ‘hands-off’ control and holding 
agencies accountable. The use of PIs were 
also changing from ‘tin-openers’ to more 
use of ‘dials’ because PIs were 





measure and use 
performance 
information 
Survey data of UK local 
government collected by 
308 questionnaires. 
Comparison of existing 
systems in education, 
social services, highways, 
housing and refuse 
collection to an ideal 
system.  
PIs most frequently used were related to 
costs, volume of service, utilisation rates, 
time targets and productivity. PIs least 
used were quality of service, customer 








Survey of agency heads in 
Norwegian local 
government 1990/1991 
53% of the municipalities reported to 
apply performance evaluation, but only 
15% were estimated to provide 




ability of standards 
relevant to local 
government 
functions and how 
performance 




Content analysis of 
budgets, annual reports 
and selected documents 
for libraries and leisure 
services, specifically 
parks and recreation, in 97 
US city government 
Relevant standards and actual 
performance figures suitable for 
comparative purposes existed. This could 
be utilised more to capture media and 










to the Next Steps 
objective 
Content analysis and 
comparisons of the first 
57 UK Next Steps 
agencies’ 1991/92 relative 
to the 1988/89–1990/91 
annual reports 
Although there was an improvement, a 
significant proportion of the agencies 
reported little or no information on 
efficiency and effectiveness. There was an 
enhanced emphasis on reporting quality 
and effectiveness 
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(Table 2 continued.) 
Author Research problem Methods Conclusions 
Haselbekke  
(PMM 1995) 
Use of public 
policy and 
performance 
measurement in the 
Netherlands 
Content analysis of Dutch 
central and local 
government budget 
memorandums 1995 
The amount of published data on various 
parts of the production process, both 
input, activity and output, had grown 
rapidly in the last years. Local 
governments had achieved better results in 
performance measurement than central 
government, but there was still a striking 
lack of productivity information at both 
levels of government 
Thompson  
(FAM 1995) 
Review of service 
performance 
reporting in New 
Zealand local 
authorities 
Content analysis of annual 
reports of service 
performance of 11 public 
art galleries the second 
year after implementation 
of service reporting in 
1990 
Performance measures adopted addressed 
objectives inappropriately and 
incompletely. The finding pointed to a 









Content analysis of 
programme performance 
statements of 17 Austral-
ian central government 
departments and agencies 
1991–92 and 1992–93 
Performance monitoring was contingent 
on ambiguity (‘difficulties in defining or 
measuring ends’), and uncertainty 
(‘difficulties concerning means’)  
Boyne  
(LGS 1997) 
Evaluation of the 




by the Audit 
Commission can 






Content analysis and 
theoretical analysis of 
validity, and statistical 
analysis of PIs for 39 
English non-metropolitan 
counties, 8 Welsh 
counties, 32 London 
boroughs, 36 metropolitan 
districts, 296 English non-
metropolitan districts, and 
37 Welsh districts 
PIs were not comprehensive regarding 
conceptual criteria for performance as 
equity, public participation, and 
responsiveness to local preferences. 
Effectiveness issues were completely 
ignored. Nevertheless, a small set of 
variables may be used on some 
dimensions of performance. However, 
some of the differences in service 
coverage, quality, speed of response, 
efficiency, service utilisation and 
administrative effectiveness, were beyond 
the control of individual councils. The 
Audit Commission should be clearer on 










Case study of UK and 
Swedish public health 
service practice 
There were tensions when trying to 
balance the provision and use of financial 
and non-financial information. The 
decentralised approach in Sweden led to a 
more balanced approach to performance 
measurement than the centralised 
approach adopted in the UK 
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(Table 2 continued.) 
Author Research problem Methods Conclusions 
Edwards  
(LGS 1998) 
The impact of the 
Citizen Charter 
Indicators (CCIs) 
on the activities of 
one consumer 
group 
UK single case study The division of the interest group (a 
national campaign for more and better 
public conveniences), energies and 
resources on the annual CCI exercise 
drew the group's campaigning teeth. 
Because of lack of technical expertise 
about PIs, consumer groups can make 
errors of interpretation and draw false 
conclusions which may undermine their 
credibility and thus undermine their 
campaigns. Far from empowering 
consumer groups, the production of the 
Audit Commission’s PIs for local 
authorities may have the opposite effect of 
disempowering 





publishing PIs in 
annual reports 
affects variation in 
efficiency through 
competition 
Content analysis and 
analysis of variance of PIs 
from 115 English and 
Welsh local authorities 
annual reports 1981/82–
1984/85 
The results showed no increased 
competition. If competition was present in 
local government performance, it was 
likely to be peer group pressure and to a 
lesser extent political control (ruling 
party). However, there were inadequate 
output measures and arbitrary numbers of 
PIs on the services 






Content analysis of 11–30 
Welsh district council 
annual reports each year 
from 1981/82 to 1988/89, 
interviews of council staff, 
and statistical analysis 
The annual reports contained little to 
assist judgements on councils’ 
performance. Accountability could be 
enhanced by central government issued 
codes of guidance, and by councils 
placing their reports more directly into the 







Case study in UK 
National Health Service 
Reliance on PI schemes may have 
dysfunctional consequences. Attention 
should be given to managerial incentives 
implicit in PI schemes 
Boyne  
(PMM 1996) 





Correlation analysis of 
263–296 UK local 
government services in 
non-metropolitan districts 
Performance in service provision as 
quality, efficiency and administrative 
effectiveness, is associated with scale, but 
scale and performance must be measured 
with appropriate measures. Development 
of performance measurement has provided 
more appropriate measures for local 
government reorganisation decisions than 
before 
Note. AJPA = Australian Journal of Public Administration, BJM = British Journal of Management, FAM 
= Financial Accountability and Management, IRAS = International Review of Administrative Sciences, 
LGS = Local Government Studies, MAR = Management Accounting Research, PA = Public 
Administration, PAR = Public Administration Review, PMM = Public Money and Management, PPMR = 
Public Productivity and Management Review.  
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Hands-off control was used to denote the usage of PIs in the paradox of the UK 
conservative administration that reducing the role of central government required tighter 
central control (Carter, 1989). In the Netherlands the public sector had been exposed to 
reduced budgets since the early 1980s, and especially the local government had 
developed and achieved results in performance measurement (Haselbekke, 1995; 
Helden, 1998). PIs may be used as signals and ‘dial’ (point to) whose responsibility a 
performance area is (Carter, 1991; Carter and Greer, 1993; Kravchuk and Schack, 
1996). Focus on certain PIs can signal certain strategies to certain stakeholders. In 
public sector the incentives are (often) non-financial. Instead of using PIs tied to 
financial incentives as often analysed in agency theory, public sector PIs may have 
incentives through the embarrassment effect which is a result from failing to meet 
relevant performance expectations. Such embarrassment may be effective for the 
organisation because it can stimulate managerial search activity for future improved 
performance. However, this is somewhat contrasting the emphasis on building 
motivation and commitment as found in many other popular management control 
models, for instance as in management by objectives (MBO) (Poister and Streib, 1995) 
and total quality management (TQM) (Berman and West, 1995).  
In spite of the fact that organisational learning is a major ingredient in the 
performance measurement research programme, there seems to have been published 
only a few empirical studies on performance measurement and its effects on 
organisational learning (e.g. Smith, 1988; Carter, 1991; Meyer and Gupta, 1994). Case 
studies showed that PIs were used as learning devices in organisations (Carter, 1989; 
Carter, Klein and Day, 1992). PIs may detect outliers both as potential failures or as 
successes. Such detection, ‘tin-opening’ (Carter, 1991), may address further 
investigations on variation in organisational forms. One major advantage with cost-
benefit and policy analyses and thus performance measurement, is that implicit 
judgements can be made explicit and subject for analysis when pursued with integrity 
(Wildavsky, 1966). At the same time, this points directly to several political aspects as 
power, conflict and transparency, and will be discussed later on. In the longer run 
performance measurement may adjust rules, routines and SOPs. Rules are reflecting 
organisational learning processes by which organisations adapt to their environments. 
Such behaviour has been extensively studied in conjunction with organisational 
effectiveness and institutional legitimacy under bounded rationality.  
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Table 3. Benefits of using performance measurement 
Perspective Functions 
 
Instrumentalism Monitor efficiency, effectiveness and equity 
 Enhance control and accountability (‘hands-off control’) 
 Reduce uncertainty 
 Reduce ambiguity 
 Reduce information asymmetry 
 Signalling (‘dials’) 
 Incentive (‘embarrassment effect’) 
 Detecting problems, failures and successes 
 Enhance memory and retrieval of information 
 Enhance learning (‘tin-openers’) 
 Develop rules, routines and SOPs 







Politics Reveal conflicts 
 Change power relations 
 Redistribute resources 
 Enhance transparency 





Institutional leadership through organisational cadres and culture promoting esteemed 
values has been one of the core explanations for institutional effectiveness in the old 
institutionalism (Selznick, 1957). Organisational structures and processes as 
performance measurement and annual reporting may play a significant role also in 
socialising recruits and in changing or upholding organisational values through culture 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Several studies revealed symbolic use of information (Feldman and March, 1981). 
Sørensen (1994) found that 53% of the Norwegian municipalities reported that they 
applied assessment of productivity. However, only 15% provided some kind of 
quantitative performance measures on productivity. This may imply symbolic use of 
organisational control models, but could also have reflected lagged implementation. For 
instance, Hall and Rimmer (1994) and Palmer (1993) reported that quality of service, 
customer satisfaction and achievement of goals were least used as PIs, whereas 
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Hyndman and Anderson (1995) reported that there was an enhanced emphasis on quality 
and effectiveness reporting from 1988 to 1992. Carter (1991) stated that PIs were very 
much the fashion of the 1980s in the UK, despite that this method was grounded on 
older ideas from the 1960s. Use of symbols and rituals could be an effect of lack of tacit 
products and services as output of the organisations (Pfeffer, 1990) and may therefore be 




Information is not only for internal use but could also to a large extent be used to 
influence or adapt to the environment. Rational organisations could therefore seek to 
design themselves in order to minimise the necessity for manoeuvring and compromise 
(Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Performance measurement may be used 
in several strategies for coping with power and dependence and thus requires design of 
appropriate information systems. This was corroborated by the findings that the 
development of PIs had provided better measures for decisions on municipal mergers 
(Boyne, 1996). This supports the notion of PIs as highly exposed for politics. 
The purpose of public sector is to solve problems and conflicts which the market and 
volunteer exchange can not solve. In political institutions ideologies should be 
inconsistent, and mistrust and scepticism are encouraged (Brunsson, 1989). Performance 
measurement may in this context reveal underlying conflicts, inconsistencies and 
priorities to the legitimate decisions makers and to the proper decision arena, rather than 
having political decision processes behaving as garbage can processes subject to 
unrepresentative or uninformed political influence (Wildavsky, 1966, 1969). 
Performance measurement may inform both the advocates and the guardians in the 
budgeting processes. Performance measurement could both increase transparency in 
organisational processes and enhance credibility of the organisational outcomes. Both 
transparency and credibility are valued in representative, political institutions.  
 
Obstacles to performance measurement 
 
The organisational obstacles to using performance measurement have been categorised 
into the three phases of implementation, use, and effects, cf. table 4.  
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Table 4. Obstacles to using performance measurement 
Phase Obstacles 
 
Implementation Low theoretical or methodological planning competence 
 Little resources/capacity for development 
 Lack of implementation network structure 
 Impatience 
 Resistance 
Use Lack of relevant statistics 
 Measurement errors 
 Misinterpretation 
 Low decision relevance 
 Need for rich information 
 Running down of PIs 
 Proliferation of PIs 
 Information overload 
 Indirect lines of responsibility (common agency) 
 No ownership of performance 
 Loyalty to professional norms rather than to management 
 Misrepresentation (manipulation of data) 
 ‘Creaming’ 
 Discredit of PIs 
Effects Suboptimisation 
 Tunnel vision 
 Myopia 
 Measure fixation 
 Gaming/Ratchet effect 
 Ossification 
 Revealed complexity 
 Increased transparency 
 Increased accountability 
 Increased conflicts (‘decibel meter’) 
 Reduced credibility (prestige) 
 Reduced legitimacy 
 Reduced power 





Implementation of performance measurement systems is treated as investment projects. 
The costs must be balanced against the value of improving government performance and 
credibility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, incremental budgeting may 
after all be more cost efficient and rational than a formal performance measurement 
system (Lindblom, 1959). However, the performance measurement costs may be 
reduced by using available, existing data, using random samples rather than population 
data, and employing agency personnel both to collect and analyse data. Carter (1989) 
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held that the performance measurement progress in the UK had been tardy and data-
driven, and that PIs remained an imperfect and often ineffective instrument of control. 
Midwinter (1994) argued that in Scotland the rhetoric of performance measurement was 
much more elaborated than its methodology. Most PIs could be described as ‘local 
government statistics’ rather than performance measurement and were invalid for inter-
unit and inter-organisational effectiveness comparisons. Thus, implementation requires 
competence in welfare theory and public choice (Wildavsky, 1966; Jackson, 1990), as 
well as capacity for information system development and adequate training (Nyhan and 
Marlowe, 1995). The implementation process itself may have a significant impact on the 
costs and overall potential for usage. A common approach to implementation studies has 
been to distinguish between top-down and bottom-up processes and where the latter 
have been claimed to enhance implementation success (Likierman, 1993). However, 
also implementation structures as networks and decoupling could have substantial 
positive impact on information systems and organisational control (Hjern and Porter 
1981; Johnsen, 1999). Competence, overcoming resistance, and patience are required as 
implementation of performance measurement systems commonly extend three to four 
years (Jackson, 1993).  
A common management slogan is ‘what get measured gets done’. One may measure 
and monitor certain items and relations in order to achieve desired changes. The process 
of placing issues on the agenda trough measurement may reveal management’s 
preferences or the organisation’s objectives. Who decides what and how issues are to be 
measured furthers power over other participants in the relation. At the same time 
information systems which are not for external legitimisation purposes only, face a risk 
of resistance. The specialists who are in charge of performance measurement may be 
regarded by stakeholders as ‘techies’ who are into getting too much control relative to 
status quo. Resistance against measurement and conscious misuse or influence on the 
measures or processes, may also further power to those who measure or who defy 




Resistance towards measurement and possibly changes from these processes may be a 
reasonable objection due to abuse of the data which may encompass measurement 
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errors, non compatibility in comparisons, low competence among the intended users of 
the data, and fear of misinterpretation (Ballantine, Brignall and Modell, 1998). 
Misinterpretation is to send wrong policy signals due to bounded rationality, although 
the agent is in possession of all the facts. Edwards (1998) reported that an interest group 
due to lack of expertise made errors of interpretation, resulting in potentially loss in 
credibility and disempowering. The risk of misinterpretation is especially present if 
relevant comparison to time-series and cross-sectional data are lacking, and the PIs have 
low validity and reliability (Hyndman and Anderson, 1995; Thompson, 1995; Boyne, 
1997). In short, PIs may after all not be decision relevant. But, reluctance to implement 
performance measurement could be motivated by fear of loosing power and to be cut off 
from the political centre (Egeberg, 1995). Self-interested bureaucrats may prefer policy-
making tasks which require rich information (Daft and Lengel, 1990), and avoid routine 
and technical matters which may require less rich information typically measured with 
PIs. If PIs reveal information to the politicians which formerly have been exclusively in 
the bureaucrats’ domain, the politicians could make more policy and the bureaucrats less 
(but more dull routine work). Thus, bureaucrats could be reluctant to implement such 
information systems.  
Because political institutions in the public sector are rational complex organisations, 
and the actors typically will incorporate all relevant arguments (Brunsson, 1985), there 
is a potential for considerable proliferation of PIs and information overload. The 
performance measurement system then easily is subject to the running down of PIs as 
the agencies adapt and hence the PIs no longer discriminate performance, resulting in 
even more proliferation.  
Outcomes of public sector services are commonly complex. Though there may be 
much interdependence between units, the responsibility for causing an effect on a 
service may be shattered both around in the organisation and outside the organisation 
through common agency. There may on these reasons be no real ‘ownership of the 
performance’. The PIs were seen as imperfect instruments of control resulting in 
unwanted ‘backseat driving’ without providing a greater degree of central control over 
services (Carter, 1989). However, this may be no real obstacle to performance 
measurement because measurement typically is employed in order to enhance 
organisational learning. However, accountability to professional norms by clan control 
rather than to management by output control, may be an obstacle to performance 
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measurement.  
Opportunism may impinge upon measurement and explain why organisations have 
obstacles to using such systems. Misrepresentation is deliberate manipulation of data so 
that reported behaviour differs from actual behaviour. A common strategy to overcome 
or reduce this problem is to have the front-line staff collect and record the data which 
then are integrated into their own information systems. This may also reduce the 
proliferation problem. A special variant of misrepresentation is creaming which is 
serving those clients who most likely will profit from the measurement, by only 
measuring selected aspects to divert the attention. Both misrepresentation and creaming 




Dysfunctional effects of narrow or biased organisational goals are highly relevant 
obstacles to using performance measurement as organisational control. Suboptimisation 
is the pursuit of narrow local objectives by managers, at the expense of the objectives of 
the organisation as a whole. Tunnel vision is defined as an emphasis by management on 
phenomena that are quantified in the performance measurement scheme, at the expense 
of unquantified aspects of performance. Myopia is the pursuit of short term target at the 
expense of legitimate long term objectives. Myopia could be countered by measuring 
processes related to long run effectiveness, rather than measuring outcome. Measure 
fixation is defined as an emphasis on measures on success rather than the underlying 
objective. For instance, in several studies PIs on equity were found to be sparse relative 
to data on cost efficiency, even though the critique of the emphasis on cost-minimising 
rather than welfare optimising has been known in the public administration literature for 
long time (Simon, 1947/1997). 
Performance measurement may also be exposed to more dysfunctions common in the 
Soviet and budgeting literature. The ratchet-effect may be explained as the phenomenon 
where targets are irreversibly raised in response to one year’s productivity improvement. 
This effect may be anticipated and countered by gaming. Gaming is defined as 
deliberate manipulation of behaviour to secure strategic advantage. Gaming leads to 
distortions in actual behaviour, while misrepresentation is the distortion of reported 
behaviour. Gaming may be countered by using a number of PIs which may be difficult 
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to game simultaneously. However, this strategy also may lead to proliferation. Another 
strategy is to use performance measurement which is independent of historical data. 
Methods as data envelopment analysis (DEA), ratio analysis and benchmarking using 
cross-sectional data may also counter gaming. These methods may function as 
introduction of competition through pseudo-markets and selection of ‘best-practices’. 
Albeit such measures may enhance cost efficiency and equity, variation and selection 
are no guaranties for optimality (Alchian, 1950). Bureaucratic measurement schemes 
can furthermore inhibit innovation and lead to ossification. Ossification is defined as 
organisational paralysis brought about by excessively rigid systems. Ossification could 
be countered by annual system reviews using the criterion of decision-relevance and 
cost-benefit judgements, in addition to rewarding managers for awareness of new 
challenges.  
If the political perspective could be argued for explaining benefits from using 
performance measurement, then this perspective could be used in explaining 
organisational obstacles also. If the outcome could be revealing the organisational 
complexity and inconsistencies to the environment through transparency and 
accountability, the implications may as well turn out to some stakeholders as increased 
conflicts and decline in both credibility, legitimacy, and hence reduced power and less 
resources in the longer run. For instance PIs in central and local government, which are 
public information, may enhance the decibel meter, which is feedback politicians 
receive from constituency groups by bureaucratic performance (Moe, 1984). Although 
‘back-seat driving’ may have no immediate effects on enhanced control, several long 
run consequences could be anticipated. As central government or the local government 
principals learn more about local government slack, grants may also be reduced and not 
only redistributed. The effect of politicians granting reduced budgets to a bureau after 
exposure to new information from the agent is known as negative political feedback. 
Organisational obstacles to performance measurement may thus have both legitimate 





Organisational actors implement and use performance measurement when the estimated 
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overall benefits supersede the expected overall costs. This explanation corresponds to 
standard, positive, agency theory arguments. However, the costs and benefits must be 
examined along dimensions of instrumentalism, institutionalism and politics 
simultaneously. The costs and benefits may also vary over the different stages of 
implementation, use and effects. As the conclusion is profoundly simple on the 
conceptual level, it is overly complex, controversial and indeterminate on a practical 
level. One may assume that power and resources of using PIs will change during the 
performance measurement system’s life cycle, from case to case, between organisational 
units, and between governmental levels. That is when politics enters the stage. This may 
call for empirical studies of users of PIs as advocates and guardians, ‘techies’ (experts) 
and laymen, and as winners and losers. 
The dominant perspective on organisational control has been managerial cybernetics, 
contingency theory, and symbolism from new institutionalism. However, the core of a 
public sector performance measurement research programme should also incorporate 
adjacent perspectives as agency theory, public choice, organisational learning, and not at 
least the resource dependence perspective which in fact incorporates many of the other 
theories and, furthermore, addresses politics explicitly. Paradoxically, the resource 
dependence perspective seems at present to be under-utilised in public management. 
The literature review has revealed several concepts as being relevant in explaining 
performance measurement, for instance decision relevance, running down, proliferation, 
slack, asymmetric information, uncertainty, and ambiguity. This study documents public 
sector performance measurement as a very complex organisational form used for 
instrumental, political and institutional reasons simultaneously. The findings do not, 
however, give any unequivocal support for the decoupling proposition, maybe because it 
neglects resistance. Nor has the conventional wisdom from contingency theory of use of 
budget and clan control rather than behaviour and output control (i.e. performance 
measurement) under contingencies of ambiguity and uncertainty, provided adequate 
explanations, although this may also be due to its use of abstract concepts, complicated 
presentation, and disconnection from decision variables actually used in organisations 
(Pfeffer, 1997).  
The present study is limited regarding review of many relevant theories to include in 
a public sector performance measurement research programme. Specifically it should be 
noted that the mimetic isomorphism proposition in new institutionalism (DiMaggio and 
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Powell, 1983), where organisations adapt to ambiguity and uncertainty by modelling 
themselves after other organisations which are perceived as successful, could provide 
explanations of organisational use of performance measurement under contingencies of 
asymmetric information, uncertainty and ambiguity, which are highly relevant for public 
sector performance measurement. Such explanations may simultaneously combine both 
instrumental, institutional and political dimensions. Furthermore, the mimetic 
isomorphism proposition, in contrast to the decoupling proposition, to a large degree 
corresponds both to agency theory, organisational ecology, classical contingency theory 
as well as with the resource dependence perspective. 
Future research on public sector performance measurement may be fruitfully pursued 
along several paths. First, a conceptual model of organisational use of performance 
measurement may be developed. Second, empirical studies of how organisational 
control structures are used could be utilised to put hypotheses from different theoretical 
perspectives and theories to empirical tests. Third, more empirical studies on effects of 
performance measurement systems may be conducted.  
 









The purpose of this chapter is to formulate the research problem initially addressed in 
chapter 1 in greater detail. This is done by developing a conceptual model of 
organisational use of performance measurement in political institutions, and formulating 
corresponding, testable hypotheses. My main research question is how asymmetric 
information and uncertainty impinge upon performance measurement in political 
institutions. However, it is now time for me to draw upon the conceptual discussion 
from chapter 2 and the empirical evidence I have reviewed in chapter 3. This means that 
when I shall try to answer my overall research question, there are several issues related 
to it that I want to address in order to provide a qualified answer. Specifically, the 
notions of ambiguity and complexity as dimensions of uncertainty have to be 
recognised.  
To recapitulate chapter 3, the literature review revealed several ‘white spots’ in the 
literature regarding organisational use of performance measurement in the public sector. 
First, conceptual studies on the organisational level are lacking. Second, some assertions 
with public management are taken for granted without, or with contradictory empirical 
support. Third, there have not been many empirical studies of the underlying causal 
processes to explain the organisational diffusion, use or effects of public sector 
performance measurement. Fourth, power issues have only implicit or seldom been 
addressed. A conceptual model of organisational use of public sector performance 
measurement seems on this background to be warranted before one proceeds with any 
further empirical studies.  
The rest of the chapter is outlined as followed: In the next section concepts and 
relationships explaining use of public sector performance measurement derived from 
agency theory/public choice, contingency theory, and new institutionalism are 
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elaborated. A conceptual model is formulated and testable hypotheses are stated. All 
hypotheses are stated in present tense and written as positive assertions. They are not 
written as ‘null’ hypotheses. The hypotheses are formulated consistent with the evidence 
stated in the literature and not necessarily according to what I personally have believed. 
The third section discusses the conceptual model based on common criteria.  
 
 
THREE PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANISATIONAL CONTROL 
 
Agency theory and public choice are chosen from the economics of organisation as 
relevant perspectives for the conceptual model because they both address information 
issues in organisational control explicitly. On the other hand, Mueller (1989) stated that 
power was largely ignored by economists and practitioners of public choice. This calls 
for a deeper appreciation of power issues in addition to the public choice perspective. 
The structural contingency approach states that under certain conditions, some structures 
are more effective than other structures. In recent years also the new institutionalism has 
been widely used, and especially among sociologist management researchers. The 
contingency theory and new institutionalism perspectives have been chosen because of 
their explicit treatment of ambiguity and uncertainty in organisational control. For 
simplicity and extending the terminology of chapter 3, I have labeled the public 
choice/agency model as an instrumental perspective, the contingency/new 
institutionalist models as institutional, and the political model as politics. Conceptually 
it is not possible to distinguish one, political model from the other persepctives because 
almost all the other perspectives used here encompass politics to some extent or another. 
Cf. for instance how public choice explains bureaucrats’ use of asymmetric information. 
However, the research tradition within most perspectives but public choice and the 
resource dependence perspective, seems to have treated politics implicitly. In this study 
I have aimed at modelling politics explicitly. 
The selection of concepts explaining use of performance measurement is based on 
the literature review in chapter 3. This review revealed the organisational concepts of 
asymmetric information, slack, uncertainty regarding the transformation process of input 
to output, ambiguity of output, and political power, as relevant to explain the 
organisational use of performance measurement in the public sector. The propositions 
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regarding the concepts (the ‘whats’) and their relationships (the ‘hows’) are presented 
together with the discussion of their underlying causal relationships (the ‘whys’) 
(Whetten, 1989). Hypotheses are then derived and are termed H1, H2, …, H10, cf. also 
figure 4. Cues from the conceptual model to variables, indicators and data on the 






























Figure 4 is a conceptual model of use of performance measurement in political 
institutions. Otley (1980) noted that as organisations use a wide range of control 
mechanisms serving different purposes, it is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the 
effect of one specific means of control, say use of performance measurement. He instead 
recommended an initial research strategy of trying to isolate those control systems 
which are particularly suited for certain circumstances. In figure 4 this means that the 
explanatory concepts are chosen for their presumed causal relationships with 
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organisational control. That is, the conceptual model is modelling the relationship 
between organisational structure and organisational control. The relationship between 
organisational control as independent variable and its effects on organisational 
performance as dependent variable (the dotted lines from use of performance 
measurement to the three concepts of cost efficiency, allocative efficiency and equity), is 
not studied here. (See Steers (1975) for a review of empirical, multivariate models of 
organisational effectiveness, and March and Sutton (1997) for a discussion of studies 
with performance as a dependent variable.) The omission of effectiveness as dependent 
variable in contingency theory research has formerly been critisised in the literature 
(Otley, 1980). However, to include organisational effectiveness as independent variable 
to explain organisational control, has also been put forward (Langfield-Smith, 1997). It 
is this latter approach which has been chosen in this study: Organisational slack, which 
could be related to organisational effectiveness, has been used to explain use of 
organisational control models.  
 
An instrumental model 
 
The typical problems studied in public choice are bureaucrats trying to maximise output, 
the budget or the discretionary budget, and the sponsor, often political representatives, 
maximising votes. In public choice it is asserted that uncertainty creates a potential to 
exercise power while information provides a capacity to do so. Public choice and agency 
theory have two relevant concepts for explaining organisational control and use of 




In the Niskanen-tradition of public choice, the word bureaucrats has two meanings. In a 
general sense it includes all full-time employees of a bureau. A bureau is defined as a 
non-profit organisation financed by an appropriation or a grant from a sponsor. For the 
most part bureaucrats refers to senior officials of a bureau with a separate identifiable 
budget (Blais and Dion, 1991). In this study the term bureaucrats is employed in the first 
mentioned meaning, as employees of a bureau.  
Mueller (1989) concluded in his review of the Niskanen-tradition that the 
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bureaucracy models of Niskanen are static models and do not directly explain why 
government grows. Mueller pointed to an indirect explanation of opportunism as ‘ability 
to misrepresent the true prices and quantities of publicly provided goods’ as cause. This 
may point to asymmetry and possibly the agents’ (bureaucrats’) ability to achieve sub-
optimal solutions due to uncertainty of cost structure and output: ‘The ability to 
misrepresent [true prices and quantities] is likely to depend in turn on the size and 
complexity of the budget itself. The bigger the bureaucracy, the more difficult it is for 
outsiders to monitor its activity, and the more insiders there are who are working to 
increase the size of the bureaucracy. Thus, the bureaucracy is likely to depend on its 
absolute size’ (Mueller, 1989: 340).  
In agency theory the concept of ‘specific information’ have been used in conjunction 
with organisation size: ‘For our purposes, noncomplex means that specific information 
relevant to decisions is concentrated in one or a few agents. (Specific information is 
detailed information that is costly to transfer among agents.) Most small organizations 
tend to be noncomplex, and most large organization tend to be complex, but the 
correspondence is not perfect’ (Fama and Jensen, 1983: 304). Thus, bureaucracy size 
could possibly be used as an indicator for degree of asymmetric information. The bigger 
the size of the bureau, either measured as budget or by staff, the greater the degree of 
asymmetry or specific information ‘in favor’ of the bureau.  
Hypothesis 1 is formulated congruent with public choice but applied to political 
institutions with multiple principal–agent relationships. In public choice and in agency 
theory opportunistic behaviour is assumed undertaken in order to maximise budget or 
slack. The bigger the bureaucracy, the more difficult it could be for outsiders to monitor 
its activity, and the more insiders there could be to work for increasing the bureaucracy 
and increasing slack (Mueller, 1989). With increasing size there may be more agents 
who could co-operate in misrepresenting the true prices and quantities of the publicly 
provided goods, thus asymmetric information is assumed to increase with the number of 
bureaucrats. One means to increase the bureaucracy, budget or slack, is by utilising 
private information, distort information or hide information. Opportunistic behaviour 
could in this manner then be conceptualised as refusing performance measurement in 
order to utilise asymmetric information between the agent and the principal. As 
performance measurement reduces asymmetric information, the bureaus will resist such 
implementation and use. Thus, one could assume that performance measurement would 
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decline relatively with increasing bureaucracy size. However, this would be a static 
analysis. Agency theory may also be used to explain organisational development and 
implementation of control structures when there is asymmetric information, which one 
could assume is a typical trait with political institutions. The principals may employ 
monitoring in order to facilitate organisational learning. This calls for performance 
measurement which in the longer run may reduce uncertainty. The propositions 
provided on asymmetric information from public choice and agency theory thus seem to 
be contradictory and the net effect indeterminate. To my knowledge, empirical tests of 
these two propositions simultaneously, have not been documented in the literature. As 
conventional wisdom predicts that output control is relatively less used under 
uncertainty, hypothesis 1 is therefore formulated congruent with public choice.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Organisations with much asymmetric information use performance 





Slack has been defined as payment to coalition members in excess of what is required to 
maintain the organisation. In public choice and in agency theory one assumes that the 
bureaus and agents may behave opportunistically. They may maximise the discretionary 
budget (budget slack) (Migué and Bélanger, 1974) or utilise private information for 
rent-seeking. In order to do so, they could avoid (exit) or resist (voice) performance 
measurement (Hirschman, 1970). Cf. also the concept influence cost from agency theory 
which is defined as attempts to reallocate and protect rents and quasi-rents within the 
organisation (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Influence costs are assumed to rise with the 
size of the organisation because relative more people will compete for the bigger rents 
in absolute size. Persistent non-legitimate slack in one municipality or in one 
governmental level, implies that other organisations or citizens are without some 
resources which they otherwise could have been entitled to. Mueller (1989) found 
evidence for government bureaucracies having higher unit costs than private firms when 
they supplied measurable outputs (tons of garbage collected). Mueller hypothesized that 
level of slack will increase with bureaucracy size and complexity of the budget. Blais 
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and Dion (1991) found no evidence for Niskanen type hypotheses regarding slack-
optimising bureaucrats, but the effect of size was not investigated.  
Hypothesis 2 is concerned with actions the bureacrats could execute in order to 
enhance slack if slack initially is low, alternatively actions to keep slack high in 
circumstances where slack initially is high. For instance, the agent could refuse to 
undertake performance measurement in order to conceal a high or an illegitimate level 
of slack. Alternatively, with low level of slack the agents could try to reveal information 
in order to influence decisions such that the level of slack in the longer run increases. As 
there are more bureaucrats in large organisations who could behave opportunistically 
and facilitate asymmetric information, one could therefore assume that organisations 
with more asymmetric information (large bureaucracies) have relatively more slack than 
other organisations (hypothesis 2).  
 
Hypothesis 2: Organisations with relatively more asymmetric information have 
relatively more slack. 
 
The NPM literature has also addressed slack as an explanatory concept to explain the 
doctrinal components of NPM. Hood (1991, 1995) proposed the motif-and-opportunity 
proposition to explain the adoption of components in the NPM in different countries. 
That is, fiscal stress, meaning little slack, and a governable public sector, in the meaning 
that the societal ruling coalition is willing or able to implement changes, both have to be 
present for NPM to be used. If local government efforts to legitimise increased slack do 
not succeed, these municipalities may face the risk of employees, bureaucrats, 
inhabitants and firms voting with their feet by migrating to other municipalities. Thus, 
the employment of performance measurement in this conflict of scarce resources by the 
concept of slack is a relevant causal explanation to be modeled (hypothesis 3). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Organisations with relatively little slack use performance 
measurement to a larger extent than organisations with relatively more slack. 
 
An institutionalist model 
 
In the conceptual model in figure 4 the contingency perspective means that under some 
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combinations of ambiguity and uncertainty, some information systems are used more 




Uncertainty has once been defined as the difference between the amount of information 
required to perform a task and the amount of information already possessed by the 
organisation (Galbraith, 1973). The greater the task uncertainty, the more information 
must be processed during execution of the task to a given level of performance. Thus, 
the amount of task uncertainty is a result of a specific task and a specific organisation. 
To this one may add that then organisational history and power may impinge upon both 
uncertainty and the execution of tasks. A problem with Galbraith’s (1973) definition of 
uncertainty is that organisations perform tasks in spite of uncertainty and lack of 
relevant information. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) defined uncertainty as the degree to 
which future states of the world cannot be anticipated and accurately predicted. It seems 
as this definition is closer to the inherent meaning in uncertainty as used by Thompson 
(1967). I have therefore used the latter definition of uncertainty in my study.  
Otley (1980) concluded that of all the contingent variables proposed, uncertainty in 
particular stood out. (Uncertainty was also referred to as unpredictability, and non-
routineness.) Complexity and size were considered as important because of the 
uncertainty associated with them. Uncertainty is an alternative explanation to 
opportunism and slack-maximising in explaining the presence or absence of use of 
performance measurement. High degree of complexity in production can lead to 
uncertainty regarding the output of the production. There may exist several relations 
between output uncertainty and performance measurement. First, much output 
uncertainty may give little information with decision relevance from any PIs. This may 
cause performance measurement to be cost inefficient to undertake and reduce the 
likelihood of performance measurement of services with a high degree of output 
uncertainty. This explanation has been the ‘conventional wisdom’ and also expressed in 
public sector accounting and organisation theory textbooks.  
Organisational complexity and uncertainty may be used in arguments which provide 
contradictory explanations to the conventional wisdom on organisational use or non-use 
of performance measurement. One argument is that less complex (small size) 
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organisations may have easier flow of rich information (Daft and Lengel, 1990). Rich 
information is complex information and is often provided by face-to-face contact, verbal 
communication or direct observation. This gives little demand for formalised 
management reporting systems which anyway encompass information of low richness. It 
may not be feasible to collect large amounts of rich information in large organisations. 
Thus, information has to be condensed, analysed and aggregated into numbers and 
figures of low richness, especially for routine tasks which also could be more prevalent 
in larger organisations. Larger organisations may also achieve more benefits from the 
resources invested in performance measurement systems relative to smaller 
organisations. This may make information with low richness as PIs redundant or cost 
inefficient in small sized organisations.  
A second argument may also be put forward. If there is much output uncertainty, this 
may call for measurements just in order to reveal information and enhance 
organisational learning (Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1983). However, hypothesis 4 is formulated congruent with conventional 
wisdom contingency theory, and not the classical contingency, resource dependence or 
new institutionalism theories.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Performance measurement is used less when there is more 
uncertainty in the service production.  
 
In organisation theory it is often assumed that under contingencies of uncertainty, 
slack is favourable for organisational effectiveness. Slack can grease operations, trigger 
innovation, serve as stock of energy, and buffer against fluctuations and conflicts. In this 
respect one may assume there is an optimal amount of slack. Here I have for simplicity 
assumed the basic proposition that relatively more uncertainty leads to more 
organisational slack (hypothesis 5).  
 
Hypothesis 5: When there is more uncertainty in the service production there is 
also relatively more organisational slack.  
 




Ambiguity refers to words, sentences or events with two or more interpretations 
concurrently. It can also denote unclarity, complexity and paradoxes. Additionally it 
should be noted that ambiguity is a subjectively perceived situation (Weick, 1995). If 
ambiguity refers to lack of clarity, it could be similar to uncertainty. However, the main 
problem with ambiguity, and contrary to uncertainty, is that more information does not 
necessarily overcome the information (decision) problem.  
In this study ambiguity has been restricted to the political processes in the local 
government representative councils. In public choice the concept political competition is 
used to denote rivalry among representatives or candidates for seats or other political 
resources. Baber (1983) discussed the difference between inter- and intraparty 
competition and auditing in the public sector. He argued that if political agents alone 
can deal more credibly with interest groups in local than in state governments, then the 
benefits to political entrepreneurs of party affilition are relatively less in local 
government. Thus, intraparty competition likely plays a relatively greater role in 
contracting and monitoring in local governments than in state government. With a 
relatively high degree of political competition between representatives or candidates 
within the same party, one may assume that this can arouse ambiguity. Thus, there could 
be relatively more ambiguity in local government politics than in state or national 
politics.  
With a high degree of ambiguity on political goals it could be difficult to state what is 
relevant to measure with PIs. It is assumed that ambiguity increases with political 
coalitions. Thus, political coalitions could diminish the use of performance 
measurement because ambiguity is not reduced by more information. This could reduce 
the likelihood of using performance measurement, according to contingency theory. In 
the conventional wisdom then, more ambiguity implies less use of output control and 
hence less use of performance measurement (hypothesis 6). In the new institutionalism, 
more ambiguity induces symbolic use of control structures according to the decoupling 
proposition (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In the mimetic isomorphism proposition (Powell 
and DiMaggio, 1983) however, more ambiguity leads to enhanced modelling activities 
after perceived successful organisation. If successful public sector organisations are 
conjectured with use of performance measurement, then more ambiguity furthers more 
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use of performance measurement, and indeterminate if this notion is not the case. As 
with the test of the contradicting explanations of monitoring advanced by public choice 
versus agency theory, I do not know of empirical tests of the competing propositions of 
decoupling versus mimetic isomorphism. However, as the conventional wisdom 
corresponds both to the 1980s version of contingency theory and to the decoupling 
proposition, hypothesis 6 is formulated according to these explanations rather than the 
mimetic isomorphism proposition.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Performance measurement is used less when there is more 
ambiguity than when there is less ambiguity.  
 
A political model 
 
Organisational, political power is assumed to be constituted by laws and regulations and 
to be dependent upon political parties, interest groups, political and executive leadership 




Several studies indicate that municipal leadership may only have modest effect (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). Changes of municipal leaders as mayors and chief administrative 
officers, only explained a small part of the variance in total income and expenditure in 
Canadian municipalities (Begadon and Agócs, 1995). Characteristics of cities, local 
government structure, and interest groups’ influence, had far greater impact on 
municipal income and expenditures than either short-term historical changes or changes 
in leadership. Nevertheless, a weakness with such studies could be that analyses of 
broad budget allocations do not address the ability of municipal leadership to influence 
allocation or distribution within the aggregate budget. Another critisism of such studies 
is that budgets are concerned about input, while management and leadership may be 
more concerned about output and outcome. The conclusion regarding low municipal 
leadership influence may therefore have been valid on organisational budget decisions, 
but not on performance. Leadership may have more to say on management issues as 
performance measurement, than on budgets, which is a typical responsibility of the 
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representatives. Leadership variables have therefore been omitted in this study. On the 
other hand, a variable for management skills and competence on formal control 
structures have been included. 
One may assume that performance measurement and monitoring are demanding 
regarding management skills and competence. For instance, in Lüder’s contingency 
model of financial accounting innovations, staff qualifications are categorised as a 
component of implementation barriers (Chan, Jones and Lüder, 1996; Laughlin and 
Pallot, 1998). Thus, management skills and competence are candidates for formulating 
hypotheses. Furthermore, if there is low management competence, the organisation 
could try to balance this over time for instance by investing in research and development 
or participating in networks. Networks could take the form of formal or informal co-
operation with other governmental organisations, consultants, business schools or 
universities. Inter- and intra organisational implementation structures or networks are 
also common in industries and government. Organisations where management has 
access to or participates in performance measurement networks, are likely to have 
relatively more performance measurement. If such networks are known in advance, they 
could have been included as variables in the study. Some examples of explanations 
could be that in smaller organisations there is relatively less slack and less management 
competence in performance measurement, and hence use of performance measurement 
are less than in bigger organisations. However, as the political leadership is assumed to 
seek control by employing skilled, competent and loyal management, this may increase 
management competence, but could also increase the need for monitoring the agents 
(Zimmerman, 1977).  
 
Hypothesis 7: Performance measurement is used relatively more when there is 




Political power and politics are subject to several approaches of conceptualisation. NPM 
has been adopted both in countries with conservative or liberal rules as in the UK and 
USA in the 1980s, as well as in countries which usually are regarded as social 
democratic or socialist as Norway and Sweden (Hood, 1995; Laughlin and Pallot, 1998). 
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NPM has also been upheld in countries when the major political preferences have 
shifted from conservative to liberal or to social democratic as in the UK and in the USA 
in the 1990s. Sørensen (1995) studied spending preferences of elected local government 
politicians in Norway and argued that political parties were particularly relevant as they 
are the basis for the electorate choice. He found that party affiliation had an impact upon 
the demand pattern in the Norwegian local government. Aaberge and Langørgen (1997) 
found that the municipal party concentration, measured with the Herfindahl-index, 
correlated with the marginal propensity to save. Hence, they concluded that a strong 
political leadership had the opportunity to resist pressure for spending increases. Thus, 
political power seems to be a relevant concept both judged by theoretical and practical 
considerations.  
Information on cost efficiency, allocative efficiency and equity from performance 
measurement may be used to alter budgets both in content as well as in size. From 
public choice it is known that leftist representatives usually prefer to expand public 
activities while rightist representatives prefer to reduce or hold activities (Sørensen, 
1995). Left-wing parties were the Socialist Left Party and the Labor Party. Leftist parties 
could oppose performance measurement, because this information may be used to re-
allocate resources from the public sector to the private sector. But, leftist politicians 
could also use performance measurement to argue for increased resources and taxes in 
the longer run (optimise output to a given level of input). Rightist politicians could use 
performance measurement in order to reduce slack and hence reduce public sector 
resources and tax burden in the longer run (minimise budget to a given output). Thus, 
both rightist and leftist politicians are expected to use performance measurement in 
order to enhance cost efficiency, allocative efficiency and equity according to their 
political preferences. How political preferences would impinge upon performance 
measurement on the organisational level, has hitherto not been addressed. There is 
therefore no theoretical justification regarding any directional effect of political 
preferences on use of organisational control structures. Thus, the relationship between 




Power to influence coalitions and hence decisions is assumed to stem from relative size 
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of the interest groups. It is therefore assumed that organisations will be influenced by 
their most powerful interest groups in order to use performance measurement in 
accordance with the preferences of the interest groups. Sørensen and Hagen (1995) 
found that local government representatives (agents) generally were responsive to the 
demands of the local residents (principals). The national party politics seemed to have 
had little impact on the local adjustment processes. Thus, in studies of local government 
politics one may, to simplify the issue, rule out influence from national party politics. A 
large share of local government employees of the total number of voters may on the 
other hand have influence on the representatives preferences and thus on organisational 
decisions and actions. Most Norwegian government employees preferred a higher public 
spending level than did other citizens (Sørensen, 1995). Furthermore, public sector 
professionals demanded greater quantities of their own services. Relative power 
between politicians and public sector employees may then impinge on the use of 
performance measurement. I assume that the better informed the politicians are, the less 
power the interest groups will have. The more power the bureaucrats’ interest groups 
have, the less the political power of the sponsors, assumed that there are no coalitions 
between the political parties and the public sector employees.  
While budget allocations may attract considerable attention both from internal and 
external interest groups, one knows little or nothing empirically of how organisational 
control models attract interest group attention. A problem in the analysis is on the one 
hand, if interest groups are present, to state that they have sought to influence 
organisational decisions. On the other hand, interest group may put considerable 
pressure both on politicians and on management. However, interest group activities may 
not always succeed. On the contrary, such activities may also trigger enhanced 
managerial and political efforts in performance measurement to suppress the power of 
internal interest groups in political institutions. However, hypothesis 8 is formlated with 
the assumption that more internal interest group power affects performance 
measurement negatively.  
 
Hypothesis 8: Performance measurement is used relatively less when the public 
sector employees are more powerful.  
 
Sørensen (1995) also found that members of the leftist parties tended to have relatively 
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more representatives with a public sector employment background. Thus, there may be 
an interaction effect between leftist political power and public sector employee interest 
group power. As representatives’ political preferences and the over-representation 
(adverse selection) of public sector employees among the left-wing parties have not 
been previously studied in relation to use of formal control models in organisations, a 
model with interaction terms may be included in empirical studies. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Performance measurement is used less when there are relatively 
more leftist representatives and at the same time relatively more powerful 




Municipal dependence on local taxpayers could be a motivating force for disclosing 
information as performance measurement in annual reports. Although there are many 
information strategies open to a local government which want to legitimise efficiency 
and avoid Tiebout mobility out of the municipality, use of annual reports and media may 
be relevant. Local government dependence on local taxpayers is assumed to correlate 
with relatively much use of performance measurement, cf. hypothesis 10.  
 
Hypothesis 10: Performance measurement is used relatively more when there is a 





A model should be judged on the three criteria of truth, beauty and justice, where justice 
is a model’s ability to contribute to making a better world (Lave and March, 1975). 




Truth has to do with a model’s ability to be tested and to reveal empirical support of the 
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hypotheses. The model in figure 4 is testable in the sense that significant correlations in 
the expected directions between variables measuring the explanatory concepts, and 
between these variables and the studied phenomenon organisational use of performance 
measurement, would corroborate or falsify hypotheses derived from the propositions. 
Furthermore, it is better to compare alternative models rather than to accept or reject a 
single model (Lave and March, 1975). Regarding the demand for testing alternative 
models instead of one single model, the conceptual model depicted in figure 4 is 
comprised of three models. The criteria of testing alternative models can be 
accomplished by empirical tests of hypotheses derived from all the three alternative 
models simultaneously. In addition, the instrumental model, the institutional model, and 
the political model may be judged and compared to the symbolic perspective in new 




Beauty is characterised by simplicity, fertility, and surprise. These three dimensions will 




The model in figure 4 have only concepts included which were discussed as explaining 
organisational use of performance measurement in the literature review in chapter 3. 
Concepts explaining the implementation phase of performance measurement systems 
have not been included in the conceptual model. 
Some frameworks explaining organisational structures and use of information have 
already been proposed, as Lüder’s contingency model of public sector accounting 
innovation and Hood’s (1995) opportunity-and-motive explanation for NPM. Such 
frameworks may also take culture and social and political structures into consideration. 
Hood’s motive-and-opportunity propositions could have cultural assumptions regarding 
opportunity with implications for slack. Hofstede (1984) defined culture as collective 
programming of the mind. Hofstede (1984) studied culture in a multinational company 
in 40 countries and his analysis revealed 11 national cultural clusters based on the four 
main dimensions labelled ‘power distance’, ‘uncertainty avoidance’, ‘individualism’ and 
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‘masculinity’. Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark comprised for 
instance one such cluster (a North-European group). South-Africa, Germany, 
Switzerland and Italy was another group. New Zealand, Ireland, UK, Canada, Australia 
and USA belonged to a third cluster (an Anglo-American group). An objection with 
regard to comprehensivness in the proposed conceptual model in figure 4, could be that 
cultural and societal structures have not been explicitly modeled. On the other side, 
judged by parsimony, one could argue that such factors could be explanatory concepts 
both with regard to size, slack, uncertainty, ambiguity, and power. However, for 
simplicity of the model these exogenous variables have not been included.  
Hofstede (1984) concluded his study of culture by stating that in the past 30 years 
there had been too much reliance on American-made management and theories for 
countries in which neither the societal conditions nor the mental programming of the 
population were similar to those in the United States. He argued that there was a lack of 
locally valid theories of management and organisation in which the universally, the 
globally imposed, and the culturally specific elements were recognised. Thus, both the 
perceived and accepted level of uncertainty and ambiguity, and power in figure 4 could 
be dependent on culture both on a national level, and also on an organisational level. 
In spite of the conceptual model’s parsimony, the conceptual model in figure 4 
nevertheless is comprehensive regarding potential concepts’ relevance, as reviewed in 
chapter 3, for explaining use of performance measurement. The call for a theoretical 
foundation in public choice, agency theory and organisational learning (Jackson, 1990), 
and the importance of decision relevance (Mayston, 1985), proliferation and running 
down (Meyer and Gupta, 1994), have been incorporated. In new institutionalism, 
decoupling has often been over-emphasised (Carruthers, 1995), and power-issues has 
often been treated too lightly (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Instead of using decoupling 
from the symbolic perspective as explanatory mechanism only, both the classical as well 
as conventional wisdom contingency theories have been employed. The often omitted 
power issue in both public choice and new institutionalism has been accounted for by 
including a distinct model of power.  
The comprehensiveness of the conceptual model also poses some potential problems. 
The concepts are selected from perspectives which may have different levels of analysis. 
Public choice and agency theory have assumptions at the individual level but 
nevertheless study group or organisational outcomes. Structural contingency theory is 
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aimed at the organisational level. The resource dependence perspective is related to both 
intra- as well as interorganisational dependencies. The new institutionalism is often 
more concerned about organisational fields than with specific organisations. There may 
also be overlap of the models as power could have been modeled explicitly in all the 
three perspectives of instrumentalism, institutionalism and politics. The separation of 
power into one model on the other hand makes comparisons of different models more 
feasible later on at an empirical stage. This may enhance the possibility of selecting only 
concepts and models with empirical support and as such enhance truth and parsimony.  
The conceptual model in figure 4 has several limitations. First, temporal effects are 
not modelled. However, in empirical studies the model may be employed with lagged 
variables. For instance, slack in period t – 1 could be hypothesised to influence use of 
PIs in period t. One may also imagine that anticipated performance measurement in 
period t may influence slack in period t – 1, as seen from periode t – 1. Thus, 
simultaneity may be present. Second, the model is still overly simplified. Many control 
variables as national culture and governmental regulations are omitted. Third, only use 
of performance measurement as dependent upon either the bureaucrats or the political 
representatives as organisational constituencies, are modeled. Direct influence from 




The fertility aspect is upheld by generality; making nouns and verbs general. Generality 
is pursued by the choice of general concepts in the model. The generality makes the 
model relevant for several theoretical perspectives as public choice and agency theory, 
structural contingency theory, and new institutionalism. The generality also makes the 
model fertile for empirical research. Studies may be executed by a variety of methods as 
by panel data design, cross-sectional studies and by case studies. Data may be collected 
from many potential sources and by different tecniques as interviews, observations, 
surveys, and content analysis. Variables may span from micro level individual data 
regarding representatives’ political preferences, to organisational meso level variables 
regarding services’ output uncertainty and goal ambiguity, to organisational macro level 
variables as size, budget complexity and slack. Thus, the hypotheses are general enough 
to be utilised in a number of different research strategies with respect to design and data 
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in later empirical stages. The conceptual model can in this respect also serve in different 




A surprising model is an unpredictable model. The many tentative relations in the 
model(s) imply a large stock of potential surprises in explaning organisational use of 
information and addressing conventional wisdom. As an example, one may think of 
high degree of ambiguity and asymmetry as very likely to foster opportunism, but that 
strong bureaucratic norms of accountability, transparency and righteousness nurtured by 
altruistic organisational, or national cultures reduce such organisational behaviour. The 
conceptual model may also provide surprises in empirical tests of conventional wisdom 
both in management practice and in accounting theory, political science and in new 




The conceptual model may have several implications for theory and practice which in 
the longer run tentatively may be beneficial. First, many reforms have been studied in 
the political science or sociologist new institutionalism tradition and recorded as 
hypocrisy (Brunsson, 1989), as implementation failures, and as mere fashions, 
ceremonies and myths without altering organisational practice (Brunsson and Olsen, 
1993), or again as complex and paradoxical patterns (Olson, Guthrie and Humphrey, 
1998). The conceptual model developed in this study may give an enhanced 
understanding of the underlying causal instrumental, institutional and political dynamics 
present in such reforms and their contributions to the observed organisational practices 
and paradoxes.  
Second, Lüder’s contingency model has conceptualised financial accounting 
innovation at the national level. Hood’s hypotheses have conceptualised core 
explanations regarding NPM at the national level. The model in figure 4 has 
conceptualised use of non-financial control systems at the organisational level. It fills in 
a gap where conceptualising the use of non-financial organisational control systems has 
been missing.  
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The proposed conceptual model in this study has several implications for future 
research and some recommended research problems are addressed. First, as performance 
measurement has been described as one doctrinal component of the reinventing 
government movement and NPM, this model may contribute with factual knowledge 
about use of organisational control structures as performance measurement. Empirical 
tests of the proposed model or elements of it, may provide enhanced knowledge of how, 
where and why performance measurement is used in public sector. 
Second, the model may be used to test hypotheses generated from public choice, 
agency theory, contingency theory and the new institutionalism simultaneously. This is 
warranted as much research on public management models and reforms has been 
studied descriptively in mainly a few perspectives, commonly structural contingency 
theory and/or the new institutionalism, without adequately testing alternative 
explanations from competing models, say budget maximisation or opportunism as main 





The main result of this chapter is a conceptualisation of the use of performance 
measurement in political institutions in a simple model with testable hypotheses. The 
hypotheses can also be classified into distinct models from different theoretical 
perspectives. These models may then be compared against each other. As such this 
conceptual model is a contribution following general advises in building models in the 
social sciences of comparing alternative explanatory models, and following the advise 
from Meyer and Gupta (1994) regarding comparing several models in trying to explain 
organisational use of performance measurement. The model encompasses not only 
potential opportunistic, budget-maximising or rent-seeking behaviour from the bureau, 
but also potential ‘shirking’ from the sponsors by not demanding performance 
measurement (assuming a certain level of performance measurement should be 
warranted), which is discussed in public choice but which has often been missing in 
agency theory. Furthermore, the model also conceptualises some political aspects which 
often have been missing and therefore have been called for in the new institutionalism.  
 









The purpose of this chapter is to explain the method I have used. This chapter is divided 
into six sections following this brief introduction: Research design, Content analysis and 
the dependent variable, Independent variables, Data analysis, Limitations and 
delimitations, and Summary. In the next section, Research design, I elaborate on why I 
have chosen a planned variation, correlational design, and why I chose a population 
study of the Norwegian municipal setting. In the second section, I explain why and how 
I used content analysis to collect data for the dependent variable. In the third section I 
document the measurement and data collection of the independent variables. In the 
fourth section, I address the selection of modified regression analysis as estimation 
method for the models. I have included a brief discussion on the limited applicability of 
significance tests in population studies. The fifth section states some limitations and 
delimitations of my study. (Delimitations are limitations on my study I have deliberately 





The overall aim of this study has been to explore the limits of certain theories on the 
economics of organisation in explaining public sector management. Research designs in 
the social sciences are commonly divided into the three groups of exploratory designs, 
quasi-experiments, and correlational designs. The theories’ concepts, relationships and 
domain of explanation have been relatively clearly stated in chapter 4. This excludes an 
exploratory study. Furthermore, as contingency theory often involves several 
independent variables, and testable hypotheses from a conceptual model already are 
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available, a research design with a relative large number of cases instead of case studies, 
could be employed in order to enhance the internal validity. I have therefore chosen a 
correlational research design, also called a cross-sectional study, in this project. A 
correlational design means that the relations between some independent variables and 
dependent variables are measured. However, this design does not establish causality. 
Both the time order of the variables and the ruling out of the alternative explanations 
have to be established by theoretical and logical considerations (Frankfort-Nachmias 




I have already chosen local government as context for my study of organisational 
control in political institutions. Local government both has substantial macro economic 
impact and provides core services in the welfare state. However, it is difficult to draw 
the boundaries between local government and other organisations, both over time and 
between countries. Local government in Scandinavia seems to be suited as setting for 
testing agency theory derived hypotheses because the municipalities are organized 
explicitly in terms of principal–agent relationships (Olson, 1990). The setting which has 
been selected for the empirical study was the municipal local government in Norway. 
The municipal sector is assumed to have a relatively high degree of ambiguity and 
services which often are associated with high levels of uncertainty. Local government as 
setting also provided a high degree of control for ‘external variables’, as the local 
government has relatively comparable institutions. However, it should be noted that 
Norway is a small country and the European countries have different governmental 
institutions compared to the complexity for instance of the US public sector (Olson, 
Guthrie and Humphrey, 1998).  
The governmental sector is often organized in three, hierarchical levels. The 
Norwegian government is also divided into three levels: local authorities 
(municipalities) regional authorities (counties), and the central government. Central 
control over the local government may be classified into four categories: Entitlement of 
citizens’ legal rights to services, restrictions on organisation by legislation and 
regulation, minimum standards, and approval of budgets and loans. Norwegian local 
government is more coercive and centrally controlled than other Scandinavian countries 
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(Baldersheim and Ståhlberg, 1994). However, the Norwegian local government seems to 
be highly suited as setting for studies of the agency theory, public choice, contingency 




On the onset it should be noted that the results from this study are not designed to be of 
empirical generalisability to local government in Norway or in other specific countries 
in general. The purpose of this study has rather been to study some theories in an 
empirical setting and eventually generalise the results to a conceptual level. Financial 
disclosure has been mandatory in Norwegian local government since the 1920s and is 
now regulated by the Municipal Act of 1993. However, use or disclosure of PIs have not 
been mandatory in Norway, albeit certain plans were developed in the mid 1990s for 
mandatory disclosure of municipal PIs from 2001 and onwards. On the other hand, the 
central government and Statistics Norway collects large amounts of local government 
statistics which to some extent also could be used as PIs.  
The Norwegian local government was in 1996 comprised of 435 municipalities and 
18 regional municipalities (counties). It is commonly claimed that the intermediate level 
of government, the counties, is subject to more extensive central control than is the 
lower, municipal level (Sørensen, 1997). One may therefore assume that the municipals 
have more discretion and therefore are better suited empirically as population for this 
study, than the counties are. In addition, the Norwegian local government has far more 
municipalities than counties, something which may be utilised in order to have 
sufficient number of cases for a multivariate analysis.  
To achieve sufficient variation in the independent variables, a planned variation 
design has been employed. Specifically, due to the fact that the large majority of the 
Norwegian municipalities are of rather small size, all the larger municipalities (the 39 
municipalities with 20,000 inhabitants or more in 1996, the capital Oslo excluded), have 
been included in the population. The remaining municipalities were selected from 
Southern part of Norway only in order to reduce institutional and structural variability 
compared to including municipalities from Northern Norway as well. Furthermore, to 
reduce the number of units from the maximum level of 435 municipalities to a 
manageable number of cases for the content analysis data collection, only municipalities 
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from seven of the 18 counties were selected, This stepwise procedure resulted in a 
theoretically defined population of 176 municipalities, including the 39 large 
municipalities, from all the five main regions of Norway. Of the 176 municipalities, 11 
did not respond, and three municipalities did not publish any annual report in 1996. All 
the 11 municipalities which did not respond, had less than 20,000 inhabitants. The 
usable population was then 162 annual reports. I judged this to be an acceptable number 
of cases for undertaking a multivariate analysis.  
 
 
CONTENT ANALYSIS AND THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
The context of potential strategic and symbolic use of information means that both 
validity and reliability could be difficult to achieve by using questionnaires or 
interviews. Thus, one may have assumed a potential threat of strategic answers if 
obtrusive measures should have been used. This called for use of multi methods and 
multi traits (triangulation), or use of unobtrusive measures (Webb, Campbell and 
Schwartz, 1966). In this study the data on the dependent variable has been collected 
with unobtrusive measures by content analysis. The independent variables have been 
collected as secondary data.  
Content analysis has been defined as a research method that uses a set of procedures 
to make valid inferences from a text (Weber, 1990). Content analyses classifies textual 
material by reducing it to more relevant, manageable bits of data. Content analytic 
procedures operate directly on text or transcripts of human communications. Control in 
organisations is closely tied to communication and information. Compared to techniques 
such as interviews or observation, content analysis yields unobtrusive measures in 
which the sender or the receiver of the message is unaware that it is being analyzed. 
This was assessed as enhancing the validity in this study relative to using surveys, 
interviews or observations. However, there is no single right way of doing content 
analysis, and the method is both difficult and time-consuming if it is to be done well.  
 
Municipal annual reports 
 
Data collection on the dependent variable was performed by content analysis of texts in 
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municipal annual reports. Municipal annual reports have been extensively studied by 
content analysis in the empirical performance measurement literature, cf. table 2. Also 
financial annual reporting in the new institutionalism perspective (Mezias, 1990) and 
governmental accounting disclosure in a public choice perspective (Giroux, 1989) have 
been studied. There were several arguments for choosing the annual report as object for 
study. First, annual reporting represents a relatively routine, and maybe also an 
important, behaviour in large bureaucratic organisations. Second, the reporting process 
involves many of the organisational stakeholders including management, 
representatives, employees, the accounting profession, suppliers, and regulatory bodies. 
The processes cover phenomena both at the individual, organisational and inter-
organisational level. Third, the data are public and accessible, and regarding much of the 
information conveyed, probably also fairly reliable. Fourth, by using annual reports it is 
possible to test reliability. Fifth, by using archival data the data sources are not affected 
by the measurement and data collection processes as could have been present in 
observations, interviews, or in surveys. Thus, any information obtained from archival 
records could still have been used symbolically or strategically, but not as a 
consequence of the measurements of my study.  
A priori I assumed that there is a close resemblance between information revealed in 
the annual reports for municipalities and information used in the municipalities’ 
management control, and closer resemblance between such information in public sector, 
non-profit organisations than in firms. Public sector annual reports commonly report 
statistics, metrics and judgements on many issues not only for the representatives as the 
primary principal, but for many constituencies and stakeholders. Since much 
decisionmaking in public sector is not based on prices, such information may assist the 
different stakeholders in their influence activities in order to affect resource allocation, 
assuming that the representatives make the final decisions in order to optimise social 
welfare under bounded rationality. Thus, public sector annual reports may be less clear-
cut external reporting only relative to annual reporting in firms. There is also some 
support in the literature in order to state that information systems generally affect 
management control (Swieringa and Weick, 1987). Thus, I assume that public sector 
annual reports are relevant as data source for management control information in that 
context. A counter argument is that information is collected and used for external 
symbolic purposes and is loosely coupled to internal organisational control. However, 
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this assertion is questionable and may furthermore also be fully compatible with use of 
information also for internal, instrumental purposes (Donaldson, 1995; Stinchcombe, 
1997). The question if annual reports resemble data used for management control 
remains however an empirical question. 
Municipal annual reports have been said to be an innovation in Norway in 1984. I 
am, however, aware of the fact that an annual report from a municipal hospital did 
already exist for the fiscal year 1949–50. Furthermore, average costs, capacity utilisation 
and numerous statistics were documented in this report (but no financial statements). 
However, in this thesis it has been assumed that extensive use of municipal annual 
reports readily available for study, has not been present before the 1980s. In 1989 260 or 
56% of all Norwegian municipalities published annual reports (Mellemvik and Olson, 
1996). It is also likely that the number of municipalities using performance 
measurement is less than the number of annual reports. One also has to consider the 
time span since PIs were begun implemented in Norwegian local government in the mid 
1980s. In 1996 it was over 10 years since innovation with municipal annual reporting 
was reported started and major research and development projects of municipal 
performance measurement were mounted (Johnsen, 1999). Collection of 1996 annual 
reports may therefore have provided relevant data on performance measurement as a 
dependent variable, and also variability in the independent variables.  
 
Classifications and frequencies 
 
A central idea in content analysis is that the many words of the text are classified into 
much fewer content categories. To make valid inferences from the text, it is important 
that the classification procedure be reliable in the sense that it is consistent: Different 
people should code the same text in the same way (inter-subjectivity). However, 
organisational control as research topic is inter-disciplinary. Evidently, this criterion is 
difficult to fully satisfy. As inter-subjective agreement only exists for the most obvious 
aspects of communication, or only for a few people that happen to share the same 
cultural and sociopolitical perspective, shared meanings are not a presupposition for 
content analysis. Furthermore, Krippendorff (1980) argued that since high reliability is a 
requirement for high validity but does not assure it, standards for validity are clearly 
more powerful and hence preferable to standards of reliability. A variable is valid to the 
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extent that it measures or represents what the investigator intends it to measure. 
Therefore, it has been laid much emphasis on making the variables valid, making the 
data reproducible, and enhancing reliability by using an additive index. The 
measurement has been discussed in detail in the measurement sections.  
To enhance validity and reliability, general guidelines regarding data collection for 
content analysis have been followed (Krippendorff, 1980; Weber, 1990). First, based on 
theory and the literature review, categories were defined and a registration form was 
developed into a research instrument. A guide with definitions of all categories used was 
written as a supplement to the registration form. The instrument for the dependent 
variable was furthermore tested by the author in a pilot study encompassing all the 18 
Norwegian counties with satisfactory results. Data collection for the main study has 
been carried out by me and 13 graduate students of management and public 
administration, but with the author conducting the bulk of the work. The data collection 
phase for the municipal data began with the author first coding one municipal report. 
Several measures where then taken in order to enhance the intercoder reliability. A copy 
of this annual report together with a copy of the employed registration form used for this 
first annual report, and the guide encompassing all categories with definitions, were then 
provided to all the participants in the data collection. All coders were furthermore 
briefed before the data collection, and all coders could reach me during the data 
collecting stage in order to clarify upcoming issues. 
The dependent variable, performance measurement, comprised frequency counts of 
both PIs and verbal conclusions on performance. The measurement of PIs was an 
extension of previous used approaches as reported in parallel studies (Pollitt, 1986; 
Smith, 1988; Boyne and Law, 1991; Palmer, 1993; Haselbekke, 1995; Hyndman and 
Anderson, 1995; Alford and Baird, 1997; Boyne, 1997; Johnsen, 1999). The seven 
categories of PIs were capacity utilization, partial productivity ratios, indexes of 
standard or quality, average costs, distribution ratios, finance ratio (full cost ratios), and 
coverage of needs ratios.  
Preceeding approches to empirical studies of performance measurement have only 
counted PIs. However, I have also measured text elements as sentences and paragraphs 
in addition to ratios and numbers. Ouchi (1977) stated that the literature on 
organisations had not clearly distinguished control and structure from each other. 
Structure was explained as vertical and horizontal differentiation, centralization and 
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formalization. Control was defined as a process where behaviour and outputs are 
measured, monitored and evaluated, preconditioned by factors which influence the 
reliability and validity of such comparisons, and is distinct from structure. However, 
other authors (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1997) did 
not distinguish structures from processes in organisational control. For instance, it could 
be misleading to separate performance measurement into structure and process because 
monitoring through evaluation, feedback and negotiations based on PIs (process) may be 
as substantial for organisational control as the formal act of reporting and disclosing PIs 
(structure) in itself. Practical consideration regarding limitation of space in the annual 
reports may enhance the use of verbal summary conclusions rather than presenting 
numerous and proliferating PIs only, which nevertheless changes over time due to the 
running down process of PIs. In this study, performance measurement was therefore 
measured as an additive index comprising both the sum of frequencies of the seven 
categories of quantitative PIs, and the sum frequencies of Kleven’s (1993) four 
categories of verbal conclusions regarding performance in municipal annual reports: 
Policy statements, conclusions regarding needs, evaluations, and neutral statements. The 
concurrent use of categories both for PIs and verbal conclusions in a performance 
measurement index has not been formerly employed in the empirical literature. 
In accordance with the research practice on public sector performance measurement, 
only information outside the financial statements were analyzed. Albeit models as 
accrual accounting may be fully feasible for measuring financial accountability and 
inter-temporal transfers of financial wealth, the use of such control models for 
measuring performance regarding effectiveness in non-profit organisations do 
nevertheless not make much sense (Simon, 1947/1997; Anthony, 1989). In many for-
profit organisations accounting models may serve both functions of accountability and 
performance measurement reasonably well and especially on divisional and aggregate 
organisational levels. Non-profit organisations, on the other hand, have to rely on non-
financial performance measurement in order to be able to make any qualified judgments 
about output and performance, if input control, rules, clan control and political control 
are to be supplemented.  
The sum of frequencies (category counts) of the use of the seven categories of 
quantitative PIs and the four categories of verbal conclusions comprised an additive 
performance measurement index, cf. figure 5. An index is a composite measure of two 
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or more items as indicators. Indexes differ from scales by less rigour in their 
construction. Indexes may be constructed by mere accumulation of scores, and do not 
require the underlying principle of uni-dimensionality and such rigorous test of validity 
and reliability as most scales do (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992). Thus, only 
scales which depend on one or more latent variables are to be tested with reliability 
coefficients from the classical test theory. Two or more cause indicators of a latent 
variable may not need to correlate. They can have a zero or even an inverse association 
(Bollen, 1989). Variables which cause a latent variable are not covered by classical test 
theory and popular reliability coefficients as Cronbach’s alpha are in such cases not 
valid. However, also indexes, for instance based on content analysis data, are subject to 
issues regarding reliability and validity (Weber, 1990). The PI sub-index in itself may be 
conceived as a cause indicator where the sum counts of each specific, defined PI forms 
the PI sub-index. However, the performance measurement index only utilises the sum 
score of the PIs, together with the sum scores of verbal conclusions. I have therefore 
assumed that my performance measurement index is an effect type indicator where the 
two items of PIs and verbal conclusions reflect two central dimensions of the 














Figure 5. A tree model of the performance measurement index and the MBO measure 
 
 
In the beginning of the data analysis, two of the most influential observations were 
found to have been registered early in the data collection phase, which had extended 
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over a period of one and a half years. An influential observation has a disproportional 
influence on one or more aspects of the regression estimates and may encompass 
extreme values, leverage points and outliers (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1992). 
The two annual reports were then recoded to test intertemporal stability and accuracy. 
Stability is the extent to which the results of content classification are invariant over 
time. Accuracy is the extent to which the classification of the text corresponds to a 
standard or norm and is the strongest form of reliability in content analysis (Weber, 
1990). The annual report which had the highest score in the first coding, got 3% less 
frequencies in the recoding. The annual report which had the lowest score in the first 
round, got 12% more frequencies in the second round than in the first round. Only a few 
frequencies in both annual reports were reclassified into another subcategory in the 
recoding. This was found to be satisfactory both with respect to stability and to 
accuracy.  
The measurement of control models also included management by objectives and 
self-control (MBO). Drucker (1954, 1976) asserted that the three pillars of MBO were 
formulation of objectives, employee participation, and evaluation of results. Rodgers 
and Hunter (1992) asserted that MBO consisted of goal setting, participative 
management, and objective feedback. Thus, MBO and performance measurement are 
not identical as performance measurement does not necessarily rely on formulations of 
goals or extensive employee participation (Johnsen, 1999). Moreover, objective 
feedback in MBO is not necessarily provided by PIs exclusively. Rodgers and Hunter 
(1992) provided a meta-analysis of 30 studies of MBO in the public sector and 
concluded that MBO had a positive impact on productivity in all the public sector 
agencies studies. At present no such study exists for performance measurement. MBO is 
in my study measured as frequency counts of judgements on achievements of objectives, 
cf. figure 5. Thus, only one of the three components of MBO was measured by this 
index. The inclusion of MBO in the study was done to provide a multi-trait approach in 
measuring public sector organisational control. This also provided a means for checking 
the construct validity the performance measurement index. Construct validity means 
that a measure is correlated with other measures of the same construct and uncorrelated 
with measures of dissimilar constructs.  
The Cronbach’s alpha reliability measure for the performance measurement index 
was .54 with PIs and verbal conclusions included as two items. A Cronbach’s alpha 
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reliability measure equal to or above .70 is judged as a ‘good’ reliability and values of 
.50 as minimum level of acceptable reliability (Hair et al., 1992). Thus, it could be 
assumed that the reliability of the performance measurement index was satisfactory. The 
index would have declined to .40 if the judgements of achievement of objectives item 
was included in the index, supporting the notion of performance measurement and MBO 
as two distinct models. Thus, the index seems to be sensitive enough to distinguish 
between the phenomena of interest (Krippendorff, 1980).  
 
Normality and transformations 
 
Content analysis data are unlikely to be either univariate or multivariate normal as many 
data analysis techniques, including regression, make as assumption for proper use. 
However, additional research is needed to assess whether the robustness of such 
statistical methods really compensates for the deviations of most content analysis data 
from the Gaussian normal distribution (Weber, 1990). Such research is far beyond the 
scope and limits of this thesis. However, as far as it has been foreseen, the issues of 
normality and statistical assumptions have been dealt with in accordance to 
considerations of the concepts and mechanisms of the theories involved, and in 
accordance to a theoretical consideration of a basic content analytic problem of how 
frequencies are to be measured.  
In quantitative content analysis one basically assumes that the more a text contains of 
a particular category, say by counting its frequencies, the more the text is concerned 
with this issue. However, it could be reasoned that the initial mention of a theme or 
issue requires more effort or energy than a successive one. Economically this relates for 
instance to monitoring systems, measurement competence and routines which could be 
regarded as requiring an initial organisational specific investment. The investment 
required to make the initial measurements and monitoring, and the benefits obtained by 
it, may be substantial, but the proceeding performance measurement may have a positive 
but decreasing marginal value. If initial efforts require more energy than proceeding 
efforts, then it may be valid to put heavier weight on the first frequencies, or discounting 
the latter frequencies. This may also be achieved by transforming the variables, say by 
taking the square root of the number of frequencies. As with the issue of content 
analysis data, normality and using certain data analysis methods, also this measurement 
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issue is at present underresearched (Weber, 1990). However, this issue seems to be 
relevant for performance measurement, and will be further addressed in conjunction 





The independent variables were chosen in order to operationalise the concepts employed 




On the basis of public choice and agency theory, one may assume that the degree of 
asymmetric information is dependent upon size. On these reasons, manyear municipal 
employees (bureaucracy size) has been used as indicator for asymmetric information. 
Secondary data statistics on municipal manyear are readily available, but not data on 
municipal managers with separate and identifiable budgets, as Niskanen (1971) defined 
as bureaucrats. Therefore, in this study bureaucracy size and hence asymmetric 
information has been measured with the variable municipal manyear, with data for 
municipal employee manyears in 1996. Gordon and Smith (1992) have developed a 
measurement instrumemt for studying the effects of asymmetric information and 
postauditing capital investments on firm performance in a study of management control 
systems design. Asymmetric information was measured as an index comprised of firms 
size, diversification of product lines, degree of company internationalisation, and 
variation in the firm’s earnings. Both company internationalisation and variation in 
firms’ earnings are irrelevant for local governments. Diversification of services is 
relatively less relevant in Norwegian local government as most municipalities produce 
the same services albeit they are free to produce services which are not prohibited by 
law (‘negative restriction’). Thus, the use of a size variable to measure asymmetric 
information is corroborated by practice in the empirical, organisational control 
literature.  
 




Some studies have used expenses per capita as a proxy for municipal productivity. A 
proxy variable is a variable assumed to be correlated with the concept of interest (the 
latent variable) that is used to measure the concept when it can not be measured directly 
(Berry, 1993). Bollen (1989) remarks that such observed variables have a variety of 
names as manifest variables, measures, indicators, and proxies. Using proxies may cause 
two problems of measurement. A proxy variable may have measurement errors in 
measuring the true score of the proxy. Furthermore, the proxy may reflect the concept of 
interest imperfectly. This can have implications for empirical analysis. In for instance 
multiple regression, such measurement errors stemming from using proxies may not 
only affect the variables with errors, also the regression coefficients without errors may 
be affected. As there are severe measurement problems with expences per capita as 
productivity indicator, the data on free disposable municipal income have been judged 
as the most conceptual valid slack indicator. In this study organisational slack has 
therefore been measured with free disposable municipal income variable as an indicator.  
The free disposable municipal income variable has recently been developed by 
Langørgen and Aaberge (1998) in Statistics Norway partly as a response to common 
claims that local government statistics have been of low validity and reliability. The free 
disposable municipal income variable was estimated based on detailed municipal 
accounts and community characteristics for 426 municipalities in 1993. Documentation 
of the microeconometric model used to estimate the free disposable municipal income 
and the mandatory municipal expenses, are given in Aaberge and Langørgen (1997). 
Free disposable municipal income was defined as income in excess of what is 
mandatory expenses according to laws and norms given by the Norwegian parliament, 
Stortinget, and the Norwegian government. The restricted municipal expenses were 
estimated as heterogeneous ‘minimum production (operating) costs’ disaggregated on 
different municipal services each constrained by exogenous factors as population’s age 
group served by the services, socio-demographic variables, variables assumed to control 
for economy of scale, and climatic factors, varying from services to services. (Cf. table 
3.1 in Langørgen and Aaberge (1998) for a detailed account. See also Boyne (1995) for 
a critique of the use of certain variables, commonly inhabitants, to explain economy of 
scale in municipal service production.) Population density, centrality, dummy-variable 
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for municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants, and the inverse of number of 
municipal inhabitants, were included in the demographic variables. The inverse of 
number of inhabitants is a convex, decreasing function of the number of inhabitants. 
The sum of the free disposable municipal income and the municipal income with 
restricted or mandatory use according to laws and norms, would comprise the 
endogenous municipal budget constraint. Municipal operating expenses, budget surplus 
and the fee income were defined as endogenous variables in the model. In Norway there 
is a tax on labor input in the production process, and this tax is geographical 
differentiated on five levels due to regional development policies. Thus, in rural regions, 
the lowest tax was zero, while in the most urban regions this tax was above 10% in 
1994. These labour input taxes were not detracted from the municipal accounts data. 
This means that the free disposable municipal income may have been underestimated 
for the municipalities with the smaller tax rates, mostly smaller and non-central 
municipalities. Free disposable municipal income has been measured as an index. Free 
disposable municipal income in 1994 per capita, measured in 1993 NOK, was divided 
on the mean for all the municipalities save for Oslo (434 municipalities) (Langørgen and 
Aaberge, 1998). 
As explained in chapter 4, the slack variable is an indicator for organisational 
effectiveness but in my study modelled as an independent variable. One may assume 
that slack and organisational effectiveness in preceding years are valid candidates for 
explaining organisational control structures in proceeding years. Furthermore, one may 
assume that municipal slack is not changing dramatically on the organisational level 
from one year to the next. The stability of the free disposable municipal income variable 
was measured by correlating the 1993 data with the 1994 data for all the municipalities 
save for Oslo. The computed correlation coefficient was 0.96 and the variable was 
judged to be relatively stable (Langørgen and Aaberge, 1998). This stability makes the 
free disposable municipal income variable a potential good candidate for measuring 
organisational slack. Also, there usually is a substantial time lag, at least three years, 
from a decision to implement or use organisational control models is taken, before such 
systems are implemented and subsequently used. This time lag may also be longer for 
relatively complex organisational control structures. Hence, lagging the variables is one 
means to avoid problems related to simultaneity in the models. The time lag between the 
measurement of independent variable slack in 1994 to measurement of the dependent 
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variable performance measurement in 1996, conforms to the underlying causal relations 




Uncertainty has been measured partly as a dichotomous variable to be used in a bivariate 
analysis, and partly with organisational size as an indicator for complexity, to be used in 
multivariate analysis. Uncertainty in municipal services was measured as an ordinal 
level, dichotomous measure (see table 8). It was asserted that primary schools, health 
care and social services, and cultural services, had more uncertainty than central 
administration, housing, development of commerce and environmental planning, 
infrastructure services, and maintenance of roads. It is recognized that this is only 
sufficient as a preliminary approach to measuring uncertainty. However, some support 
for this approach may be found. Pettersen (1995) discussed characteristics of health 
services production in counties arguing for relative high uncertainty in that context. In 
economics of schooling the production function is not certain. E.g., it has not been 
found any relation between expenses per pupil and outcome (Hanushek, 1986). 
Furthermore, the bivariate analysis encompassing this variable is used only as a 
complement to other measures.  
Organisational complexity with size as indicator has been used in former contingency 
theory explanations of uncertainty (Wildavsky, 1986). Organisational complexity was 
measured as municipal inhabitants per January 1, 1996, termed municipal inhabitants. 
Some studies have made an ordinal level measure of organisational size as variable. 
Borge and Rattsø (1993) divided the municipalities into two groups: Small 
municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants, and large municipalities with 5000 
inhabitants or more. They found that Norwegian municipalities and large municipalities 
showed a strong sluggishness in budget allocations. Organisational complexity and 
inferior voter control may contribute to more rigidity in large compared to small 
municipalities. Langørgen and Aaberge (1998) divided the municipalities into three 
groups: Small municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants, medium sized 
municipalities with 5000 to 19,999 inhabitants, and large municipalities with 20,000 or 
more inhabitants. This division was chosen in their study to avoid categories with few 
municipalities. I have also used these categorisations in a bivariate analysis in my study 
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for the same reason. The interval breadth increases with size of the municipalities, at the 
same time as the number of municipalities in each category decreases. However, in the 
mutiple regression analysis in this study, I have used municipal inhabitants as a proxy 
for complexity as a metric variable.  
In addition to the dichotomous and the metric measures of uncertainty and 
complexity respectively, an organisational design variable may be warranted. Otley 
(1980) warned against making inferences about links between contingent variables and 
information systems without explicitly considering the intervening variables of 
organisational design. A core contingency theory design parameter is decentralization. 
Formalisation and specialisation are other core organisational design variables. 
Decentralised municipalities may reduce complexity and thus uncertainty by gathering 
task information according to local needs and delegating decisionmaking to 
subordinates. Thus, larger organisations may of sheer complexity have so much 
uncertainty that output control is substituted with other control structures as budget 
control and decentralization. Data regarding a control variable for municipal 
organisational design has therefore been included. The data was collected from a 
municipal survey undertaken by Statistics Norway autumn 1996. An organisational 
design variable measuring degree of decentralization as a dimension of organisational 
efforts at reducing complexity, was judged to be a valid operationalisation.  
Decentralisation has been measured as the number of municipal services which had 
decentralised administration i 1996. The services were categorised in primary schools, 
kindergarten, health services, social services, services for drug addicts, social services 
for children and youngsters, nursing services for elderly and disabled persons in their 
own homes, nursing services for elderly and disabled persons in institutions, and two 
‘other’ categories. Thus, this variable may vary from 0 to 10. Data was collected by 
questionnaires. Unfortunately, only 141 of the municipalities in my population either 




An unstable or weak ruling political coalition is assumed to increase goal ambiguity in 
the service provision relative to a stable or strong ruling political coalition. Due to the 
relative high degree of intraparty competition in local government, it may be more 
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relevant to study the formation or presence of political coalitions than to focus on parties 
in themselves. In the Norwegian municipalities the political parties are proportionally 
represented in the municipal council. This facilitates compromises and bargaining rather 
than dominance from the largest party, as the largest party only seldom has majority rule 
in the municipal council. The public finance literature has employed the Herfindahl-
index to measure party concentration (Stigler, 1972). The Herfindahl-index is defined 
as: 
 






where Sj is the share of representatives from party j in the municipal council, and P is 
the number of parties. The Herfindahl-index takes the value 1 when a single party holds 
all seats in the council. The minimum value is 1/P when the seats are equally divided 
among the P parties. The relationship between party concentration (political leadership) 
and presense of political coalitions (ambiguity) is unknown. The presence of political 
coalitions has therefore been explored as an indicator for ambiguity in municipal 
councils. To accomplish this, a dummy variable was employed with value 1 if the mayor 
and the deputy mayor came from different political parties, and the value 0 otherwise. 
The value 0 was assumed to indicate little need for forming political coalitions and 
hence low level of goal ambiguity. The value 1 was assumed to indicate the existence of 
political coalitions and hence relatively more goal ambiguity. Although this variable is 




Organisational and political political power is a complex and multi-dimensional issue. 
Political power has been measured with three variables: Centrality of the municipality is 
used as a proxy for the municipal management’s power. Representatives’ leftist political 
preferences were used to measure power issues among the representatives. Percent 
municipal employees of all inhabitants aged 16–74 with an occupation was used to 
measure the bureaucrats’ interest group power. The following discussion is an attempt 
to qualify these choices.  
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Municipal management competence: One may assume that the chief administrative 
officer’s and the senior financial officer’s competence are organisational bottlenecks 
regarding performance measurement implementation. This could have been 
operationalised as their formal management education and professional experience. This 
calls for detailed survey data. As there are neither reliable population data on 
performance measurement projects or networks, nor a municipal management 
competence database available, a proxy for the management competence concept has 
been considered.  
One may assume that skilled and competent managers are relatively more available in 
larger labour markets than in smaller labour markets. If so, the centrality of the 
municipality may be a proxy to measure availability of management skills and 
competence. There are many counter-arguments to this proxy. For instance, there may 
also be more keen competition for skilled and competent managers in central labour 
markets which may not favour municipalities. In non-central municipalities, managers 
with less formal competence may stay longer in the municipality and hence become as 
skilled and competent as managers with more formal competence. Furthermore, non-
central municipalities may rely more on informal control models than formal control 
models as performance measurement. On the other hand, non-profit organisations are 
expected to mix different control models simultaneously (Ouchi, 1979; Meyer and 
Gupta, 1994). Hence, centrality may be of importance for the availability of crucial 
management skills and competence especially in the case of formal control models. On 
these reasons the municipal’s centrality has been used as a proxy in order to explore 
potential effects of municipal management skills and formal competence on 
performance measurement. The demographic variable municipal centrality was based on 
Statistics Norway’s official 1990 classification of the municipalities into seven 
categories on a ordinal level of measurement. The seven categorizations were made 
based on classification of the largest municipalities into three levels of regional centers, 
and commuting time to the nearest center for the remaining municipalities. The value 1 
indicates lowest centrality and the value 7 indicates highest centrality.  
Leftist representatives’ political power in the municipal council: Leftism was 
measured as representatives belonging to either the Labor Party, the Socialist Left Party, 
or the Norwegian Communist Party as percentage of all the representatives of the 
municipal council after the 1995 municipal election.  
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Bureaucrats’ interest group power: Power from interest groups may come from two 
kinds. The inside group may be associated with local government employees, 
professionals and trade unions. The outside group may be associated with clients of 
local public services. Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) studied rigidity (sluggishness), 
of local government resource allocation. Political pressure of interest groups and media 
was measured as perceived by politicians by surveys. The results showed that pressure 
groups related to primary education explained an important part of the sluggishness 
observed. Pressure groups promoting kindergartens and health care stimulated 
reallocations. Pressure through the media had more or less the same effect as special 
interest groups. Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) argued that given the empirical 
problems of measuring the multi-dimensional activities of interest group connections to 
the political system, alternative strategies to this documentation would have been 
fruitful. Another means to measure power was by different characteristics of the relevant 
interest groups, which has been chosen in this study. 
The percentage of municipal employees of all employed inhabitants aged 16–74 in 
the municipality last quarter 1997, was used as proxy for the power of municipal 
bureaucrats. It is assumed that this percentage is relatively stable over time, such that 
this variable may serve as a proxy for the percentage of municipal employees of all 
employed inhabitants aged 16–74 in the municipalities also in 1996. Borge, Rattsø and 
Sørensen (1995) recommended to study the interaction between the interest group 
indicators and the size of the relevant client group in the empirical analysis. However, 
the percentage municipal employees variable is relative to the overall municipal 
employment.  
Municipal dependence on local taxpayers: Dependence on local tax payers have been 
put forward as explanation for monitoring in local government. The strength of local 




All data (except the dependent variable) were collected as secondary data (archival data) 
from official statistics. Data regarding organisational slack, the free municipal 
disposable income variable, were obtained from Statistics Norway (Langørgen and 
Aaberge, 1998). These data were newly developed in 1997–98 for the fiscal year 1994. 
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Statistics Norway had in 1997 plans to develop such data also for the following years, 
but this has been postponed. Thus, only data for 1994 were available.  
Data regarding municipal inhabitants, centrality, number of representatives and 
political party affiliation in the municipal councils and municipal employee manyears, 
were available through local government election statistics, the municipal data base, and 
the municipal organisation data base from the Norwegian Social Science Data Service 
(NSD) with data originally delivered from Statistics Norway. These data were also used 
to compute two new variables which have been used in this study as indicators for the 
goal ambiguity and political power concepts. First, the dummy variable political 
coalition was created to measure the existence of ambiguity in the municipal council. 
Second, the leftism variable was computed as measuring the proportion of leftist 
representatives in the municipal councils after the 1995 municipal election. 
Furthermore, the secondary data used in developing the VFM auditing and financial 
auditing indexes, also came from these data sources.  
Data on ordinary income tax per capita and the data on the political variable on 
percentage municipal employees, were obtained from official publications published by 





The measurement models of the three models hitherto employed in this thesis to explain 
local government performance measurement could be specified in a general model as: 
 
Y = f(model I, model II, model III) 
 
where Y is the dependent variable performance measurement, model I is the agency 
theory/public choice model independent variables, model II is the contingency theory 
and new institutionalism model independent variables, and model III is the political 
model independent variables. A full model encompassing models I through III may be 
labelled model IV.  
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Modified regression analysis 
 
The dependent variable, the performance measurement index, is a metric, interval level 
measure. The independent variables have been measured both on nominal, ordinal, and 
interval levels of measurement. However, such variables may be used in regression 
analysis. Multiple regression has been chosen because of its relative simplicity, and its 
ability to fully utilize the metric, dependent variable.  
A general multiple regression equation used to estimate the regression coefficients 
(ßi) could be on the form: 
 
(1) Y = ß0 + ß1X1 + ß2X2 + … + ßnXn + e 
 
where Y is the dependent variable, ß0 is the intercept, ßi is the regression coefficient for 
variable Xi, and e denotes a random disturbance (error) term. In this study a modified 
regression analysis (MRA) is used. A modified regression analysis is a specific 
application of multiple regression analysis where the regression equation also contains 
an interaction term (Hartmann and Moers, 1999). This interaction term also often 
utilises a ‘dummy variable’ approach which is using a nominal (or ordinal) level 
variable which only takes on the values 0 or 1. This technique is some places termed as 
an instrumental variables (IV) approach. Thus, a simple, modified regression analysis 
equation could be on the form: 
 
(2) Y = ß0 + ß1X1 + ß2X2 + ß3X1X2 + e 
 
In equation (2) the terms X1 and X2 are the main effects of variables X1 and X1 on Y. 
The product (X1X2) is said to be the moderating effect of variable X2 on the relationship 
between Y and X1. However, when interaction terms are included in the regression 
equation, the lower-order effects should be ‘partialed out’ by including them in the 
regression equation. For instance, equation (2) would have been incorrect if the 
interaction term was included but not the lower-order effect of variable X2. To establish 
the existence of an interaction effect, a hierarchical regression analysis is performed. 
First an analaysis with the main effects is undertaken, then a second analysis with both 
the main and the interaction term is run. Differences in the parameter estimates then 
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indicate the presence of interaction effects. It should be noted, though, that the inclusion 
of interaction terms should be guided by theory, and that the inclusion of interaction 
terms of higher than second-order, is in general not recommended.  
 
Applications of significance tests 
 
Significance testing is one of the most used and maybe also one of the most useful 
techniques in quantitative analysis. A significance test is a test of a hypothesis (Mohr, 
1990). The classical technique of inference was developed to make inferences to 
unobserved, population properties from observed, random samples drawn from the 
population. A second kind of inference is primarily used with a randomised, controlled 
experiment, and one wishes to state that a relation probably is causal. This may be 
warranted as research often is concerned with judgements regarding if a relationship or 
property is worth further thought and research efforts, often in competition with many 
other relationships and ideas.  
A standard conception of the use of significance tests is that if a population could be 
tested directly, no inferences would be necessary, and any difference between the means 
or any correlation between variables would support the hypothesis (Frankfort-Nachmias 
and Nachmias, 1992). Lindsay (1995) stated explicitly that samples must be randomly 
selected in order to use the test of significance validly. However, many researchers use 
the significance test also for non-random samples. Mohr (1990) has discussed the use of 
significance tests in detail.  
In the ‘econometric-modelling’ function tests of significance are used to assess the 
probability that a parameter estimate of a certain magnitude might be attributable to the 
random-disturbance component of a model rather than indicating a true causal effect. 
This function is called so because it is most common within the discipline of economics, 
but it is also used in other disciplines. A parameter is defined as a summarising property 
of a collectivity when that collectivity is not considered to be a sample. A statistic is 
defined as a summarising property of a collectivity when that collectivity is considered 
to be a sample. In the econometric-modelling function no random sample from a 
population or randomisation in experimental design is used, only some collectivity is 
observed. The test is used to assess: a) if a relationship is so large that it probably could 
not have been the entirely misleading result of the random disturbance term, but rather 
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may be judged to be a ‘true causal’ impact, or b) if the relationship is so small that it 
might well be due to the random-disturbance component and thus no assumed causality 
exist. However, in order for the econometric-modelling function of significance test to 
apply, the model must be correctly specified such that all that is left out is the random 
error term. This condition hardly ever exists in practical econometrics.  
A second use of significance tests in population studies is the strength-of-relationship 
function. This function is seldom acknowledged to be used, not commonly referred to in 
textbooks, albeit it is probably the most common use of significance tests of all. This 
function gives the probability, no matter what design or nondesign has been employed, 
that one would have obtained a statistic in a certain range of magnitude if one had 
actually implemented a randomisation or random sampling procedure. Its popularity and 
versatility may be due to the need for a convenient translation of strength of 
relationships into the common language of probability.  
Caution is necessary in use of significance tests because of sample size. Almost all 
relationships are significant in very large samples. The test of strength-of-relationships 
then is only helpful in small and moderate sized samples. Furthermore, in addition to 
randomness, relationships may also stem from spurious or coincidental circumstances. 
In studies of collectivities as in this thesis where random sampling or randomization 
have not been employed, only the strength-of-relationship function applies. It is then 
only a rough tool and must be employed with consideration to the above mentioned 
limitations. Significance tests nevertheless can only inform that a difference appears 
real. It can not explain what caused the apparent difference. Thus, the main test must, 
for all practical concerns in empirical analysis in organisation theory, include ruling out 
plausible, alternative explanations to the proposed explanation as formulated by the 
reseacher through the hypotheses. Furthermore, instead of a research strategy of seeking 
significant results within single studies, significant results could be judged by obtaining 
reproducible results from performing several studies under different conditions within a 
research programme. An alternative criterion to significance tests is then whether the 
same model holds for many sets of data (Lindsay, 1995).  
 
 
Chapter 5: Method 
 111 
LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS 
 
Several limitations in this study have been addressed throughout the thesis. Here only 
what has been deemed as the most severe shortcomings, shall be highlighted.  
First, the reliability of many of the indicators employed in the empirical studies could 
have been improved. This relates both to the secondary data obtained from official 
statistics regarding the independent variables, use of proxies, and measurement 
problems inherent in the content analytic approach which have been used to measure the 
dependent variable. Although I have judged the construct and internal validity to be 
satisfactory throughout the study, several of the variables have measurement errors 
affecting reliability. Specifically, the use of size-related variables as indicators in 
accounting research and organisational studies has been critisised (Kimberly, 1976; 
Bujaki and Richardson, 1997). However, I have conformed to Kimberly’s three 
suggestions: First, that different relationships between aspects of size and dimensions of 
structure should be posited based on theoretical considerations (for instance asymmetric 
information and complexity). Second, aspects of size may vary as a function of 
organisational type (for instance decentralised versus centralised organisations). Finally, 
to conceptualise organisations which leads one to ask dynamic questions (for instance 
anticipating resistance and not only symbolism).  
Furthermore, I have used an extension of previous content analysis performance 
measurement indexes developed for public sector organisations for the PIs item of my 
dependent variable. However, the organisation and structure of municipal service 
provision is so varied that two hypothetical identical scores on such performance 
measurement indexes between countries, would not be comparable unless special efforts 
have been taken for making them comparable. I have not made such arrangements. 
Hence, the variable scores should not be compared across countries, or even over long 
time periods within the same country, without great caution in the interpretations.  
Second, several issues regarding internal validity may be questioned. For example, it 
has been suggested that a high level of organisational slack impedes the principals to 
employ performance measurement in order to enhance organisational learning and thus 
effectiveness. However, such behaviour may also be consistent with an explanation that 
slack triggers use of organisational control models which may symbolize rationality and 
effectiveness, and thus sustain both legitimisation and the initial slack. The empirical 
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results will not provide any critical test of the rational, economic approach to positive 
theory on political institutions versus symbolism as in the historical, sociological 
approach. The results have to be interpreted guided by theory. 
Third, the empirical results may have limited external validity. The empirical studies 
in my project have all been undertaken in one national setting. Other countries could 
have specific contingencies which make direct inferences from my results to other 
countries invalid. For instance, it has been found that US municipalities which were led 
by mayors rather than professional city-managers, had relatively less developed 
organisational control systems (Ward, Elder and Kattelus, 1994). This result was also 
found specifically with regard to use of performance measurement in 1997 in US 
municipalities with 25,000 or more inhabitants (Poister and Streib, 1999). All 
Norwegian municipalities are led by a chief administrative officer. This could have 
increased the sophistication of performance measurement in Norwegian municipalities 
relative to countries without professional, municipal top-management. This may reduce 
the generalisability of the empirical findings to some countries. One should therefore be 
careful in generalisations of the findings to other specific settings, though generalisation 
of the findings to a conceptual level seems to have been reasonable qualified. Anyway, 
the results in this study may complement the existing literature on public sector 
performance measurement as much of the previous reported studies have been 
conducted in contingencies with strong central government regulation or mandatory use 
of peformance measurement in the federal and state government, as in the UK and in 
USA. See however Ramberg (1997), Poister and Streib (1999) and Streib and Poister 






This study attempts to test specific hypotheses from agency theory/public choice, 
contingency theory, institutionalism and the resource dependence perspective. A cross-
sectional, planned variation design with Norwegian local government as setting was 
chosen, as this seemed to be suited for testing the hypotheses. The population was 
defined as 176 municipalities including all 39 large municipalities in order to secure 
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variability in the independent variables. The usable population turned out to be 162, 
which was judged to be satisfactory for the multivariate analysis. However, data from 
1995 for all the 18 counties were used in a pilot study to test the research instrument for 
measuring the dependent variable, performance measurement, regarding reliability and 
validity. The main study has used the Norwegian municipalities as population. All data 
reported in this thesis are from the municipalities. 
The dependent variable, performance measurement, was measured with an additive 
index comprised of two items. The data on this dependent variable was collected by 
content analysis of municipal annual reports for 1996. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability 
measure for the index was only .54, but above the treshold of .50 for satisfactory index 
reliability.  
The agency theory/public choice model independent variables were municipal 
manyear as indicator for asymmetric information, and free disposable municipal income 
as a measure of organisational slack. The contingency theory/institutionalism model had 
two variables. The first variable was uncertainty which was measured with three 
indicators. The first indicator was a dichotomous variable divided into high and low 
undertainty in the municipal services. The second indicator for uncertainty was 
municipal inhabitants as a proxy for complexity. Complexity as a function of 
organisational size is assumed to positively affect uncertainty. The third indicator for 
uncertainty was an organisational design variable where it was assumed that municipal 
decentralisation is used under high degrees of complexity and uncertainty. The second 
contingency variable, ambiguity, was a dummy-variable for political coalitions in the 
municipal council.  
The power model had four variables. First, municipal management competence was 
measured with municipal centrality as a proxy. It was asserted that formal skilled 
management control competence may be more accessible in centrally located 
municipalities, which may enhance management power on behalf of the chief 
administrative officer as principal. Second, representatives’ political power was 
measured with leftism. Third, bureaucrats’ interest group power was measured as 
municipal employees’ numerical strength relative to all employed inhabitants in the 
municipality. Lastly, municipal dependence on local taxpayers was operationalised.  
Modified regression analysis was chosen as estimation technique for the models. It 
was also asserted that square root transforming the dependent variable by could remedy 
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certain content analysis measurement problems related to counting frequencies which 
otherwise could give too little credence to initial mentions of some issue relative to 
successive mentions. Such data transformations of the independent variables may also 
remedy certain violations of the regression assumptions, most notably linearity.  
 









This chapter documents the results of the analyses in relation to the hypotheses 
presented in chapter 5. However, first a univariate and a bivariate description of the 
population for my study is provided. Then the estimation of the four regression models 
is documented. The next sections address the findings from the analyses. The analysis is 
ended by a simple case study of the 12 municipalities which were ranked highest and 
lowest on use of performance measurement. The chapter is rounded off with 
conclusions from the results.  
 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE POPULATION 
 
Table 5 presents the median, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values, 
skewness and kurtosis for all the independent as well as dependent and control 
variables. Of the responding 165 municipalities, 98% disclosed annual reports in 1996. 
The theoretically defined, planned variation population consisted of the 162 
municipalities which disclosed annual reports. The municipalities had on average 627 
manyears, but half of the municipalities had 303 manyears or less. The mean level of 
free disposable municipal income in 1994 in the population data for this study was 
almost identical with the mean for all Norwegian municipalities in 1994. However, in 
the population for this study half of the municipalities had only 67% or less of the mean 
level of free disposable municipal income.  
The 162 municipalities varied in size from 214 to 224,000 inhabitants with a mean of 
15,900 inhabitants. Note that many empirical studies from the US due to data 
availability only study municipalities equal to or larger than 25,000 inhabitants (Poister 
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and Streib, 1995, 1999; Streib and Poister, 1999), 50,000 (Rubin, 1988), or even only 
municipalities with 100,000 (Giroux, 1989) or more inhabitants. This reduces the 
external validity of the findings in this study to some of the other results reported in the 
literature. At least half of the 162 municipalities had mayor and deputy mayor from 
different parties.  
Most of the municipalities were centrally located. The most leftist municipal council 
had 70% leftist representatives, but half of the municipal councils had 32% or less leftist 
representatives. The mean percentage of municipal employees of all employed 
inhabitants aged 16–74 in the municipalities was 20% in the first quarter of 1997. The 
smallest and largest values were 13 and 43% respectively. The mean ordinary income 
tax per capita in 1996 was NOK 11,410.  
The mean score on the performance measurement index was 68 frequencies. The 
index varied from 0 to 292, however only 1 municipality scored 0 on this index. 
Regarding PIs 12 municipalities had no occurrences of PIs in their annual reports in 
1996. Thus, 99% of the population used some sort of performance measurement as 
operationalised in this study, and 93% used some sort of PI. However, use of PIs or 
verbal conclusions does not automatically imply that the municipalities in question 
actually used the performance measurement model as formal organisational control. 
Reporting of local government statistics and verbal conclusions could be used separately 
and without any connections with the performance measurement model. The mean 
scores of the PI and verbal conclusion subindexes were 14 and 54 frequencies 
respectively.  
The MBO index showed a mean of 35 frequencies. 83% of the municipalities were 
found to use the MBO model in their annual reporting. Half of the municipalities 
responded much or some emphasis on at least 2 of the 5 items in the VFM auditing 
index. Half of the municipalities responded much or some emphasis on at least 1 of the 
2 items of the financial auditing index.  
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Measurement Median Mean St.dev. Min. Max. Skewnessc Kurtosisd 
Independent variables         
1 Municipal manyears 1996 Metric (N=162) 303.50 626.67 (1052.59) 18 9348 5.15 34.68 
2 Free disposable municipal income 1994 Relative to mean. Metric (N=162) 0.67 1.01 (1.45) 0.03 12.66 5.05 31.53 









4 Decentralisation 1996 Number of decentralised services 
Non-metric (N=141) 
0.00 1.16 (2.17) 0 10 2.11 3.91 
5 Mayor and deputy mayor from different parties Dummy variable for political coalition: 0=No, 1=Yes (N=162) 1.00 – – 1 0 – – 
6 Municipal centrality Seven categories: 1=low, 7=high centrality. Non-metric (N=162) 6.00 5.07 (2.33) 1 7 -0.83 -0.92 
7 Leftist representatives in the municipal council Percentage. Metric (N=162) 0.32 0.34 (0.13) 0.00 0.70 0.30 -0.12 
8 Municipal employees 1997 of all employed 
inhabitants 
Percentage. Metric (N=162) 0.19 0.20 (0.05) 0.13 0.43 1.83 4.50 
9 Income tax per capita 1996 Norwegian kroner (NOK) (N=162) 10343 11410 (4535) 7694 44787 4.76 27.05 
Dependent variables         
10 Performance measurement indexa Additive index of PIs and verbal conclusions. Metric (N=162) 62.00 68.10 (48.46) 0 292 1.75 4.89 
11 Performance indicator subindexa Frequency counts of 7 categories of PIs. Metric (N=162) 9.00 14.36 (18.64) 0 138 3.68 17.93 
12 Verbal conclusion subindexa Frequency counts of 4 categories. Metric (N=162) 50.00 53.73 (37.01) 0 180 1.20 1.86 
Control variables         
13 Management by objectives (MBO)a Judgements of achievement of objectives. Metric (N=162) 6.00 34.65 (68.31) 0 437 3.28 12.84 
14 Value for money (VFM) auditing indexb Additive index of 5 dummy variables. Non-metric (N=138) 2.00 2.20 (1.35) 0 5 0.16 -0.64 
15 Financial auditing indexb Additive index of 2 dummy variables. Non-metric (N=138) 1.00 0.72 (0.72) 0 2 0.44 -0.86 
Note. All variables are untransformed.  
a Frequency counts of text items (including ratios and diagrams) were collected by content analysis of Norwegian municipal annual reports 1996.  
b The index is municipalities which responded much or some emphasis on different auditing activities in 1996 (coded 1, otherwise 0 on each of the items in the indexes). There were 5 questions 
related to 3 different VFM auditing activities: Control of budgetary approbation, control of cost efficiency, and control of allocative efficiency. The 2 financial auditing activities were accounting 
control and legal control. Data was collected by mailed questionnaires. The municipal officers’ replies where obtained in co-operation with the senior municipal audit officer. (Source: Norwegian 
Social Science Data Service.) 
c Skewness measures the symmetry of a distribution (often) relative to the normal distribution. A positively skewed distribution has relatively few large values that it tails off to the right. A negatively 
skewed distribution has relatively few small values. A skewness value outside the range of -1 to +1 indicates a substantially skewed distribution.  
d Kurtosis measures the peakedness or flatness of a distribution compared to a normal distribution. Positive values indicate a relatively peaked distribution and negative values indicate a flat 
distribution. 
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The Spearman rank correlation coefficients are given in table 6. Usually the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient is reported in conjunction with multiple regression 
analysis, also in the cases where some of the data are on an ordinal measurement 
level. However, because several of my data were severely skewed (non-normal 
distributed), I have chosen to present the Spearman rank order correlation 
coefficient instead of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The interpretation of the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient r (rho) is the same as for the Pearson’s r. The 
correlation coefficient varies between –1 and +1 which means perfect negative and 
positive correlation respectively. Rules of thumb on magnitudes are that 
correlations below .19 are very low; .20 to .39 are low; .40 to .69 are modest; .70 to 
.89 are high, and .90 to 1 are very high. It is emphasised that bivariate correlations 
do not imply causality, nor control for alternative explanations. Thus, the reported 
rank correlations in table 6 are not sufficient in themselves for rejecting or claiming 
support for the hypotheses.  
Of the Spearman rank correlation coefficients regarding the 9 hypothesised 
bivariate relationships, it can be seen that 4 were negative and 5 were positive. 6 of 
the 9 rank correlations were greater than r = ±.33. Furthermore, seven of the rank 
correlations were significant on the .01-level (p < .01) with one-tailed tests. 
However, 4 of the 9 correlations were in the opposite direction than hypothesised.  
The rank correlation between municipal manyears and the performance 
measurement index was modest with r = .51 (p < .01) and in accordance with 
hypothesis 1 which predicted a positive relationship. The rank correlation between 
municipal manyears and free disposable municipal income 1994 was low with r = –
.38 (p < .01) while hypothesis 2 predicted a positive relationship. Note, however, 
that the two indicators used in this operationalisation did not satisfy the temporal 
ordering for causal explanations, but were nevertheless selected due to 
measurement problems (availability of data). The rank correlation between free 
disposable municipal income in 1994 and the performance measurement index was 
low with r = –.33 (p < .01) and in accordance with the direction predicted in 
hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 4 predicted a negative relation between uncertainty 
(complexity) and use of performance measurement. However, the rank correlation 
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between municipal inhabitants and the performance measurement index was modest 
with r = .49 (p < .01) and of opposite direction than the hypothesised sign. 
Furthermore, the rank correlation between the decentralisation index and the 
performance measurement index was also positive but low with r = .25 (p < .01). 
Note also that there was a moderate positive rank correlation of r = .54 (p < .01) 
between municipal manyears and decentralisation. Thus, as expected, the 
municipalities seem to decentralise more as complexity increases with 
organisational size.  
Hypothesis 5 predicted a positive relationship between uncertainty and slack. However, 
the rank correlation between municipal inhabitants and free disposable municipal income 
in 1994 was modest with r = –.43 (p < .01) and of opposite direction than predicted by 
hypothesis 5. Note also for this relationship that the two indicators used in the 
operationalisation did not satisfy the temporal ordering for causal explanations, but were 
nevertheless selected due to measurement problems. The fourth relationship contrary to 
predicted was between ambiguity and use of performance measurement where hypothesis 
6 predicted a negative relationship. The rank correlation between the dummy variable on 
different party affiliation of the mayor and deputy mayor and the performance 
measurement index showed the very low positive relationship of r = .05, but this 
relationship was not significant on the .05 level. The rank correlation between municipal 
centrality and the performance measurement index was also very low with r = .17 (p < 
.05), but with the sign in the hypothesised direction according to hypothesis 7. The rank 
correlation between percentage leftist representatives in the municipal councils and the 
performance measurement index was low and with r = .27 (p < .01). The rank correlation 
between percentage municipal employees of all employed inhabitants aged 16–74 in the 
municipality and the performance measurement index was modest with r = –.41 (p < .01) 
and with the direction of the sign as predicted in hypothesis 8. The last hypothesised 
relationship present in table 6 was between municipal dependence on local taxpayers and 
use of performance measurement. The rank correlation between income tax per capita and 
the performance measurement index was very low with r = .19 (p < .01) and with the sign 
as predicted in hypothesis 10.  
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Table 6. Spearman’s (rho) rank correlation coefficients 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Municipal manyears               
2 Free disposable municipal income -.375**              
3 Municipal inhabitants .981** -.430**             
4 Decentralisation .524** -.166* .525**            
5 Mayor and deputy mayor from different party .075 .060 .122 .053           
6 Municipal centrality .333** -.236** .413** .171* .269**          
7 Leftist municipal representatives .353** -.514** .330** .089 -.304** -.011         
8 Municipal employees of all employed  -.741** .459** -.811** -.333** -.212** -.526** -.168*        
9 Income tax per capita .292** .212** .236** .075 .011 .107 -.085 -.218**       
10 Performance measurement index .508** -.332** .492** .246** .052 .166* .271** -.410** .189**      
11 Performance indicators subindex .496** -.198** .487** .229** .037 .203** .226** -.400** .275** .692**     
12 Verbal conclusions subindex .405** -.347** .388** .183* .065 .110 .269** -.333** .092 .935** .478**    
13 Management by objectives (MBO) .277** -.011 .278** .078 .119 .165* .053 -.297** .237** .296** .343** .209**   
14 Value for money (VFM) auditing index .209** -.100 .225** .096 .180* .104 .085 -.252** .038 .170* -.020 .223** -.001  
15 Financial auditing index -.044 -.050 -.048 -.013 -.100 .027 .084 .102 -.034 -.036 -.040 -.040 -.028 -.115 
Note. All variables are untransformed. Missing cases regarding the decentralisation, VFM and financial auditing indexes, were deleted casewise (N=136–162).  
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed). 
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ESTIMATION OF THE MODELS 
 
Regression analysis utilises the technique of minimising least squares. It has several 
assumptions where linearity is one of the most important. Breaches on the linearity 
assumption are commonly remedied with transformations of the data (Kimberly, 1976). 
For instance, size-related variables are commonly skewed. Subsequently such data are 
often transformed using logarithmic transformations. This reduces the potential of the 
variables’ correlation to be very strongly affected by extreme scores. Furthermore, the 
distribution which results from a log transformation more closely approximates the 
normality assumption which underlies multivariate analysis. However, this approach 
implicitly assumes a curvilinear relationship with all of the other variables in the 
equation. Nevertheless, nonlinearity may be relevant if the administrative structure of 
interest is very sensitive to size difference when organisations are relatively small, but 
less sensitive to such differences in larger organisations. If the administrative structure is 
a function of several exponentiated variables, the equation can be tested with linear 
regression taking log transformations of all the variables. However, such logarithmic 
functions were unknown a priori in my study, and may furthermore have been unduly 
restrictive as a starting assumption for this ill-defined problem. It is also common to use 
square root or quadratic transformations of size related variables. I have therefore 
employed the modified regression analysis as outlined in chapter 5. This approach 
facilitates choosing selective data transformations and inclusion of interaction terms 
based on a priori theoretical grounds (Pong and Whittington, 1994).  
The dependent variable, the performance measurement index, was square root 
transformed. This form was chosen to discount the impact of subsequent frequencies of 
performance measurement above the initial levels. Visual inspection of the size related 
variables, municipal manyears and municipal inhabitants, still indicated nonlinearity 
when these variables were plotted on the square root transformed dependent variable. 
On theoretical reasons one may assume that both asymmetric information and 
complexity increase more than proportional relative to increase in number of 
bureaucrats and decentralised administrative units respectively. This is due to the 
potential exponential increase in number of cross-relationships as the number of 
bureaucrats and decentralised units increase. However, on a practical level, it seems 
highly unrealistic to assume that for instance bureaucrats should or could utilise all 
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theoretical available networks. Hence, a square root transformation for these two 
independent variables was chosen. This seemed to improve the non-linearity problems, 
but not completely discard it.  
It was assumed that the models could be mis-specified. The ordinary least square 
(OLS) estimations were therefore performed with a constant term in each of the 
regressors. The constant term can capture some of the specification errors both from 
omitted variables and from mis-specified functional forms. All variables were entered 
into the regression equation in one single step (the ‘enter’ method).  
The asymmetric information indicator, municipal manyears, posed a problem of 
collinearity with the indicator for uncertainty (complexity), which was measured with 
the (organisational size) municipal inhabitant variable. A rule of thumb is that a 
correlation of .80 or more represents a problem of collinearity. The correlation between 
these two variables was close to unity. A remedy to this collinearity problem could have 
been to estimate the agency theory/public choice model with the asymmetric 
information variable (bureaucracy size) included, and the contingency theory model 
with the organisational complexity indicator (organisational size) included separately, 
and then based on corroboration of the hypotheses, judge which of these variables 
respectively should have been included in the fully specified, explanatory model 
encompassing all the three models. An alternative approach could have been to assume 
that complexity and uncertainty were reflected in the organisational design variable 
decentralisation. In that case, the municipal inhabitants indicator for complexity might 
have been discarded, and the most severe collinearity problem could have been omitted. 
However, this latter approach would basically have made the positive assumption that 
the municipalities already had an optimal contingency fit, while my main project was to 
undertake empirical investigations without making such assumptions. Furthermore, 
contingency fit is an issue for further investigations. Even though I had included an 
organisational design variable in my study, adequate performance measures (other than 
slack) were not included which would have been warranted in order to infer conclusions 
on municipal contingency fit. On this reason I chose the first approach. The models were 
estimated separately and then the variable which was empirically supported through the 
tests of the hypotheses and theoretical reasoning, was selected for the full model (model 
IV).  
Hypothesis 5 predicted a positive relationship between uncertainty and slack. 
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However, such a relationship was not corroborated by using bivariate rank correlation 
with municipal inhabitants (in 1996) to explain free disposable income (in 1994). 
Although the time ordering of the hypothesised independent variable (uncertainty) here 
preceded the dependent variable (slack), in the operationalisation the data for the 
dependent variable preceded the data for the independent variable. It is recognised that 
this, in conjunction with using indicators for the latent variables uncertainty and slack, 
are major sources for measurement problems. Furthermore, the lack of support to the 
hypothesised relationship between uncertainty and slack may also be due to institutional 
factors in the Norwegian local government grant system. This system has been criticised 
for granting too much resources to smaller, non-central municipalities, and too little 
resources to larger, central municipalities (Borge and Rattsø, 1996). Hence, the, negative 
rank correlation of –.43 between the complexity indicator municipal inhabitants and the 
slack indicator free disposable municipal income, could be attributed to the grant system 
and not to municipal discretion on organisational slack and design decisions. This 
specific bivariate relationship in my data could therefore be spurious. A spurious 
relationship is present when two variables appear to be connected but the connection is 
not a ‘true’ relationship. I have therefore not specified or included the hypothesised 
interaction term in hypothesis 5 between uncertainty and slack in estimation of models I 
and IV. The lack of variables incorporating the local government grant system thus 
indicates omitted variables and potential sources of mis-specification in my models.  
The results from regressing models I to IV on the square root transformed 
performance measurement index are given in table 7. The reported regression 
coefficients are all standardised (beta) regression coefficients because this makes it 
possible to compare directly the effect of the regression coefficients as to their relative 
explanatory power of the dependent variable. The beta coefficient is the coefficient 
estimate from a regression in which the variables have been standardised. It can be 
interpreted as the number of standard error changes in the dependent variable which 
results from one standard error change in the independent variable. Only the adjusted 
coefficient of determination squared (R2) is given as an overall goodness-of-fit measure 
for the models as this measure can be used to compare models which use different 
numbers of independent variables. The explanatory power for all four models was 
relatively low as only 22 to 32% (F < .01) of the total variation in the best case was 
explained by the models. However, the sign of the complexity/uncertainty indicator in 
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model II was opposite than predicted and moreover of relatively great magnitude. The 
28% potential explanation by model II of the total variance is possibly more due to the 
new institutionalism symbolic or isomorphism explanation in conventional wisdom than 
to contingency theory. That is, with increasing uncertainty performance measurement is 
also used more, but for external legitimacy and decoupled from internal control, or as 
adaptation to uncertainty. Thus, it seems that the full model (model IV) explained the 
most (adjusted R2 = .32), followed by a marginally less explanatory power by the agency 
theory model, and lastly the political model. The public choice explanation in model I, 
however, was not supported, and is to be discussed further in chapter 7. All models have 
been estimated with an intercept. All models also had a positive parameter coefficient 
for this term. This may suggest that performance measurement is common as control 
model regardless of contingencies or institutional circumstances, or that the models are 
mis-specified. The latter alternative is, due to the skewed distributions and the 
likelihood of omitted variables, most plausible.  
 
 
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
 
A consistent result over the models which used asymmetric information as explanation, 
was that use of performance measurement increased when the indicator for asymmetric 
information, municipal manyears, increased. Many factors may vary with size related 
variables. Thus, model I with only a few independent variables, gave a larger parameter 
coefficient (.55) for asymmetric information, than model IV (.23), which had more 
independent variables. For instance, if management competence vary positvely with 
organisational size, then the reported beta coefficient of .55 in model I may have 
captured effects from organisational competence as well as from asymmetric 
information. Thus, one should be very cautious in interpreting the parameter in model I 
and IV as a true effect of asymmetric information only. However, hypothesis 1 was not 
supported in either of the two models. Hence, the results could be interpreted as when 
there is more asymmetric information, more performance measurement is used.  
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Table 7. Multiple regression analysis of square root of performance measurement 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Hypothesis 




Politics Full model  
1 
 









Municipal manyears 1996 (square root) * free disposable municipal income 
1994 (square root) (interaction term of asymmetric information and slack) 
-.06 
(-.231) 





Free disposable municipal income 1994 (slack). Square root transformation -.16 
(-1.095) 





Municipal inhabitants 1996 (complexity). Square root transformation  .52 
(6.850)** 
  H4 (–) 
4 
 







Mayor and deputy mayor from different parties (political coalitions in the 






















Municipal employees 1997 of all employed inhabitants aged 16–74 
(bureaucrats’ power)  





7*8 Leftist municipal representatives * municipal employees of all employed 
inhabitants aged 16–74 (interaction term of leftist representatives’ power and 
bureaucrats’ power) 



















 Adjusted R2 .31 .28 .22 .32  
 F-value 24.614** 21.381** 9.875** 9.282**  
Note. Standardised regression (Beta) coefficients. T-values in parenthesis. N=162. 
*Significant at the .05-level.  
**Significant at the .01-level. 
a 21 missing values for decentralisation replaced with mean. 
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ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND SLACK 
 
The results of models I and IV gave inconsistent results regarding the interaction term of 
asymmetric information and slack. In model I hypothesis 2 was not supported, while in 
model IV, hypothesis 2 was supported. As model IV controlled for more variables than 
model I, I assume that greater weight should be laid on the results of model IV. Thus, it 
seems reasonable to assume that hypothesis 2 only got partial support. Therefore, there 
could be a positive interaction relationship between asymmetric information and slack.  
 
 
SLACK AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
 
The relationship between the slack indicator and use of performance measurement was 
consistent between models I and IV and negative according to hypothesis 3. 
Furthermore, in model IV the slack indicator was given a larger parameter coefficient (–
.38) than in model I. It thus seems plausible to state that the results give support to the 
notion that relatively more slack is related to less use of performance measurement.  
 
 
UNCERTAINTY AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
 
The relationship between uncertainty and performance measurement has been 
investigated by several means. First, the multiple regression results given in table 7 are 
presented. Then additional analyses by difference between means (table 8) and 
crosstabulations (table 9) are presented.  
Hypothesis 4 stated a negative relationship between uncertainty and use of 
performance measurement. However, both the two indicators for uncertainty used in 
model II, and the remaining indicator for uncertainty (decentralisation) used in model 
IV, had positive parameter coefficients. This lack of support to hypothesis 4 is 
congruent both with the basic agency theory explanation which states that monitoring 
increases when uncertainty increases, and the alternative explanation of decoupled 
symbolic use of performance measurement when uncertainty increases. I therefore tried 
to sort out some of this unclarity by conducting more detailed analysis of uncertainty 
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and performance measurement below.  
 
Table 8. Performance measurement and MBO by uncertainty and services 
 Performance measurement  MBO 
 Mean St.dev. Min Max  Mean St.dev. Min Max 
Chief administrative officer’s 
comments 
4.40 (4.32) 0 19  0.30 (0.83) 0 6 
          
High uncertainty services          
Primary schools 11.98 (10.17) 0 52  6.51 (14.54) 0 95 
Health care and social services 19.40 (17.21) 0 110  7.44 (15.13) 0 95 
Culture and religion 8.34 (7.88) 0 46  5.98 (17.18) 0 143 
Per service 13.24 (9.91) 0 60  6.64 (14.24) 0 100 
          
Low uncertainty services          
Central administration 7.74 (7.88) 0 47  4.01 (8.89) 0 54 
Housing, commercial development, 
environmental planning 
5.04 (5.82) 0 36  3.32 (8.74) 0 59 
Infrastructure 9.77 (10.86) 0 80  6.12 (14.11) 0 87 
Road maintenance 1.40 (2.31) 0 12  0.96 (3.39) 0 33 
Per service 6.00 (5.26) 0 38  3.60 (7.22) 0 39 
          
All municipalities 68.10 (48.46) 0 292  34.65 (68.31) 0 437 
Note. Mean, standard deviation (in parenthesis), minimum and maximum of frequency counts in municipal 
annual reports. All variables are untransformed. N=162. 
 
 
Table 8 gives the use of performance measurement and MBO in the 162 Norwegian 
municipal annual reports in 1996 by assumed level of uncertainty and by services. The 
municipalities disclosed performance measurement most in the category of services with 
anticipated highest degree of uncertainty. In the high uncertainty category the mean use 
of performance measurement per service was 13 compared to 6 in the category with 
assumed lowest degree of uncertainty. Furthermore, the data in table 8 showed a 
relationship contrary to expectations according to conventional wisdom (assuming for 
the time being instrumental use of organisational control). A similar picture was 
revealed on the municipal use of MBO which also was most extensive in the services 
with assumed most uncertainty.  
The municipalities used performance measurement most in health care and social 
services, and in primary schools. Health care and social services had the highest average 
use of performance measurement with a mean of 19 followed by primary schools with 
12 and infrastructure with 10. Thus, both the two services (health care and social 
services, and primary schools) with highest use of performance measurement were in 
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the category with assumed highest uncertainty. Also the service with lowest average use 
of performance measurement in the high uncertainty category, culture and religion 
services, had a higher average use of performance measurement than most of the 
services in the category with assumed low uncertainty. The maximum values also 
showed that there was a substantial potential for performance measurement in all 
services and especially in the category with assumed high uncertainty. The minimum 
values showed that not all the municipalities disclosed performance measurement or 
MBO in all services.  
Thus, hypothesis 4 was neither supported when performance measurement and 
uncertainty was analysed with municipal level data in table 7, nor when performance 
measurement and uncertainty by services was analysed in table 8. Furthermore, use of 
the MBO model seems to validate the results from using the performance measurement 
index. However, as both indexes have been collected by the same content analysis 
method, other measures must be employed in order to provide adequate multi-method 
multi-trait validation of the results. The result of such an approach is reported in table 9.  
 
Table 9. Municipal control models by size and decentralisation 
 Small municipalitiesa Medium municipalitiesb Large municipalitiesc 



















































































Note. Mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis). All variables are untransformed.  
a Less than 5,000 inhabitants.  
b 5,000–19,999 inhabitants. 
c 20,000 or more inhabitants. 
d Municipalities with one or more service groups with decentralised administration.  
e Additive index with 5 dummy variable items ranging from 0 (low emphasis) to 5 (much emphasis). 
f Additive index with 2 dummy variable items ranging from 0 (low emphasis) to 2 (much emphasis). 
 
 
We may assume that complexity and hence uncertainty increases with increasing 
municipal size. In the Norwegian local government context it is common to assume that 
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municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants are small and municipalities with 20,000 
inhabitants or more are large. However, these categorisations may vary between 
countries. It is assumed that as complexity and hence uncertainty increases with 
increasing organisational size, the municipalities may take measures in order to reduce 
uncertainty to a manageable level. Common organisational design approaches used to 
reduce uncertainty are formalisation, specialisation and decentralisation. In table 9 the 
use of four distinct organisational control models are given both by municipal size and 
by decentralisation. It should be noted, though, that results computed from small 
numbers, for instance data from the cells with less than 10 cases, should be interpreted 
with great caution due to potentially low reliability. Table 9 shows that use of both 
performance measurement, MBO and VFM auditing increased with increasing 
municipal size, but were moderated by decentralisation among the largest 
municipalities. Furthermore, municipal emphasis on financial auditing were largely 
insensitive to variation in any particular way with regard to size and decentralisation. 
This result is plausible as financial auditing is regulated by law and connected with long 
traditions and norms on general accepted accounting practice (GAAP). VFM auditing is 
not standardised to the same extent as financial auditing. Neither performance 
measurement nor MBO are regulated or mandated at all in the Norwegian local 
government. Thus, the data reported in table 9 did then not support hypothesis 4. 
Moreover, both using data collected by different methods, and using data for dissimilar 
control models, provided results consistent with the previous reported results. Multi 
methods provided consistent results while multi traits revealed dissimilar results. These 
findings provide enhanced corroboration to the construct validity and reliability of the 
indexes developed and employed in this study.  
 
 
AMBIGUITY AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
 
Hypothesis 6 predicted a negative relationship between ambiguity and use of 
performance measurement. However, both model III and model IV gave consistent but 
small positive parameter coefficients of the ambiguity indicator. This means that 
hypothesis 6 was not supported. However, the indicator for ambiguity is questionable. If 
the mayor and deputy mayor do not come from the same party, this could also indicate a 
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relatively high degree of political interparty competition. If one assume that both the 
position of mayor and deputy mayor have substantial influence, then these positions may 
have relatively more influence when there is only one such position in the parties in 
question rather than in situations when there are two such positions within the one, 
ruling party. If this critique is substantial, then I have not tested hypothesis 6. However, 
if the indicator is valid for measuring political competition, then one may tentatively 
assume that as political competition increases, performance measurement is used more. 
Thus, in that case, this indicator should have been included in model III rather than in 
model II.  
 
 
POWER AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
 
Except for the indicator for municipal employees’ power, all the indicators for the 
political variables’ parameter coefficients were consistent in sign across model III and 
model IV. However, hypothesis 7 on a positive relationship between management 
competence and use of performance measurement was not supported. There are many 
potential explanations for this result. Measurement errors regarding the use of municipal 
centrality as indicator for management competence is certainly one.  
The results gave a consistent and relatively high and stable parameter coefficient for 
a positive relationship between leftist representatives in the municipal councils and use 
of performance measurement.  
Hypothesis 8 predicted a negative relationship between municipal employees’ power and use 
of performance measurement. As model III and model IV gave inconsistent signs for the 
parameter coefficients, the results are inconclusive. However, the parameter coefficient for the 
interaction term between leftist municipal representatives and the municipal employee power 
indicator were consistent and negative. Hypothesis 9, which assumed a negative relationship 
between adverse selection of municipal employee and leftist municipal representatives and use of 
performance measurement, was supported. The last variable in the political model was municipal 
dependence on local taxpayers. It was found a positive relationship between income tax per capita 
and use of performance measurement in both model III and IV, thus supporting hypothesis 10.  
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Table 10. Municipalities ranked highest and lowest on performance measurement 
























Most use of performance measurement in the annual reports 
1 Stavanger Rogaland 105,626 1.15 Yes 0.33 0.15 2,558 Yes Yes 
2 Trondheim Sør-Trøndelag 144,670 0.46 Yes 0.34 0.16 3,180 Yes Yes 
3 Porsgrunn Telemark 31,959 0.57 Yes 0.47 0.17 3,677 No No 
4 Ålesund Møre og Romsdal 37,527 0.37 Yes 0.26 0.14 3,306 No Yes 
5 Bodø Nordland 39,916 0.59 Yes 0.49 0.14 3,380 Yes Yes 
6 Tromsø Troms 57,384 0.43 Yes 0.48 0.14 5,376 Yes Yes 
 Central tendency 69,514c 0.60c Yesd 0.39c 0.15c 3,580c Yesd Yesd 
           
Least use of performance measurement in the annual reports 
157 Audnedal Vest-Agder 1,551 0.97 Yes 0.29 0.23 13,547 No Yes 
158 Bygland Aust-Agder 1,346 1.99 Yes 0.40 0.32 14,250 No Yes 
159 Sirdal Vest-Agder 1,753 5.17 Yes 0.21 0.35 3,409 No No 
160 Austevoll Hordaland 4,274 0.74 Yes 0.22 0.20 11,314 No No 
161 Iveland Aust-Agder 1,140 1.07 Yes 0.24 0.22 14,735 No No 
162 Åmli Aust-Agder 1,900 1.28 No 0.57 0.27 11,473 No Yes 
 Central tendency 1,994c 1.87c Yesd 0.32c 0.27c 11,455c Nod – 
Note.  
a Source: Ministry of Local Affairs and Regional Development (1998).  
b Source: Johnsen (1997) and Vabo (1996).  
c Mean (N=6).  
d Mode (N=6). 
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CASE STUDY OF MUNICIPALITIES WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST USE 
OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
 
Case study is a research design which is used to investigate a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context and espescially when the boundaries between 
the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident. Furthermore, case studies cope 
with the situation when there are more variables than cases (datapoints or units of 
analysis). The case study research design relies on multiple sources of evidence used for 
triangulation, and benefits from prior development of theoretical propositions to guide 
data collection and analysis (Yin, 1994). Here I have utilised a simple case study design 
in order to learn as much as possible from my data. The strategic aim of a regression 
analysis is basically to reveal potential commonalities in the data by identifying or 
inference population parameters. Another research strategy is to reveal differences by 
scrutinising ‘outliers’. One case study tactic in searching for cross-case patterns is to 
select pairs of cases and then list similarities and differences between each pair 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b). For instance, the most distinct cases may be studied in detail in 
order to understand why these cases do not fit neatly within a common typology or why 
these cases reduce the overall fit for instance of a regression model. While this tactic 
commonly is used in building theories, here I have used this tactic in order to validate 
the results from the multiple regression. Thus, if this case study eventually reveals 
similar conclusions as the multiple regression, greater trust can be put in the results 
reported above. If dissimilar results are revealed, then the trust in the above reported 
findings would decline. Furthermore, a case study might provide insights which 
otherwise could have been lost by using one or a few methods alone.  
Table 10 presents the six highest and the six lowest ranked users of performance 
measurement together with 10 independent variables. The data on municipalities which 
have participated in performance measurement implementation networks or participated 
in municipal administrative reform projects, are obtained from Johnsen (1997) and 
Vabo (1996). Both these studies only documented municipal projects encompassing 
performance measurement or administrative reforms which had been evaluated or 
reported in the literature. 22 of the 162 municipalities (14%) of the defined population 
in this thesis had participated in one or more implementation networks or projects 
within 1996. However, this figure could have been too low as some municipalities may 
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have developed and used performance measurement without participating in reported or 
evaluated projects. The data for municipal grants per capita was obtained from official 
statistics published by the Ministry for Local Affairs and Regional Development in 
1998. The other variables are identical with the previously reported data.  
The overall results from this brief case study were that the six municipalities with 
lowest use of performance measurement, all were located in the Southern or Western 
regions. These six municipalities were all small but they had relatively much free 
disposable municipal income. They had also somewhat less leftist representatives in the 
municipal councils, but the mean percentage municipal employees of all employed 
inhabitants was almost twice as large as in the group of municipalities with highest use 
of performance measurement. All but one of the municipalities in the low-use group had 
a relatively high dependence on resources provided as grants. The remaining 
municipality, Sirdal, obtained relatively much resources from income taxes. None of the 
municipalities with lowest use of performance measurement had reportedly participated 
in implementation networks or projects regarding formal control structures, and half of 
these municipalities did not use MBO. The group of municipalities with highest use of 
performance measurement were all large municipalities and they had relatively little free 
disposable municipal income. Most of these municipalities had participated in 
implementation networks or projects regarding performance measurement or MBO, and 
all but one also used MBO.  
This simple case study seems to support several of the results reported above. Size 
related variables, little free disposable municipal income, leftist municipal 
representatives, and few municipal employees relative to all employed inhabitants, 
seemed to be related to much use of performance measurement. Furthermore, high 
dependence on resources other than grants, participation in implementation structures, 
and overlap of control models, seemed to be related to much use of performance 
measurement. Thus, also the results from the case study indicated that asymmetric 
information, slack, bureaucracy power, and resource dependence, could be relevant 
independent variables. In addition, the case study also identified other variables as 
implementation issues and overlap of control models, as potential explanations in 
studies of municipal performance measurement.  
 
 




The above reported results indicate that performance measurement is used more as 
asymmetric information increases. Thus, hypothesis 1 was not supported. Furthermore, 
the results could indicate that when there is much asymmetric information then there is 
also much slack. However, the results on hypothesis 2 were inconclusive. There seems 
to be a relation between more slack and less use of performance measurement. Here 
hypothesis 3 was supported by both models which were estimated for this relationship. 
There seemed to be a positive relationship between uncertainty and use of performance 
measurement as predicted in hypothesis 4. This relationship was analysed with three 
indicators, tested both on the organisational level and at the service level, and controlled 
for organisational design to remedy organisational complexity and uncertainty, as 
decentralisation. However, the results were consistent and indicated that more 
uncertainty was related to more use of performance measurement. The empirical results 
were inconclusive whether this extended use of performance measurement under 
uncertainty was instrumental or symbolic use of information. The empirical results did 
possibly not provide any credible test of hypothesis 6 on ambiguity and use of 
performance measurement. On the other hand, the results could indicate that 
performance measurement increased with increasing political interparty competition. 
Hypothesis 7 predicted a positive relationship between management competence and 
use of performance measurement. When municipal centrality was used as indicator for 
management competence, the hypothesis was not supported. Regarding political 
preferences and use of performance measurement, the literature is inconclusive and 
therefore no hypothesis was formulated on this issue. However, the empirical results 
indicated consistently in two models that relatively more leftist representatives in the 
municipal councils were related to more use of performance measurement. While 
hypothesis 8 was formulated with a negative relationship between the power of 
municipal employees and the use of performance measurement, the results were 
inconclusive in the two models which were estimated for this relationship. However, the 
interaction term between leftist representatives’ political power and municipal 
employees’ power which was hypothesised to be negatively related to use of 
performance measurement, was supported in both models used (hypothesis 9). Lastly, 
hypothesis 10 on resource dependence was supported as there was found a positive 
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relationship between income tax per capita and municipal use of performance 
measurement in both models estimated for this relationship.  
The above reported results must be moderated with regard to the presence of likely 
mis-specifications in the models, and measurement errors due to the extensive use of 
indicators. One possible source of mis-specification is estimating the models with 
wrong functional forms. This problem was dealt with by certain data transformations, 
but it was not entirely solved. Thus, some of the low explanatory power of the models 
could possibly be due to the presence of mis-specified functional forms in the models.  
Another possible source of mis-specification is omitted variables. The interaction 
term between uncertainty and slack was omitted from the models. One possible source 
of this specific problem was the Norwegian general grant system, which was not 
included in the models. The grant system is structurally designed to redistribute 
resources from central to non-central municipalities. However, although this is disputed, 
one may assume that this mechanism could have resulted in overcompensation for non-
central drawbacks in production costs. Thus, my data indicated that there were relatively 
more slack in smaller municipalities, and relatively less slack in larger municipalities 
with assumed more uncertain contingencies. However, these results may be due to 
omitted variables and from the Norwegian local government grant system specifically. 
As the local government grant system had redistribution mechanisms so as to achieve 
smoothing the municipal incomes toward the national mean, also the indicators for 
municipal resource dependence must be interpreted with great caution. This means that 
if a municipality had a seemingly high dependence on the local taxpayers, it must be 
considered that a hypothetical potential loss of all municipal income taxes would not 
have resulted in a subsequent identical loss in municipal operating income. The 
redistribution mechanism of the local government grant system would have intervened 
and compensated for some of this loss in resources. Furthermore, the case study 
indicated that both implementation issues and the presence of overlap of control models, 
possibly indicating or affecting management competence, were potential explanatory 
factors. These aspects may also indicate the possibility of certain omitted variables in 
the models I have used to explain municipal use of performance measurement.  
The most severe measurement errors could possibly be related to the use of size-
related indicators for asymmetric information and uncertainty. Many factors are 
assumed to vary with size in organisational studies. The reported modelled effects of the 
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variables which were measured with such indicators, must therefore be interpreted with 
great caution. Another variable which probably was concerned with measurement errors, 
was the dummy variable which initially was operationalised as an indicator for 
ambiguity. This indicator should possibly rather have been interpreted and modelled as 
indicating political interparty competition and have been included in the political model 
rather than in the conventional wisdom model of contingency theory and new 
institutionalism. If this was the case, then the results indicated that performance 
measurement increased with increasing political interparty competition.  
 









In this last chapter, I want to move beyond my specific data and integrate my findings 
into existing research and theory. This discussion proceeds with the following outline. 
Next an overview of the findings is provided and some limitations with the study are 
identified. The third section discusses potential implications of the findings for current 
organisation theory. The fourth section addresses implications for future research, policy 
and practice. The last section presents two thoughts in the closing of this project.  
 
 
OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
 
The initial purpose for this thesis was to enhance our understanding on how 
organisational control is used in political institutions. However, after a while I 
discovered that this may just as well be pursued as a second look at one of the 
widespread conventional wisdom in organisational control. Both my own experiences, 
classics in the field, as well as several empirical studies, indicated rather strongly that 
the conventional wisdom was not firmly established by empirical support, in spite of its 
widespread use in textbooks. My initial research question for this project was how 
asymmetric information and uncertainty affect performance measurement in political 
institutions, and local government was chosen as context for this investigation.  
In chapter 2 I asserted that the political dimension of organisational control may be 
prevalent also in organisational control in general, and not distinct only to political 
institutions. However, to apply economics of organisation in positive studies of political 
institutions, it was called for an extended appreciation for politics. Politics was related 
to some of the basic purposes of political institutions which are solving of collective 
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problems under coercion, and redistribution. To better understand how economics of 
organisation is used in such contexts, the difference between Pareto optimality and 
Kaldor-Hicks optimality was reviewed. It was argued that as Kaldor-Hicks optimality 
encompasses Pareto optimality, addresses politics, and makes clear that the issues of 
allocative efficiency and equity are inseparable dimensions of effectiveness, the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion was deemed to be a firm foundation for the positive political theory 
research programme, and a fruitful perspective for analysing organisational control in 
political institutions. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion explicitly makes us aware of the fact 
that economics of organisation in political institutions is as much about redistribution of 
the initial resources, and about conflicts and losers, as about taking initial resources as 
given, compromises and winners, as the Pareto criterion addresses. The Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion furthermore provides a sound theoretical framework of welfare economics to 
be utilised when the economics of organisation is to be applied in political institutions. 
This theoretical framework has been drawn upon in the proceeding chapters in this 
thesis. Though the claim for using welfare theory and Kaldor-Hicks optimality as 
criterion in positive studies of political institutions are not new, it nevertheless seems to 
have been neglected in several disciplines in the later years, as in accounting and in 
political science. The first find in this study of organisational control in political 
institutions was therefore a rediscovery and reappreciation of classical microeconomics, 
not as more borrowing from the economics research tradition, but as borrowing from the 
microeconomics research programme. It was furthermore suggested that this theoretical 
framework may also have relevance to organisational control in general and not only for 
positive studies of political institutions. 
In chapter 3 I reviewed literature on performance measurement in political 
institutions. Performance measurement is an issue in many theories, but especially 
agency theory, classical contingency theory, organisational learning and the resource 
dependence perspective were found to be illuminating in explaining organisational 
control under asymmetric and uncertain contingencies. The second find was the 
longstanding tradition of public management performance research and the relatively 
rich empirical literature on public sector performance measurement. Again, politics 
turned out to be a fruitful perspective on organisational control. However, more 
conceptual clarity and parsimony was called for, and this was pursued in the proceeding 
chapter.  
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In chapter 4 I elaborated on a conceptual model relating asymmetric information and 
uncertainty to other explanatory concepts in studies of performance measurement in 
political institutions. The third find, which emerged both from the review of the 
literature and from investigating the conceptual model, was the overwhelmingly 
complexity permeating the issue of organisational control in political institutions. Based 
on the conceptual model I derived several testable hypotheses from public choice, 
agency theory, contingency theory, new institutionalism and the resource dependence 
perspective.  
Chapter 5 documented the method which was utilised to test the hypotheses with the 
Norwegian local government as setting. The elaboration on the research design revealed 
some of the inherent methodological problems related to empirical studies of 
organisational control and confirmed the find of complexity from the previous chapters. 
Potential limitations regarding external validity and generalisability from my study were 
assumed to be connected to the relatively small size of the municipalities in my study, 
local versus central government as setting, mayor-led versus city management-led 
municipalities, and between countries which have mandatory use of performance 
measurement versus other countries.  
Chapter 6 documented the multivariate analysis using multiple regression on 
municipal performance measurement. The fourth find in this thesis was that of the three 
models, only the agency theory model and the political model was judged to have 
received empirical support. The fifth and surprising find was that the basic proposition 
commonly employed in contingency theory of relatively less instrumental use of output 
control uncertainty, was rejected as there was ample use of performance measurement 
and other related control models under contingencies of uncertainty. Also the agency 
theory model received more support than the public choice model. Thus, politics as well 
as the alleged symbolism stood out as relevant alternative explanation to the lack of 
support to the conventional wisdom. When a full model was specified using all the three 
models of agency theory, contingency theory/new institutionalism and politics, this only 
succeeded marginally better than the agency theory model alone in explaining 
performance measurement. However, in addition to providing additional empirical 
support to the theoretical relevance of asymmetric information and slack, also some 
empirical support was given to the relevance of politics and resource dependence. The 
empirical results thus may have corroborated the proposition both in agency theory and 
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in positive political theory that asymmetric information and political uncertainty leads 
the representatives as principals to establish governing structures which may make their 
agents monitor themselves in competition for scarce resources.  
Although the results indicated that the models were mis-specified as the overall 
explanation of the phenomenon was limited, only 22 to 32% of the total variation was in 
the best case explained by the models, many of the theoretically assumed conceptual 
relations were estimated. Several of the hypotheses, which were formulated congruent 
with conventional wisdom, were found lacking empirical support. However, their rival 
explanations turned out to be fully compatible with the research programme outlined in 
chapter 3. The results were also made subject to control for intervening variables as 
organisational design, and the content analysis performance measurement index was 
validated in a multi-method, multi-trait approach. Both these tests indicated that the 
results on the use of performance measurement were consistent with similar control 
models as management by objectives (MBO) and value for money (VFM) auditing, and 
less congruent with dissimilar control models as financial auditing. Thus, the 
performance measurement index was found valid and satisfactory regarding reliability. 
However, due to the general use of indicators in this study and the complex phenomena 
investigated, it is a fact that there are measurement errors and in particular for the 
independent variables, which in general reduces reliability. A case study of the 12 
municipalities with either the most or the least use of performance measurement, 
seemed nevertheless to support the main results of the multiple regression analysis.  
In the positioning of the research theme and research question addressed initially in 
chapter 1, organisational control was seen in conjunction with a presumable 
consolidation phase of the public sector in many countries (cf. table 1). Such potential 
grand reforms or ‘natural experiments’ are influenced by a number of factors where 
organisational control in the political institutions involved is but one vector of variables. 
It is however striking that the public sector may have provided the leading edge on 
performance measurement issues at the same time as the consolidation of the public 
sector may have taken place, and the effects of this reform on reducing the relative size 
of the public sector in many countries now may be emerging. Meyer (1979) found that 
public bureaucracies were considerably more open to their environments than 
stereotypes as classical bureacracy theory suggested. There is not enough evidence to 
state that performance measurement in political institutions has played a significant role 
Chapter 7: Discussion 
 141 
in public sector reforms, nor has that research question been addressed explicitly in this 
thesis. The correlation nevertheless seems to provide potential for many new 
propositions on the role of organisational control in public sector reforms in further 
empirical investigations.  
 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT ORGANISATION THEORY 
 
In the 1970s Anthony Hopwood, Professor of Accounting and editor of one of the top 
four scientific journals in accounting, argued for using a critical, organisational 
perspective in accounting research (Hopwood, 1978). Hopwood gave several reasons for 
using a critical, organisational perspective. First, the critical perspective takes social 
interests explicitly into consideration. Second, the critical perspective in 
interdisciplinary research is a means to avoid assuming that certain theoretical insights 
or claims are firmly established, while they in fact may not be so. To neglect this in 
interdisciplinary research may result in ‘citation lag’ or focusing on findings and 
perspectives that subsequently are questioned or even discredited. Third, Hopwood 
argued that the organisational perspective provides a way of building on previous 
research developments. This paper has, interestingly in itself, only got 16 citations in the 
Social Science Citation Index including several from critical and postmodern scholars, 
relative to his ‘near classics’ (Brown, 1996) call for studying accounting in the context 
in which it operates (Hopwood, 1983), which many scholars have utilised in arguing for 
employing case studies, which has been cited 33 times. If this indicates that there has 
been more inductive case studies with relatively little regard for previous studies, than 
deductive or cumulative oriented studies (March, 1999), or that a multi-theory 
perspective, as organisation theory, not has been employed, then it could explain why 
the rich literature on public sector performance measurement largely has been seemingly 
unnoticed. 
I have used an organisational theory perspective throughout this project. However, 
whether my findings may have implications for current theory and cumulative formation 
of knowledge or not, depends on several factors. First, present organisation theory is 
constituted by many theories, cf. for instance Hatch (1997) and Pfeffer (1997). 
Therefore, I have restricted my discussion only to the perspectives I already have dealt 
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with so far in this thesis. Second, within a specific theory there would likely be a lack of 
consensus even among distinguished scholars, hence different scholars could reach 
different conclusions. Polsby (1998), in his rereading of Thomas S. Kuhn’s The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, argued that the resistance to change which Kuhn 
described as integral to paradigm shifts, is nowadays found less in the natural sciences 
but probably more in the political and social sciences. A paradigm is a set of 
acknowledged examples of laws, theories, experiments and instruments which serve as 
models for coherent scientific traditions (Kuhn, 1970). Polsby concluded that the more 
formal language and the more precise the empirical expectations the scientific 
communities use, the more readily they can identify normal science anomalies and 
stimulate the replacement of scientific paradigms. Normal science is here understood as 
problem-solving activity in the context of an orthodox theoretical framework (Blaug, 
1980). It should therefore be of no surprise if ‘anomalies’ may exist over extended 
periods of time in the organisation sciences as organisation theory has relatively low 
consensus of precise empirical expectations.  
Organisation and management theory is still fragmented and without the consensus 
characterising relatively more paradigmatic developed disciplines as economics and 
political science (Pfeffer, 1993; Donaldson, 1995; Engwall, 1995). Paradigm 
development refers to the technological uncertainty associated with the production of 
knowledge in a given scientific field or subspeciality. Technological uncertainty means 
here that there is disagreement on the notion that certain methods, certain sequences and 
programmes of study, and certain research questions will advance training and 
knowledge in a given field (Pfeffer, 1993). With these considerations in mind, I have 
below elaborated on my opinions on the implications of my findings for current theory.  
Both the resource dependence/organisational learning and public choice literature 
have put forward explanations as to why formal and instrumental organisational control 
models such as performance measurement, could be extensively used despite ambiguous 
and uncertain contexts. A potential explanation is that public sector management uses 
performance measurement to increase transparency, learn about means-ends 
relationships, outcomes and preferences, reduce uncertainty, and influence both power 
structures, legitimacy and resources (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995). Furthermore, 
the demand for information is not stemming from management only. Political 
competition may induce rivalling political candidates to demand information to 
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scrutinise or challenge the ruling coalitions. Such demands may increase with increasing 
ambiguity and uncertainty. Interest groups and media may demand information from 
public sector organisations, demands which could be facilitated with performance 
measurement. Also internal actors may demand information to be used for internal 
politics as well as external legitimacy. Performance measurement exemplifies that it is 
difficult to distinguish between the operational, managerial and strategic level in 
management control (Langfield-Smith, 1997), as well as between management and 
politics. In summary, performance measurement could be widely used by many actors 
and for a variety of purposes. In the following sections I have elaborated in some more 
detail certain potential implications of my findings for positive theory of political 
institutions, for contingency theory, for public management theory, and for new 
institutionalism.  
 
The relevance of agency theory for political institutions 
 
Ramberg (1997) in his doctoral dissertation Design and Use of Municipal Performance 
Measures, took a similar position as I have taken to the instrumental use of performance 
measurement in municipal organisations as contrasted to the alleged symbolic use. 
Ramberg used document studies and interviews in four Swedish municipalities in the 
early 1990s in his study. He found that performance measurement had been used in 
planning and feedback in formal control systems, but maybe to a lesser extent than was 
expected relative to the extensive interest in performance measurement issues in the 
early 1990s. However, this discrepancy may also be due to different operationalisations 
of performance measurement. I have included certain verbal conclusions in my 
performance measurement index as contrasted to only counting numerical measures. On 
the other hand, Ramberg also came to several of the same conclusions as I have come to 
in my project. Specifically, Ramberg found that the more organisational levels an 
organisation had, the more common was the design of performance measurement. I 
found that the use of performance measurement increased with increasing asymmetry, 
uncertainty and complexity. Ramberg found that for operations and units financed 
through charges, the chances of designing performance measures increased. I found that 
use of performance measurement increased with increasing dependence on local 
taxpayers. Ramberg found that standardised or process technologies facilitated design of 
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result measures. I found that there were substantial overlaps between several control 
models under contingencies of uncertainty.  
Ramberg argued that the central hierarchical levels both most likely were users and 
that they also found it more suitable to use performance measures than actors at the local 
level. Poister and Streib (1999), using a survey to senior municipal officials, reported 
that 80% indicated that the city manager or chief administrative officer was the primary 
audience for the performance measures. These findings are consistent with my 
arguments that performance measurement does not necessarily imply extensive 
employee participation but may be used in organisational control and politics more 
selectively by certain organisational actors (Johnsen, 1999).  
Ramberg (1997) did not deny that performance measurement could be used 
symbolically and as a reflection of inconsistent external demands. However, both he and 
I (and others) found that performance measurement could function as signalling. 
Ramberg explained use of performance measurement as signalling in the formal role of 
municipal section heads in ensuring that individuals working under different control 
systems and with different terminology could adequately inform and understand each 
other. This function was termed as ‘translation’ whereas I have used the more traditional 
concept of implementation for seemingly related functions. Thus, it could be likely that 
performance measurement is a means for establishing reputation and trust in TIT-FOR-
TAT like strategies (Axelrod, 1984) in organisations with relatively high degree of 
asymmetry and uncertainty. Trust requires control, and control requires trust. These two 
concepts are not mutually exclusive but rather complement each other (Power, 1997). 
Moreover, lobbying can be costly in larger municipalities (Sørensen, 1998). Therefore 
the politicians may employ monitoring to a relatively larger extent in larger 
organisations and in more uncertain contingencies because lobbying can be a less 
efficient way of receiving feedback from the constituencies in such circumstances. Thus, 
several of the findings I have reported in my study are corroborated by studies with 
different methods and with data from other settings. 
Whereas uncertainty may be reduced and profitability increased by standardisation in 
firms, standardisation only may not be an efficient strategy for local government. 
Effectiveness is pursued by efficiency and adaptiveness to local preferences. 
Standardisation may result in citizens’ dissatisfaction and inhabitants voting with their 
feet by migration to other municipalities (Tiebout, 1956). On the other hand, 
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performance measurement may be highly useful in order to monitor the effects of 
standardisation, flexibility and local adaptiveness, for instance by benchmarking 
comparable local authorities. This use of formal structures may be especially relevant in 
public sector organisations as they have to adapt under uncertainty, but without market 
competition to provide for selection of efficient organisational forms (Alchian, 1950).  
The condition of transparency furthermore may imply that less visible but common 
control mechanisms as decibel meters, sanctioning, appointment and recruitment, have 
to be complemented by formal and transparent control structures in order to both induce 
change internally, as well as to provide credible legitimacy externally. However, if 
formal control models as performance measurement are not adapted through coercion 
for instance through governmental regulation, or through strong norms for instance 
through conventional wisdom, one may expect that they are not homogeneously 
adapted. This was found in the Norwegian local government (cf. the low adjusted R2 in 
table 7 and the high standard deviations in table 8 and 9), as well as in the US local 
government regarding non-mandatory use of performance measurement. In US 
municipalities with 25,000 or more inhabitants only 38% used performance 
measurement in 1997 (Poister and Streib, 1999).  
Even though there may be extensive asymmetry and uncertainty, organisational 
control decisions are not under full control of the assumed self-interested bureaucrats. 
Put simply: public choice may provide relevant explanations as to why bureaucrats may 
resist organisational control, but agency theory seems to be more valid in explaining 
how organisational control is actually used. Thus, one explanation to the low 
explanatory power of the empirical models reported in chapter 6 and in similar studies 
(Giroux, 1989), may resemble the identification problem of simultaneous supply and 
demands functions in econometrics. The data used throughout this study may have 
represented both the bureaucracy supply function of performance measurement, as well 
as the common agency demand functions for monitoring. In the worst case, the end 
empirical results may have become an almost meaningless hybrid. Nevertheless, agency 
theory may provide substantial explanatory power to public management because 
agency theory addresses the issue that monitoring is an organisational decision. 
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The relevance of organisational learning for contingency theory 
 
Chapman (1997) recently reviewed contingency theory and argued that the literature has 
not yet developed a credible and comprehensive contingency theory of accounting. A 
limitation in the present state was that essential contingency arguments were not always 
recognised as such and incorporated in the contingency theory framework. His 
recommendation was to distinguish between complexity and uncertainty, arguing that it 
was uncertainty that would drive an organisation’s information processing requirements, 
and not complexity. Complexity may be adequately handled by organisational design on 
decentralisation, formalisation and specialisation. In this thesis I have studied 
uncertainty and its influence on information.  
I have found that use of performance measurement increased with organisational size 
and this was assumed to be related to uncertainty. This find was corroborated by Poister 
and Streib (1999) who reported that performance measurement were more prevalent in 
relatively larger US municipalities. Although their study encompassed municipalities 
with 25,000 or more inhabitants, the US municipal context was comparable to Norway 
in the respect that there was no formal mandate for US city and county governments to 
use performance measurement systems, as there was for the US federal (national) 
government under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.  
The results reported in my study are on the other hand somewhat dissimilar to the 
findings from Australian central government departments. Alford and Baird (1997) 
found that the contingency approach where problems in measuring ends (ambiguity) and 
difficulties in relating means to ends (uncertainty), was supported in explaining how the 
Australian central government departments carried out performance measurement. One 
major difference between the measurement of Alford and Baird (1997) and the 
performance measurement index presented in this study, is that the latter study has 
extended the work of Alford and Baird (1997) and others by also measuring verbal 
expressions of performance measurement in addition to counting frequencies of PIs in 
the documents only. The reason for this was that the running down and proliferation of 
PIs, together with economising in presenting vast amounts of information in a few pages 
in annual reports, may necessitate presenting verbal conclusions in stead of some 
numerical data. This operationalisation of performance measurement may have 
enhanced the construct validity of the index employed in the present study with regard 
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to measuring performance measurement rather than measuring use of PIs only. This may 
explain why the results in my study have not supported the conventional wisdom 
framework. Furthermore, Alford and Baird (1997) investigated central government 
while in this study I have studied local government. Both ambiguity and uncertainty may 
vary between these governmental levels and also between countries. One may consider 
that the public sector context in Australia with a population of 18.5 million inhabitants 
is more complex than public sector management in Norway which only has 4.4 million 
inhabitants and furthermore is a relatively rich country.  
Richness and budget constraints have been proposed as central explanatory variables 
in the contingency literature (Wildavsky, 1986), cf. also Hood’s (1995) motif-and-
opportunity hypothesis. OECD data showed that general government total outlays as 
percent of nominal GDP in 1997 were 35% in Australia and 44% in Norway. This may 
have caused a more urgent motive for Norwegian public sector to adopt performance 
measurement as a means for optimising effectiveness while for instance reducing the 
size of the public sector. Equally, marginal considerations may have urged the 
Australian government which had a relatively smaller public sector, to adopt 
performance measurement to optimise efficiency because of a need to utilise relatively 
more scarce resources.  
This discussion of the results based on contingency theory gives indeterminate 
conclusions. At the service and organisational levels, performance measurement seems 
to be used more as uncertainty increases. At the governmental or national levels, it is not 
possible to state any conclusions.  
Hitherto I have not discussed how the information could be used. Hedberg and 
Jönsson (1978) proposed the idea that information systems should be employed as 
adopted strategies were hypotheses of how the organisation and the environment work. 
According to this notion information systems are basically tools for reducing 
uncertainty. Furthermore, information systems then likely would change when both 
internal and/or external relationships change due to rational design of the information 
system. Thus, it is also likely that internal and external power relationships may affect 
design and use of information systems. Regarding contingency theory, the notion of 
reducing uncertainty in a dynamic perspective is what concerns me here. The issue of 
politics is addressed below.  
Performance measurement could be important for organisational learning under 
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uncertainty because it can reduce uncertainty in the longer run. These mechanisms have 
been appreciated and extensively elaborated on in classical economics of organisation 
(Cyert and March, 1963/1992) and classical contingency theory (Thompson, 1967) 
through standard operating procedures (SOPs). Performance measurement can address 
inconsistencies and reveal conflicts adhering to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. However, 
performance measurement could also facilitate the exploration of learning curves both 
in production and in distribution of goods. Such exploration may circumvent win-loose 
confrontations but rather turn at least some political issues into win-win, Pareto 
improvement choices.  
Appreciation of the dynamic aspect of information in reducing uncertainty seems to 
have faded away from the agenda in more recent contingency theory, as in conventional 
wisdom. The notion of designed, semi-confusing information systems in uncertain 
contingencies adds exactly this dynamic element to the development of organisational 
control structures as adaptation to the environment. In addition, also the relevance of 
politics is added to organisational control. The use of performance measurement as an 
organisational learning instrument thus corroborates Thompson’s (1967) concept of 
opportunistic surveillance (search) in organisational decision making and organisational 
learning, in addition to quasi-resolution of conflict, uncertainty avoidance, and 
problemistic search, as proposed in classical economics of organisation, cf. figure 7.1 in 
Cyert and March (1963/1992), and in more recent institutional theory (March and Olsen, 
1989). Therefore, the notion of organisational learning by reducing uncertainty seems be 
a central element in further development of contingency theory.  
 
The relevance of politics for public management theory 
 
The use of performance measurement in the Norwegian municipalities seems at first 
sight to correlate with organisational size and the relative budget size of the services (cf. 
table 8). This pattern eventually disconfirmes the contingency conventional wisdom 
prediction. On the other hand, such a pattern could be highly compatible with the 
symbolism proposition. As complexity and uncertainty increases, organisations could 
employ performance measurement as a device for external legitimacy for organisational 
control. Nevertheless, there are also alternative explanations to this decoupling 
proposition. In most municipalities education and especially the health care and social 
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services constitute the largest part of the budgets. As performance measurement may be 
idiosyncratic for most services, this may result in substantial fixed implementation 
costs. The municipalities could therefore have invested most resources in control and 
measurement systems in the services with highest use of organisational resources. 
Hence, extensive performance measurement could be expected in the largest services. 
However, public sector is not only subject to norms of efficiency but also of reliability, 
equity and transparency (Hood, 1991). Therefore, a priori there is no reason to expect 
that only the largest services are monitored. Although the data support an explanation as 
put forward in agency theory that cost-benefit considerations govern how services are 
subject to performance measurement, this is not mutually inconclusive with an 
explanation that performance measurement also could be used in services with relatively 
much ambiguity and uncertainty, and hence professionalisation. Professionalisation and 
bureaucracies tend to be related to conflicts.  
The phenomenon where the agents monitor themselves almost seems as a reversed 
principal-agent monitoring relationship in organisational control in political institutions 
(Moe, 1990) as compared to how it allegedly works in firms. Thus, in political 
institutions, the representatives may have protective structures not only by common 
agency, but also through organisational control by multiple agents monitoring 
themselves. Performance measurement may cope with uncertainty in order to enhance 
organisational learning in the longer run. Simultaneously, the multiple agents impede 
performance measurement on themselves due to politics and legitimacy. It should here 
be recalled that this notion of decentralised decisionmaking and political competition by 
no means are new thoughts. Hayek (1945) critised the central planned economy for 
being unable to execute optimal decisions due to information problems. Hence, 
decentralised decisions and competition may in the longer run be fare more efficient 
than centralised planning albeit one with central planing in theory disposes most of the 
information required to make optimal allocation of resources. In this respect, the 
observed PIs could be used analogously to the prices in a market economy.  
Schumpeter (1950), another critics of the central planned economy, anticipated that 
capitalism would eventually perish of its own success and give way to some form of 
public control or socialism, what many today might call the welfare state. In order for 
this postcapitalist system to work as a democracy, freedom of the press and competition 
for political leadership were regarded as prerequisites. Thus, politics and political 
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competition may be conducive for making the agents in the public sector utilise 
information in order to facilitate marginal adjustments. Paraphrasing Schumpeter’s 
conception of politics: Politics is not necessarily an independent factor that must be 
abstracted from investigations of the fundamentals in economics. And, when it intrudes, 
it plays according to one’s preferences either the role of a naughty boy who viciously 
tampers with the machine when the engineer’s back is turned, or else the role of a deus 
ex machina by virtue of the mysterious wisdom of statesmen. On the contrary, politics in 
itself is being determined by the structure and state of the economic process (as in 
political institutions), and becomes a conductor of effects as completely within the range 
of economic theory as any purchase or sale. These notions of political institutions and 
political competition seem to have resonance in common economic and political streams 
of reform proposals, most notably in the rightist leaning supply side economics of the 
1970s and 1980s as a means for reforming the at that time overly supply side regulated 
welfare state, and even more recently, with left’s debates on the defintion and 
implementation of ‘the third way’ in modern welfare states (Giddens, 1998).  
In sum, as a market economy relies on regulations in order for its ‘permanent 
revolution’ to function efficiently, also the public sector may rely on certain means of 
competition and decentralisation, certain means of ‘creative destruction’, however 
marginal, in addition to democracy and transparency. Certain structures of political 
competition may be warranted for reforming the public sector in order for the public 
sector to fulfill its tasks in modern welfare states. Organisational control then facilitates 
both efficiency and legitimacy.  
The resource dependence perspective is one of the few perspectives in organisation 
and management theory which deal with politics. The perspective has been most 
renowned for its contribution to strategy, and especially in conjunction with network 
analysis, and with mergers and acquisitions. Few scholars seem to have appreciated this 
perspective’s foundation in classical contingency theory, its contribution on 
organisational use of information and to organisational learning. Paradoxically, the 
elements of the resource dependence perspective which have been most valued for their 
contribution to management theory and strategy, interdependence and politics, have 
seemingly gone relatively unnoticed in public management where one in the first place 
could have assumed that politics were even more relevant (and even is where politics 
had its origin).  
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A drawback with using the resource dependence perspective in empirical analysis, is 
that its concepts are not mutually exclusive relative to many other theories. For instance, 
I have several places throughout this thesis made the case that the resource dependence 
perspective builds on economics of organisation, classical contingency theory, and 
organisational learning. However, this critique is also valid for other theories and 
perspectives like the new institutionalism. Nevertheless, the resource dependence 
perspective deals with politics far more explicitly than most other management theories. 
It is therefore intriguing to incorporate the resource dependence perspective more into 
public management than has hitherto been common. I think the resource dependence 
perspective and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion in combination could enhance the realism 
and validity of public management research and practice, and not only in public 
management theory.  
 
Instrumentalism, symbolism and isomorphism 
 
The findings challenge the symbolic interpretation of the decoupling proposition. A 
counter argument to the symbolic use of information is that performance measurement 
systems are so complex, politically risky and so expensive and time consuming to 
implement, that symbolic use could only serve as a partial explanation. A more efficient 
means to symbolise rationality could have been to adopt MBO but without PIs, which 
also many organisations may have done. MBO is probably easier and less costly to copy 
or imitate than performance measurement. Still MBO in public sector organisations has 
documented positive, instrumental effects, something performance measurement 
currently has not. However, the results showed that performance measurement was more 
extensively reported than MBO in the 162 Norwegian municipalities’ annual reports (cf. 
table 8 and 9), although PIs only consisted of a small part of the performance 
measurement reporting. Thus, neither the conventional wisdom in contingency theory, 
nor the symbolic perspective in the new institutionalism, have as yet provided an 
extensive and convincing explanation to the findings of widespread use of performance 
measurement in addition to MBO in ambiguous and uncertain contingencies. Formal 
organisational structures in NPM may then not (only) be used as ceremonies and rituals 
for organisational legitimisation and myths decoupled from the ‘real life’ in the 
organisations, but for instrumental and political purposes also. This finding supports 
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Meyer and Gupta’s (1994) proposition that non-profit organisations tend to mix control 
models. I found, but without trying to be comprehensive in accounting for the diversity 
of control models, that the municipal use of performance measurement, MBO and VFM 
auditing increased with increasing uncertainty, but that financial auditing remained 
constant. Thus, due to uncertainty it could be rational (and not only in an institutional 
sense), for organisations to adapt performance measurement as a complement to other 
control structures. This idea highlights the relevance of institutional isomorphism.  
The Norwegian setting has been found to be perhaps an extreme version of 
centralised control of the local government (Sørensen, 1997). However, the Norwegian 
government has not made performance measurement mandatory in the local government 
before 2001. Still, the local governments as agents used performance measurement 
voluntarily and extensively relative to MBO and VFM auditing. Furthermore, prior to 
1996 there were in all practical respects no normative influence on the use of 
performance measurement through the curriculums in Norwegian management schools 
and universities. Therefore, isomorphism (Powell and DiMaggio, 1983) will here only 
be discussed in relation to professionalisation. The use of performance measurement 
could correlate with the initial level of clan control, as well as with size. The results 
showed extensive use of performance measurement in health care and social services, 
education, and in infrastructure services (cf. table 8). Conflicts between management 
and the professional norms of doctors, nurses, teachers and engineers could be highly 
influencing the choice of control in these services in the first place. Thus, an alternative 
explanation to isomorphism and adoption of business models to symbolise rationality 
would be that performance measurement is used under ambiguity and uncertainty to 
scrutinise clan control and to enhance output, behaviour or political control. However, 
this explanation is probably more a part of the isomorphism explanation rather than an 
alternative explanation to it. Uncertainty may both increase when professionals are 
employed, as viewed from a management perspective, as well as have been the cause of 
employing professionals in the first place.  
Gupta, Dirsmith and Fogarty (1994) combined contingency and institutional theory in 
explaining organisational control in the highly institutionalised context of operational 
(VFM) audits of US governmental agencies by the General Accounting Office (GAO). 
Specifically, they found that audits conducted in institutionalised settings were 
associated with relatively greater use of a bureaucratic mode of control 
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(standardisation), and this control mode was not associated with variation in the 
efficiency of the audit. Furthermore, audits performed in institutionalised contexts were 
perceived to exhibit higher uncertainty (e.g. task variability, task difficulty and 
supervisor interdependence). In highly institutionalised environments there was found a 
path between both personal and group mode of control and efficiency. Lastly, size 
(larger audits) was associated with higher perceived task variability and difficulty. This 
study gives some support to the Ouchi (1979) and Hofstede (1981) conventional 
wisdom framework (which states that output control is not used under contingencies of 
ambiguity and uncertainty but substituted with clan control), but also to a notion that 
control structures could be complements and not only substitutes. Thus, to me it seems 
as though the isomorphic proposition is highly congruent both with agency theory, 
classical contingency theory, as well as the resource dependence perspective. Control 
models may overlap in organisations, and especially under uncertainty. This seems to 
have been corroborated also by Ramberg’s (1997) study of the Swedish municipalities 
and by the results from the Norwegian local government reported in this thesis. In short, 
the alleged symbolic use of organisational control structures seems to be in need for a 
revision where symbolism only is one part of a broader and more complex picture of 
organisational control under uncertainty.  
 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRACTICE 
 
In this thesis I have sought to pursue simple, critical questions combined with simple 
and basic empirical research in order to enhance our understanding and appreciation of 
positive theory on political institutions. The conventional wisdom contingency theory 
seems to be in need for a closer scrutiny, and replication studies in other settings are 
therefore wanted. The conventional wisdom seems to lack empirical support and may be 
substituted with agency theory, classical contingency theory, the resource dependence 
perspective, isomorphism, or all of these. However, there seems to be a need for more 
empirical studies, and also more thorough empirical studies, than have been employed 
in this thesis. For instance, there are several unresolved issues regarding content analysis 
in organisational control research which might be fruitfully pursued. One issue could be 
exploring how other multivariate estimation methods than linear regression, for instance 
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structural equation modelling with latent variables, or simultaneous equations analysis 
of supply and demand, might have addressed some of the measurement issues.  
The findings in this study may also have implications for policy and practice. 
Specifically, I think it could be worthwile to reintroduce more studies of the classics in 
management theory. This means educational policy should ascertain that some classical 
texts (again) are incorporated into the curriculum of management schools and 
universities. Furthermore, organisational control in political institutions may profit from 
an enhanced understanding of basic welfare theory and of how politics is dealt with both 
through protective structures and by political competition. Both policy makers and 
managers may have relatively more benefits to be reaped by investigating the now 
extensive conceptual and empirical literature on public sector organisational control, 
rather than uncritically employing business management models, or the symbolic 
perspective in new institutionalism without regard for the inherent politics in studies of 
political institutions. However, politics may be both a normative and a positive issue.  
Finally, in order to utilise performance measurement as a local government 
management instrument, it may be called for a strong actor who can impose valid 
definitions and reliable measurement of selected PIs and supervise certain levels of 
development and implementation. In some countries the central government has taken 
such an active role in the implementation of performance measurement systems. In 
some instances the central government also demands disclosure of mandatory PIs from 
local to central government and to the public at large. However, when it comes to the 
question on how specific local governments ought to use performance measurement in 
their own internal management, it should be recalled that PIs are used politically and 
furthermore both are run down and tend to proliferate. Therefore, in order for 
performance measurement to be used, it could be wise to let the organisations select and 
monitor those PIs which at any time are found to be decision relevant from the overall 
performance measurement system.  
 
 
TWO THOUGHTS IN THE CLOSING 
 
In the closing of this thesis, there are two thoughts which in particular cross my mind. 
First, when Moe (1984) reviewed the new economics of organisation with implications 
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for the study of public bureaucracy he argued that provocative positions doubtlessly 
were needed at that point in time in the development of bureaucratic theory. Provocative 
positions were called for in order to stimulate innovative work on public institutions. 
Moe stated that in the long run the interplay of theory and data could produce far more 
complex theories of dynamic political processes and relationships than modellers would 
like, but that such theories would be more representative of political reality than hitherto 
were presented. I believe this position still seems to hold true.  
Second, when I first began questioning the conventional wisdom proposition in 
organisational control, I felt more like a lonely heretic than as a student of organisation. 
However, after a while I discovered that there are many researchers who currently seem 
to reach quite similar conclusions when questioning the conventional wisdom, and 
furthermore, that much of the corresponding conceptual reasoning underlying this 
‘heresy’ in fact is eloquently explained in nothing less than the much cited classics of 
organisation theory. Regardless of the classics or my own empirical findings reported 
above, the conventional wisdom is disputed. The conventional wisdom seems to be 
lacking strong empirical evidence, at the same time as it has its critics and defenders. 
Now, in the closing of this thesis, when I propose the suggestions to incorporate more of 
the classics of organisation theory into the curricula of business and management 
schools and to do more basic but simple empirical enquiries, it feels like storming the 
open doors of management theory. On the other hand, this is, if not what normal science 
ought to be, probably what normal science in organisation and management theory most 
of the time is, given its relatively low level of paradigm development. Consequently, 
what seems as wide open doors to some, could be conceived of as solid walls by others. 
Paradoxically, this highlights the argument for more, and more basic, empirical 
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